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Limom  AND  Seward. 


REMARKS    UPON  THE   MEMORIAL    ADDRESS    OF    CHA8. 

FRANCIS    ADAMS,    ON    THE    LATE    WM.    H. 

SEWARD, 


LYGIDENT8  AND  COMMENTS  ILLUSTRATIVE  OF  THE 
MEASURES  AND  POJLICY  OF  THE  ADMINISTRA- 
TION OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
AND  VIEWS  AS  TO  THE  RELATIVE  POSITIONS  OF  THE 
LATE  PRESIDENT  AND  SECRETARY 
OF  STATE. 


BY 

GIDEON    WELLES, 

Ex-Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


NEW    YORK: 

Sheldon  &  Company. 

1874. 


■p 


^^',^ 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  1874,  by 

SHELDON  &  COMPANY, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


-7'? 


V   V    ^     ^ 

"^^ 


NKWrtUBRH  Sterbotype  Co. 


I>  R  E  F  A.  O  E. 


IN  submitting  the  following  pages,  it  is  proper  that 
the  circumstances  which  led  to,  and  attended  their 
preparation,  should  go  out  with  them.  The  "Memorial 
Address  on  the  life,  character  and  services  of  William 
H.  Seward,"  which  Mr.  Adams  delivered  at  Albany  in 
April'  1873,  by  invitation  of  the  legislature  of  the  State 
of  New  York,  attracted  general  attention,  and  is  a 
document  which,  if  permitted  to  pass  uncorrected,  would 
be  likely  to  contribute  to,  and  strengthen  false  history. 
For  a  third  of  a  century,  Mr.  Seward  occupied  prominent 
positions  in  his  native  state,  and  no  inconsiderable  space 
in  the  service  of  his  country.  It  was  appropriate  that 
the  state  which  had  honored  him  with  its  confidence 
while  living,  should  commemorate  his  death  by  an 
official  observance  such  as  the  legislature  ordered,  and 
Mr.  Adams  was  invited  to  fulfil.  From  a  variety  of 
considerations,  the  selection  of  the  orator  seemed  proper ; 
for  there  was  much  in  his  association  with  the  deceased 
to  commend  it,  and  it  opened  a  field  of  historic  interest 
worthy  of  his  pen.  The  extreme  of  panegyric,  if  the 
eulogist  chose  to  indulge  the  partiality  of  friendship  in 
that  direction,  was  allowable  and  probably  expected  ; 
but  it  was  not  anticipated  that  the  occasion  would  be 
used  to  elevate  the  reputation  of  the  deceased  statesman 
at  the  expense  of  others,  and  certainly  not  by  deprecia- 

397745 


IV  PREFACE. 

ting  or  underrating  the  abilities  of  the  President  under 
whom  he  served.  The  opportunity  might  have  been 
improved  to  say  a  word  in  vindication  of  an  administra- 
tion which  he  had  represented  abroad,  and  of  which  Mr. 
Seward  was  a  conspicuous  member,  for  it  had  in  the 
embittered  contests  of  the  period  been  greatly  maligned, 
misrepresented,  and  misunderstood.  No  small  disap- 
pointment was  experienced  to  find  the  Address  pregnant 
with  error,  and  in  some  respects  an  indorsement  of 
aspersions  derogatory  to  President  Lincoln  and  his 
capacity  for  the  place  he  had  filled,  by  representing  that 
the  merits  and  success  of  his  administration  were  due, 
not  to  him,  but  to  the  superior  intellectual  power  of  the 
Secretary  of  State. 

My  first  impression  on  reading  the  Address  was,  that 
the  surviving  members  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabinet  should 
unite  in  a  general  statement  correcting  the  misrej^resen- 
tations  semi-official ly  put  forth  at  Albany.  Such  a 
statement  from  them,  brief  and  decisive,  without  details, 
would  probably  have  been  sufficient  to  counteract  the 
misrepresentations  and  erroneous  assertions  of  Mr. 
Adams,  as  to  the  relative  merits,  executive  ability  and 
individual  services  of  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
State  during  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration.  Some  cor- 
respondence in  regard  to  such  a  proceeding  took  place 
between  Messrs.  Chase,  Blair,  and  myself,  which  was 
interrupted  by  the  sudden  death  of  the  Chief  Justice 
within  less  than  one  month  after  the  Address  was 
delivered.  This  event  rendered  it  advisable  that  some- 
thing more  should  be  done  than  a  mere  contradictory 
assertion,  or  naked  statement  that  Mr.  Adams  was 
mistaken  in  his  estimate  of  the  two  men  and  their 
relative  positions  to  each  other,  and  to  their  associates 


PEEFACE.  V 

in  the  administration,  as  well  as  to  the  whole  conduct 
of  the  affairs  of  the  government. 

Of  the  eight  persons  who  constituted  the  Executive 
Council,  and  administered  the  government  during  the 
dark  days  of  our  country's  December,  four,  besides  the 
two  eminent  characters  adverted  to  in  the  Memorial  Ad- 
dress, had  closed  their  earthly  pilgrimage.  Only  two  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet  who  first  met  around  that  council- 
board,  and  conferred  together  through  most  of  the  years 
of  President  Lincoln's  Administration,  survived  to  speak 
from  personal  knowledge  of  the  acts,  qualifications  and 
services  of  their  chief,  and  those  with  whom  they  had 
been  associated  in  that  trying  period. 

By-special  request  of  Mr.  Blair,  the  duty  of  stating 
the  facts  and  vindicating  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  adminis- 
tration from  the  errors  or  inadvertencies  of  Mr.  Adams 
devolved  on  me.  To  discharge  that  duty  with  fidelity 
was  a  delicate  and  embarrassing  task,  lest  in  developing 
the  facts  in  regard  to  the  conduct  and  measures  of  the 
administration,  and  repelling  the  remarks  derogatory  to 
President  Lincoln,  it  might  seem  that  injustice  was  done 
to  Secretary  Seward,  to  whom  credit  as  a  superior  to 
the  President  in  native  intellectual  power,  and  in  the 
force  of  moral  discipline,  and  as  directing  affairs  in  the 
President's  name,  had  been  awarded.  But  while  main- 
taining for  Mr.  Lincoln  greater  executive  ability,  I 
would  withhold  no  just  fame  from  Mr.  Seward,  whose 
versatile  and  prolific  mind,  if  less  persistent  and  reliable, 
less  capable  of  establishing  and  enforcing  a  policy,  less 
capable  of  grasping  great  questions  and  successfully 
wielding  the  highest  functions  of  government,  was 
nevertheless  in  his  position,  active,  industrious  and  use- 
ful.    If  disclosures  of  the  truth  dispel  prevailing  error, 


VI  PREFACE. 

let  it  not  be  supposed  that  wrong  is  thereby  done  to  a 
colleague  for  whom  I  had  great  personal  regard. 

Undoubtedly  both  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Seward 
believed  in  1860,  that  Mr.  Lincoln  possessed  neither  the 
abilities  nor  qualifications  to  perform  the  duties  of 
Chief  Magistrate,  and  that  he  would  consequently  be 
governed  by  some  leading  member  of  his  Cabinet.  It 
was  assumed  by  them,  and  indeed  by  others,  that  the 
Secretary  of  State  would  be  that  leading  member  and 
President,  de  facto.  Mr.  Seward  after  a  brief  experience, 
learned  his  mistake.  Mr.  Adams  never  did — nor  does 
it  appear  that  Mr.  Seward,  in  their  intimate  personal 
and  ofiicial  correspondence  undeceived  or  enlightened 
the  Minister  during  his  absence  from  the  country, 
covering  the  entire  presidency  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  Besides, 
a  class  of  partisans  in  all  that  time  busied  themselves  in 
affirming  and  inculcating  the  false  impression  that  Mr. 
Seward  was  the  actual  Executive.  John  Wilkes  Booth, 
like  Mr.  Adams  was  deceived  by  it,  and  hence  in  his 
scheme  to  overturn  and  destroy  the  government,  he 
deemed  it  essential  to  make  Mr.  Seward,  as  well  as  the 
President  a  victim.  The  murderous  attempt  of  a  crazy 
fanatic,  gave  strength  to  the  delusion  which  partisans 
had  promulgated.  Sympathy  for  the  survivor  of  that 
terrible  catastrophe,  who,  wounded  and  mangled,  escaped 
the  knife  of  the  assassin,  seemed  to  identify  him  more 
closely  with  his  chief  who  had  been  slain,  and,  tempo- 
rarily at  least,  added  to  the  delusion  which  finds  en- 
dorsement and  is  embodied  in  the  Memorial  Address. 

In  the  following  pages  I  have  confined  my  remarks 
as  far  as  possible,  to  the  acts,  views  and  transactions  of 
the  President  and  Secretary  of  State  and  measures  of 
administration  during  the  presidency  of  Mr.  Lincoln. 
Allusions   to  other  periods,  or  to   the  private  life  or 


PREFACE.  Vll 

peculiar  characteristics  of  either,  except,  as  preliminary 
or  essential  to  a  correct  understanding  of  their  official 
career,  and  political  principles  have  been  avoided.  In 
stating  the  views  and  policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  it  has  been 
no  part  of  my  purpose  to  discuss  the  labors  or  services 
of  Mr.  Seward,  other  than  those  which  relate  to  the 
administration  of  which  he  was  a  member,  not  the  chief. 
Whatever  estimate  may  be  put  upon  his  abilities — 
whatever  resemblance  there  may  have  been  between, 
him  and  the  renowned  men  of  antiquity,  or  the  distin- 
guished statesmen  of  our  own  country  of  a  past  genera- 
tion, or  whatever  may  have  been  his  experience  in 
other  years,  and  in  different  fields  of  public,  professional, 
or  social  life,  are  proper  matters  of  eulogy,  but  foreign  to 
the  purpose  of  these  remarks. 

Incidents  and  measures  which  occurred,  better  than 
statements  or  assertions,  will  disabuse  the  public  mind 
and  more  truly  than  mere  declarations  develop  the 
characteristics  of  the  men  and  the  workings  of  the 
administration.  I  have  therefore  selected  certain  cases 
on  different  topics,  which  denote  the  ideas,  executive 
ability  and  principles  of  government  of  the  President 
and  Secretary  of  State  on  questions  of  public  policy. 
They  also  indicate  the  actual  relation  in  which  they 
stood  to  each  other,  and  their  associates  in  the  Cabinet. 
The  cases  mentioned  relate  to  by-gone  measures  which 
have  been  adjusted  or  disposed  of,  and  are  parts  of  the 
recorded,  though  to  some  extent,  unpublished  history 
of  the  country  and  times. 

The  remarks  on  the  Address  as  originally  prepared 
were  too  voluminous  for  a  Magazine.  I  therefore  con- 
densed and  reduced  them  to  three  papers  which  ap- 
peared in  the  Galaxy  for  October,  November  and 
December  1873.     The  reception  of  those  papers  by  the 


VIU  PREFACE. 

public,  led  the  publishers  and  others  to  request  that  the 
numbers  which  had  appeared,  and  the  whole  of  the 
omitted  portions  with  attending  details  and  such 
additions  as  I  thought  proper,  might  be  embodied  in  a 
volume,  which  is  herewith  submitted. 

G.  W. 


Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Seward. 


XT  is  to  be  regretted  that  Mr.  Charles  Francis 
Adams,  in  his  "Memorial  Address  on  the  Life, 
Character,  and  Services  of  William  H.  Seward," 
should  have  permitted  himself  to  do  injustice  to  Abra- 
ham Lincoln.  Any  attempt  to  canonize  Mr.  Seward 
by  detracting  from  the  merits  of  his  chief  weakens 
the  encomiums  bestowed.  Mr.  Adams  has  claims  to 
consideration  by  reason  of  his  talents,  acquirements, 
social  position,  and  public  service ;  but  his  estimate 
of  the  character,  capacity,  executive  ability,  and  rela- 
tive position  of  the  Chief  Magistrate  and  his  Secretary 
of  State  betrays  a  want  of  just  discrimination  and  cor- 
rect knowledge  of  each.  A  greater  error  could  scarce- 
ly be  committed  than  to  represent  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
"  had  to  deal  with  a  superior  intelectual  power  "  when 
he  came  in  contact  with  Mr.  Seward.  The  reverse 
was  the  fact.  In  mere  scholastic  acquirements  "  Mr. 
Seward,  never  a  learned  man,"  may  have  had  the  ad- 
vantage, though  in  this  respect  there  was  less  differ- 
ence than  is  generally  supposed  ;  while  "  in  breadth 
of  philosophical  experience  and  in  the  force  of  moral 
discipline "  the  almost  self-taught  and  reflective  mind 


8  '     ''    'mR.    LINdOLNAND   MR.    SEWARD. 

of  Mr.  Lincoln,  which  surmounted  difficulties  and  dis- 
advantages that  his  Secretary  never  knew,  conspicuous- 
ly excelled.  In  the  executive  council  and  in  measures 
of  administration  the  Secretary  had  influence,  not 
always  happily  exercised ;  but  the  President's  was  the 
master  mind.  It  is  empty  panegyric  to  speak  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  as  chief,- or  to  say  his  suggestions, 
save  in  his  own  department,  were  more  regarded  or 
had  even  greater  influence  than  those  of  others.  His 
restless  activity,  unceasing  labors,  showy  manifesta- 
tions, and  sometimes  incautious  exercise  of  ques- 
tionable authority  which  the  President  deemed  it 
impolitic  to  disavow,  led  to  the  impression,  which  Mr. 
Adams  seem&  also  to  have  imbibed,  that  the  subordi- 
nate was  the  principal,  and  have  induced  him,  to  use 
his  own  words,  to  "  award  to  one  honors  that  clearly 
belong  to  another." 

.Far  be  it  from  me  to  derogate  in  the  least  from  the 
merits  and  services  of  Mr.  Seward,  for  I  was  a  witness 
to  his  assiduity,  and  to  some  exteut  a  participant  and 
coadjutor  with  him  in  the  labors  and  trials  that  the 
Administration  encountered  in  troublous  times.  But 
it  was  not  necessary  in  stating  his  merits,  even  in 
eulogy,  to  undervalue  and  misstate  the  worth,  services, 
and  capabilities  of  the  remarkable  man  who  was  at 
the  helm  and  guided  the  Government  througli  a 
stormy  period.  Unassuming  and  unpretentious  him- 
self, Mr.  Lincoln  was  the  last  person  to  wear  borrowed 
honors.  He  was  not  afflicted  with  the  petty  jealousy 
of  narrow  minds,  nor  had  he  any  apprehension  that 
others  would  deprive  him  of  just  fame.  He  gave  to 
Mr.  Seward,  as  to  each  of  his  council,  his  generous 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWARD. 


{    ' 


confidence,  and  patiently  listened,  if  he  did  not  always 
adopt  or  assent  to  the  suggestions  that  were  made. 
To  those  who  knew  Abraham  Lincoln,  or  who  were  at 
all  intimate  with  his  Administration,  the  representation 
that  he  was  subordinate  to  any  member  of  his  Cabinet, 
or  that  he  was  deficient  in  executive  or  administrative 
ability,  is  absurd.  Made  on  a  solemn  occasion  as  was 
this  address,  and  published  and  sent  out  to  the  world  in 
a  document  which  purports  to  be  not  only  eulogistic  but 
historic,  it  is  essential  that  the  errors  thus  spread  abroad 
should  be  corrected.  Mr.  Adams  had  not  an  intimate 
acquaintance  with  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  evidently  but  a 
slight  general  knowledge  of  his  character.  With  ad- 
mitted great  disappointment  and  disgust,  he,  in  May 
1861,  received  the  intelligence  that  this  lawyer,  legis- 
lator, and  political  student  of  the  praries,  whom  he  did 
not  know  and  with  whom  he  had  not  associated,  had 
been  preferred  by  the  Republican  representatives  at 
Chicago  over  a  Senator  from  the  Empire  State  with 
whom  he  was  intimate  and  familiar,  who  had  long 
official  experience,  which  he  seems  to  have  considered 
essential,  was  acquainted  with  legislative  management, 
and  whose  political  and  party  'sympathies  accorded 
with  his  own.  His  prejudices  as  well  as  his  partiality 
were  excited,  and  from  the  beginning  he  misconceived 
the  character  and  undervalued  and  underrated  the  ca- 
pabilities and  qualities  of  one  of  the  most  sagacious  and 
remarkable  men  of  the  age. 

In  his  statements  of  the  political  career  of  Mr. 
Seward,  and  of  the  structure  and  condition  of  parties 
from  the  days  of  the  Monroe  administration,  one  is 
compelled  to  believe  the  eulogist  has,  as  he  expresses 


10  ME.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

it,  plunged  in  "  the  Serbonian  bog  of  obsolete  party- 
politics."  Yet  politics  and  parties  are  an  essential  part 
of  the  history  of  the  country,  its  men  and  the  times,  and 
the  author  himself  has  made  politics  the  study  of  his  life. 
Mr.  Seward  was  also  emphatically  a  party  politician. 
He  had  a  fondness  for  political  studies  and  employment, 
and  was  at  all  times  active  and  faithful  in  the  service 
of  each  of  the  several  political  parties  to  which  he  be- 
longed. Whether  "  the  chief  characteristic  of  his  mind 
was  its  breadth  of  view  "  may  be  questioned  by  some 
who  look  to  his  general  course  and  form  their  opinion 
of  his  ''characteristics  "  from  it  and  his  acts.  If  not, 
as  is  asserted,  a  "  philosopher  studying  politics,"  he 
was  kind  and  affable,  of  a  genial  temperament,  calm  and 
subdued  under  reverses,  and  to  his  credit  never  mani- 
fested the  malevolence  and  acerbity  which  too  of  ten  char- 
acterize intense  political  partisans.  Among  his  party  as- 
sociates he  always  occupied  a  decidedly  prominent  place, 
by  reason  of  his  sociability  and  urbanity  as  well  as  of^ 
his  ability.  He  was  quick  of  apprehension,  prolific  in 
suggestions  and  expedients,  and  endowed,  if  not  with 
eloquence  or  a  commanding  presence,  with  a  readiness 
and  facility  of  expression  in  speech  or  writing  which 
enabled  him  in  consultations,  and  when  associated  with 
others,  to  carry  personal  influence  equal  to  any,  and 
much  greater  than  most  of  his  contemporaries.  He 
had  not,  however,  an  executive  mind  which  could  of 
itself  magnetize  and  subordinate  others,  or  the  mental 
strength  to  take  the  helm  and  steadily  guide  and  direct 
the  policy  of  the  government  or  of  a  party.  Henry 
Clay  once  said,  "  Mr.  Seward  is  a  man  of  no  convic- 
tions."   This  may  not  have  been  strictly  true,  yet  he 


ME.    LINCOLN    AND   ME.    8EWAED.  (^ 11 

was  not  a  man  of  fixed  principles,  whose  convictions 
would  not  yield  to  circumstances  or  be  modified  by  ex- 
pedients, some  of  which  might  be  scarcely  worthy  of 
consideration.  He  could  be  as  tenacious  as  any  in  ad- 
hering to  a  measure  or  policy  so  long  as  his  associates, 
or  those  friends  in  whom  he  trusted,  maintained  the 
position  ;  but  alone,  he  had  not  the  will,  self-reliance, 
and  obstinancy  to  plant  himself  on  the  rock  of  princi- 
ple, meet  the  storm,  and  abide  the  consequences. 

Mr.  Seward  was  a  politician — a  partisan  politician 
of  the  central  school — with  talents  more  versatile  than 
profound ;  was  more  of  a  conservative  than  a  reformer, 
with  no  great  original  conceptions  of  right,  nor  sys- 
tematic ideas  of  administration.  So  far  as  his  party 
adopted  a  reforming  policy  he  went  with  it,  and  he 
was  with  it  also  in  opposing  actual  reforms  by  the 
Democrats.  The  representation  that  he  was  a  veteran 
reformer,  or  the  leader  of  the  anti-slavery  movement 
or  of  the  Republican  party,  is  a  mistake.  He  was 
neither  an  Abolitionist  nor  a  Free-soiler,  nor  did  he 
unite  with  the  Republicans  until  the  Whig  party 
virtually  ceased  to  exist  in  most  of  the  states,  and  was 
himself  one  of  the  last  to  give  up  that  party,  of  which 
he  had  been  from  its  commencement  and  in  all  its 
phases  an  active  member.  It  was  with  reluctance  he 
finally  yielded,  when  the  feeble  remnant  of  that  organi- 
zation disbanded.  The  Republican  party,  with  which 
he  then  became  associated,  was  not  of  mushroom 
growth.  It  was  years  maturing.  Mr.  Seward,  whose 
friends  claim  for  hijn  its  paternity,  was  a  Whig  at  its 
inception.  He  neither  rocked  its  cradle  nor  identified 
himself  with  its  youth,  but  gave  it  cheering  words,  as 


12  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MB.    SEWARD. 

he  had   other  ephemeral  organizations,  in   order  to 
weaken  the  Democrats  and  help  tlie  Whigs.     Faithful 
to  party,  he  adhered  to  the  Whigs  under  all  circum- 
stances.     It  was  his   marked    public   characteristic. 
Not  until  the  Whig  party   was  prostrate — a  skeleton 
without  strength  or  vitality — did  he  yield  and  embark 
his  political  fortunes  in    the  great  uprising.     In  the 
destruction  of  the  political  scalfolding  which  he  and 
his  friends  had  constructed,  perished  the  hopes  and 
labors  of  years.     To  relinquish  the  machinery   and 
organization  which   by  lobby   management   under  a 
skilful  leader  had  become  powerful  and  controlling  in 
the  Empire  State  of  the  Union,  was  a  sacrifice  not 
willingly  made,  and  when  made  it  was  not  in  the  anti- 
slavery  interest,  but  with  a  covert  design  to  perpetu- 
ate the  Albany  dynasty  under  the  name  of  Republican. 
The  Albany  lobby  was  never  an  abolitionist  lobby  or 
an  anti-slavery  lobby,  nor  was  the  organization  or  its 
candidate.     Any  attempt  to  represent  him,  or  those 
associated  with   him,  as  occupying  a  more  advanced 
position  on  the  anti-slavery  question  than  those  who 
were  of  the  "  Jefferson  school,"  is  rather  eulogy  than 
fact.     In  the  presidential  contest  of  1848,  when  the 
domination  of  previously  existing  parties  was  broken, 
and  a  stand  was  made  against  the  expansion  of  slavery 
and  its  extension  into  the  territories  from  which  it  had 
been  excluded,  Mr.  Seward  delined  to  connect  himself 
with  the  Free-soil  or  Anti-slaver}^  cause,  but  clung  to 
the  Whig  party  which   opposed  the  movement,  and 
voted  for  a  candidate  who  was  a  slave-owner  in  prefer- 
ence to  a  statesman  and  citizen  of  his  own  State  who 
was  not. 


MK.    LINCOLN   AND   ME.    SEWARD.  13 

According  to  Mr.  Adams,  "  the  origin  of  the  divis- 
ion of  parties  which  prevailed  for  more  than  thirty 
years,"  began  about  the  close  of  the  first  quarter  of 
the  present  century,  soon  after  the  adoption  of  the 
Missouri  compromise,  consequently  in  the  opening 
years  of  Mr.  Seward's  manhood  and  political  life. 
**  At  the  outset  of  Mr.  Seward's  career,"  says  the  ad- 
dress, "  the  first  thing  necessary  for  him  to  do  was 
to  choose  his  side.     Under  his  father's  roof  the  in- 

^  fluence's  naturally  carried  him  to  sympathize  with  the 
old  Jefi'ersonian  party  on  the  one  hand,  while  the 
relics  of  the  slave  system  remaining  in  the  family  as 

'house-servants,  the  least  repulsive  form  of  that  rela- 
tion seemed  little  likely  to  inspire  in  him  much  aver- 
sion to  it  on  the  other.  JSTevertheless  he  early  formed 
his  conclusions  adversely  to  the  organization  in  JSTew 
York  professing  to  be  the  successors  of  the  Jefferso- 
nian  school,  and  not  less  so  to  the  perpetuation  of 
slavery  any  where.  The  reason  for  this  is  obvious. 
With  his  keen  perception  of  the  operation  of  general 
principles  he  penetrated  at  once  the  fact  that  the  resur- 
rection in  this  form  of  the  old  party  was  not  only  hol- 
low but  selfish.  It  looked  to  him  somewhat  like  a  close 
corporation  made  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  in  popular 
doctrines,  not  so  much  for  the  public  benefit  as  for 
that  of  the  individual  directors.  Moreover  it  became 
clear  that  among  those  doctrines,  that  of  freedom  to 
the  slave  was  rigorously  excluded  by  reason  of  the  bond 
of  union  entered  into  with  his  master  at  the  south. 
In  reality,  he  was  in  principle  too  democratic  for  the 
democrats.     Hence  he  waged  incessant   war   against 


14:  ME.    LESrCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWAKD. 

this  form  of  oligarchy  down  to  the  hour  when  it  was 
finally  broken  up." 

In  addition  to  this  fact  or  fancy  sketch,  Mr.  Adams 
says  that  in  a  Fourth  of  July  oration  delivered  by  Mr. 
Seward  at  Auburn  when  he  was  twenty-four  years  old, 
he  made  "the  deliberate  claim  of  a  right  in  the  Fed- 
eral government  to  emancipate  slaves  hy  legislation,^^ 
and  that  "  in  his  conclusions  he  proved  a  prophet." 
Jefferson,  though  sincerely  opposed  to  slavery,  was  not 
of  the  prophets  or  politicians  who  made  claim  to  any 
such  right  in  the  Federal  government.  Had  he  made 
such  claims,  or  believed  that  there  was  any  such  author- 
ity or  principle  in  the  government,  his  love  of  freedom 
was  so  great,  and  his  principles  and  convictions  so 
abiding  he  would  never  have  advised  its  relinquish- 
ment, or  consented  that  the  government  and  people 
should  be  forever  bound  by  a  fundamental  law  incor- 
porated into  the  constitution  and  made  unrepealable 
prohibiting  legislation  through  all  time  whatever,  in 
the  progress  of  human  affairs  might  be  the  opinions  and 
wishes  of  the  people.  But  Mr.  Seward  who  we  are 
told  "  waged  incessant  war  against  this  form  of  oligar- 
chy down  to  the  hour  when  it  was  finally  broken  up," 
was  ready  when  sixty  years  old  to  manacle  Congress 
and,  so  far  as  the  Federal  government  was  concerned, 
to  consign  the  slaves  to  perpetual  bondage.  In  his 
carefully  elaborated  and  celebrated  speech  delivered  on 
the  twelfth  of  January  1861,  he  said  :  "  I  am  willing 
to  vote  for  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  declar- 
ing that  it  shall  not,  by  any  future  amendment,  be  so 
altered  as  to  confer  on  Congress  a  power  to  abolish 
or  interfere  with. slavery  in  any  state."     It  is  for  the 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MK.    SEWAED.  15 

author  of  the  Memorial  Address  who  speaks  of  inces- 
sant war  against  the  slave-oligarchy  down  to  the  hour 
when  it  was  finally  broken  up,  to  reconcile  the  claim 
put  forth  by  Mr.  Seward  when  twenty-four  years  old, 
that  the  Federal  government  had  a  right  to  emancipate 
by  legislation,  with  his  willingness  after  forty  years 
experience  and  study  of  the  government,  to  surrender 
any  such  claim  or  right  forever. 

The  disposition  of  the  financial  and  tariff  questions 
which  for  years  divided  parties  under  renowned  lead- 
ers, and  the  Mexican  war  with  its  results  during  the 
Polk  administration,  affected  the  political  status  of 
individuals  and  also  the  organization  of  parties.  Clay, 
Calhoun,  and  Webster,  the  intellectual  and  imperious 
triumvirate  who  combined  against  Jackson  fifteen 
years  before,  were  each  infirm  from  increasing  years, 
and  on  the  descending  grade  of  life  and  influence.  In 
1849  they  retained,  individually,  but  a  feeble  hold  on 
fheir  followers.  Yan  Buren  and  Benton  were  no 
longer  formidable.  With  the  departure  of  old  ques- 
tions, the  old  contestants  were  passing  away.  It  was 
just  at  this  period,  when  old  political  parties  were  in 
a  fragmentary  and  transition  state,  that  Mr.  Seward 
first  entered  the  national  councils  as  a  Senator  from 
the  great  State  of  New  York.  ISTo  time  could  have 
been  more  propitious  or  circumstances  more  favorable 
for  a  genuine  reformer — a  statesman  of  mental  grasp 
and  real  executive  talent,  sincere  in  his  convictions  and 
wedded  to  principle,  'with  the  advantage  of  high 
position,  to  have  gathered  up,  concentrated  and  organ- 
ized the  disturbed  political  elements  which  were  dis- 
satisfied with  government  abuses  and  central  aggres- 


16  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

sive  power  in  behalf  of  an  institution  which  was  toler- 
ated but  disliked,  and, its  extension  tod  aggressions 
resisted.  This  was  an  opportunity  for  a  statesman,  in 
place  if  possessed  of  the  indispensable  executive  ability, 
to  have  made  himself  the  leader  of  a  great  movement. 
But  Mr.  Seward  did  not  prove  himself  equal  to  the  posi- 
tion. He  was  still  a  Whig  and  failed  to  raise  the  stand- 
ard and  rally  the  host.  In  opposing  the  assumptions 
of  a  civil  aggression,  he  was  one  with  others,  not  their 
superior  nor  their  chief.  Though  quick  of  apprehen- 
sion and  not  insensible  to  the  new  aspect  of  affairs  and 
the  change  that  was  taking  place,  he  had  neither  the 
resolution  nor  the  inclination  to  abandon  his  party, 
"  break  up  the  remnants  of  party  ties,"  and  place  him- 
self at  the  head  of  a  popular  demonstration  for  immor- 
tal principles.  He  had  been  a  life-long  party  follower 
— had  trod  the  paths  and  ruts  of  party  obediently  and 
faithfully,  tind  been  so  trained  and  disciplined,  so 
accustomed  to  look  up  to  others  to  decide  and  lead, 
that  no  will  or  independence  w^as  left  him  at  fifty  to 
take  the  initiative  in  a  new  departure.  He  had  the 
sagacity  to  see  that  new  questions  were  entering  into 
our  politics  and  old  ones  were  becoming  obsolete,  but 
possessed  not  the  courage  to  abandon  the  old,  nor  the 
organizing  and  executive  talent  to  become  the  chief  in 
a  new  movement.  Contrary  to  good  instruction  and 
sound  principle,  he  and  the  Albany  managers  at- 
tempted to  put  this  new  Repubhcan.  wine  into  old 
Whig  bottles,  under  the  delusive  idea  that  the  effete 
and  decaying  Whig  organization  could  receive  and 
hold  this  fermenting  political  element  without  burst- 
ing.    He  made  able  speeches  on  the  rising  questions, 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  17 

as  did  others ;  but  the  Senate  produced  no  command- 
ing mind,  with  "  clarion  voice"  and  magnetic  power, 
to  rally  and  lead.  Mr.  Seward  had  adventitious 
advantages  above  others  which  his  associates  felt  and 
conceded.  He  had  been  Governor  of  the  largest 
State  in  the  Union,  was  its  representative  in  Congress, 
and  stood  the  peer  of  any  of  his  associates  on  the  floor 
of  the  Senate,  but  only  the  peer.  Neither  in  Con- 
gress nor  subsequently  in  the  Cabinet  did  he  display 
the  administrative  or  executive  talent  that  was  antici- 
"pated,  or  which  partisan  admirers  claim  for  him  at 
the  expense  of  Mr.  Lincoln. 

In  closing  his  "  Memorial  Address''  Mr.  Adams 
alludes  to  the  friends  of  Mr.  Seward,  and  particularly 
one  who  survives,  *'  whose  singularly  disinterested 
labor  has  been  to  effect  the  elevation  of  others  to 
power,  and  never  his  own ;  and  to  whose  remarkable 
address  I  strongly  suspect  Mr.  Seward  owed  many 
obligations  of  that  kind."  No  person  in  the  least  con- 
versant with  the  two  men  could  have  heard  or  read  the 
address  without  a  conviction,  even  if  no  acknowledg- 
ment had  been  made,  that  the  spirit  of  the  friend 
inspired  and  imbued  the  orator  with  the  partialities, 
prejudices,  misconceptions,  and  errors  which  pervade 
the  address  and  are  manifest  on  almost  every  page. 

Mr.  Thurlow  Weed,  who  for  forty  years  was  the 
ruling  mind  of  the  party  with  which  he  was  associated 
in  New  York,  possessed  remarkable  qualities  as  a  party 
manager.  The  character  and  services  of  Mr.  Seward 
can  never  be  delineated  or  understood  without  mention 
of  this  alter  egOy  who  was  not  only  his  fidus  Achates, 
but  it  may  without,  disparagement  be  said  was  also, 


18  MB.    LINCOLN   AND   MK.    SEWARD. 

with  some  radical  failings,  his  Mentor,  Mr.  "Weed,  a 
man  of  strong,  rough  native  intellect,  without  much 
early  culture,  was  a  few  years  the  senior  of  Mr.  Seward, 
whose  more  polished  and  facile  mind  adapted  itself  to 
the  other — clung  to  it  as  the  ivy  to  the  oak — and  the 
two  became  inseparable  in  politics.  When  Mr.  Seward 
was  about  to  *^  choose  his  side,''  Weed  was  the  editor 
of  a  paper  in  western  New  York,  which  fomented  the 
wild,  fanatical,  and  proscriptive  antimasonic  excite- 
ment that  for  a  brief  period  swept  with  uncontrollable 
and  unreasoning  fury  that  section  of  country.  An 
organized  party  was  formed  on  the  narrow  basis  of 
hate,  intolerance,  and  proscription  of  every  man  who 
belonged  to  the  Masonic  fraternity,  every  one  of 
whom  was  to  be  excluded  from  office,  from  the  jury- 
box  and  all  places  of  trust.  Under  this  anti-masonic 
banner,  of  which  Weed  was  a  champion  leader,  Mr. 
Seward  enlisted  and  commenced  his  public  official 
career,  was  its  candidate  in  that  district,  and  elected 
by  that  party  to  the  Senate  of  New  York.  Many  will 
believe  that  he  did  not  manifest  great  "breadth  of 
view,"  nor  prove  himself  a  profound  *' philosopher 
studying  politics,"  nor  display  the  "  capacity  to  play  a 
noble  part  on  the  more  spacious  theatre  of  State 
affairs,"  when  he  entered  the  Senate  of  New  York  an 
anti-masonic  partisan  under  the  guidance  of  Thurlow 
Weed.  But  the  friendship  commenced  under  those 
auspices  continued  unabated  to  the  death  of  the  junior, 
and  evinces  itself  in  the  "  Memorial  Address"  which 
attempts  to  place  Mr.  Seward  above  the  President  to 
whom  he  was  subordinate,  and  "  award  to  him  honors 
that  clearly  belong  to  another." 


ME.    LINCOLN    AND    MB.    SEWARD.  19 

Mr.  Weed  possessed  capacity  which  rightly  direct- 
ed might  have  been  of  service  to  the  country  and  to 
mankind.  He  was  not  without  good  qualities  when 
party  and  personal  favorites  or  opponents  were  not 
concerned ;  but  he  was  wanting  in  political  morality, 
and  was  unscrupulous  in  his  party  intrigues — often 
and  without  hesitation  resorting  to  schemes  to  carry  a 
measure  in  the  Legislature,  or  to  secure  an  election, 
which  scarcely  savored  of  political  or  moral  honesty. 

When  the  anti-masonic  fervor  subsided  and  the 
organization  died  out,  Messrs.  Seward  and  Weed  be- 
came identified  with  the  opponents  of  the  Jackson  ad- 
ministration and  the  supporters  of  "  the  American 
system" — a  centralizing  policy.  The  address  repre- 
sents that  "  the  political  unity  of  the  country  under  its 
present  form  oi  government  naturally  divides  itself 
into  two  periods  of  nearly  equal  length."  One,  which 
commenced  with  Washington  and  closed  with  Monroe, 
related  chiefly  to  questions  of  foreign  policy.  The 
other  was  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  There  is  no  such 
natural  division.  The  statement  is  neither  politically 
nor  historically  correct,  but  an  arbitrary  assumption, 
warranted  by  neither  history  nor  facts.  The  slavery 
question  in  no  form  or  shape  entered  into  the  election 
or  administration  of  General  Jackson  or  the  great 
parties  of  that  period.  Other  absorbing  subjects,  re- 
lating to  the  bank,  to  finance,  to  the  tariff  and  internal 
improvements,  combined  under  what  in  the  party  no- 
menclature of  the  day  was  styled  the  ''  American  sys- 
tem," were  the  political  and  party  issues  for  a  quarter 
of  a  century  succeeding  the  Monroe  administration. 
It  was  then,  ''  at  the  outset  of  Mr.  Seward's  career," 


20  MB.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWAKD. 

when  there  was  no  controversy  or  difference  in  State 
or  national  parties  or  politics  on  the  subject  of  slavery 
that  Weed  and  "  the  philosopher  studying  politics," 
chose  their  side,  opposed  Jackson,  supported  Clay,  ad- 
vocated a  national  bank,  a  protective  tariff,  internal 
improvements  by  the  federal  government,  and  the 
whole  centralizing  "American  system.''  There  was 
no  identification  of  either  of  the  great  opposing  par- 
ties of  that  day  with  slavery  or  anti-slavery.  From 
1828,  when  Jackson  was  elected,  to  the  election  of 
Taylor  in  1848,  neither  party  made  the  subject  of  sla- 
very a  test  question,  or  part  of  its  political  creed.  Op- 
position to  General  Jackson  and  his  administration, 
and  to  the  policy  initiated  under  him,  to  state  rights 
and  constitutional  limitations,  combined  the  adverse 
elements  and  was  the  ground-work  of  the  Whig  party, 
\o  which  in  all  its  phases  Mr.  Seward  was  a  devoted 
adherent.  A  coalition  was  formed  by  the  Whigs  with 
the  nullifiers,  who  were  slave-holders,  and  at  a  later 
day  secessionists,  against  the  patriotic  old  chieftain 
who  put  forth  the  executive  power  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  federal  union.  But  the  tariff,  not  sla- 
very, was  the  pretext  for  nullification,  and  opposition  to 
the  administration  was  the  apology  for  a  compromise 
in  which  both  the  protectionists  and  nullifiers  surren- 
dered each  their  principles. 

Then,  and  until  some  time  past  the  meridian  of  his 
life — a  period  of  more  than  twenty  years — Mr.  Seward 
was,  for  reasons  doubtless  satisfactory  to  himself,  one 
of  the  most  zealous  and  active  party  men  in  the  coun- 
try. With  him  every  side-issue,  every  controverted 
question,  every  element  of  discontent  against  the  gov- 


■a 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    8EWAKD.  21 

emment,  was  courted,  fanned,  favored,  and  made  subser- 
vient to  party.  This  embraces  the  period  when,  accord- 
ing to  the  address,  Mr.  Seward  chose  his  side  adversely 
to  the  organization  of  the  Jefferson  school,  was  "  too 
democratic  for  the  Democrats,"  was  *'  far  more  practi- 
cal than  anything  ever  taught  by  Jefferson."  This  pe- 
culiar democracy  and  anti-masonry  constitute  what  the 
address  describes  as  "  the  various  phenomena  of  Mr. 
Seward's  public  life,"  but  which  his  contemporaries 
understood  to  be  political  partnership  of  a  very  active 
and  decided  character.  In  New  York  and  throughout 
the  country  Mr.  Seward  was  known  and  recognized  as 
a  busy  and  efficient  party  man  in  the  Whig  organiza- 
tion, and  one  of  the  leaders  to  whom  the  party  in  that 
state  was  under  obligation  for  partisan  services.  His 
sphere  of  influence  w^as  limited  to  his  state,  for  beyond 
its  borders  the  corrupt  Albany  lobby  led  and  managed 
by  Weed  was  detested  by  the  Democrats  and  dis- 
trusted by  the  Whigs  themselves.  Whatever  abilities 
or  qualities  of  mind  he  possessed — and  they  were  in 
some  respects  remarkable — were  given  earnestly  and 
cheerfully  to  that  party  and  its  centralizing  "  Ameri- 
can system  "  policy.  In  their  party  councils  in  New 
York,  Thurlow  Weed  became  tlje  supreme  manager, 
and  guiding,  controlling  spirit,  always  declining  office. 
Mr.  Seward  was  the  orator  or  oracle,  and  received  the 
official  honors.  When  anti-masonry  was  on  the  wane, 
and  after  Mr.  Seward  entered  the  New  York  Senate, 
Weed  removed  to  Albany,  where  he  established  a 
paper  and  exercised  with  skill  and  effect  his  love  of 
intrigue.  He  soon  organized  and  became  chief  of  a 
lobby  which  had  an  odious  notoriety,  and  which,  while 


22  ME.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

it  gave  him  a  certain  influence  in  ]^ew  Yoik,  was 
viewed  with  abhorrence  bj  many,  with  distrust  by  the 
whole  country.  His  management  was,  however, 
adroit ;  and  the  lobby  under  his  direction,  though 
often  profligate,  unscrupulous,  and  always  debauching 
and  corrupting,  contributed  at  times  largely  to  the  suc- 
cess of  his  party  and  the  promotion  of  Mr.  Seward. 
The  personal  influence  of  Weed  was  enhanced  and  made 
efiective  by  his  apparent  self-abnegation  and  uniform 
and  persistent  refusal  to  accept  any  office  himself, 
while  all  around  him  were  seeking  office  and  legisla- 
tive favors.  His  labors  were  not  as  disinterested  as 
represented  ;  for  if  he  declined  place  he  loved  power, 
and  it  was  his  pride  and  ambition  to  manage  the  gov- 
ernment of  l^ew  York  when  the  Whigs  were  success- 
ful and  in  the  ascendant,  to  say  who  might  hold  office, 
to  control  measures,  and  to  prescribe  the  policy  and 
direct  the  movements  of  his  party — not  always  perhaps 
judiciously  or  honestly  in  either  respect ;  but  the  ad- 
ministration in  that  State,  its  measures  and  men,  were 
nevertheless  his.  The  mental  force,  magnetism,  sys- 
tem, and  will  of  the  man  were  artful,  but  imperious 
and  indisputable  with  his  party,  yet  were  shrewdly 
and  in  general  discreetly  exercised.  Mr.  Seward,  ever 
preadvised  and  consulted,  was  his  exponent  in  the  Le- 
gislature and  in  party  councils,  and  the  advocate  or  op- 
ponent of  the  measures  and  men  as  prescribed,  with 
his  concurrence  by  Weed.  Although  the  latter  never 
sought  office  for  himself,  he  always  wanted  high  place 
for  Seward,  who  was  his  cherished  and  almost  idolized 
political  offspring,  with  whom  he  never  disagreed,  and 
who  never  went  counter  to  him.     The  two  always 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MK.    SEWARD.  23 

acted  in  concert.  It  was  interesting  to  witness  their 
joint  operations.  "Weed's  mind  had  by  far  the  greatest 
vigor,  Seward's  the  most  pliability.  It  was  so  in  their 
anti-masonic  days.  It  was  so  to  the  close.  Weed's 
apparently  disinterested  labors  were  selfish,  yet  given 
with  devoted  and  unsparing  fidelity  to  his  friend 
Seward,  who  might  wear  the  honors  while  he  was  the 
substantial  power  behind.  Their  ideas  of  government 
were  always  personal,  when  their  party  was  in  power 
they  were  the  state.  Mr.  Adams  "  strongly  suspects 
!Mr.  Seward  owed  many  obligations  "  to  Mr.  Weed. 
It  was  never  suspicion  among  those  who  knew  them, 
but  an  unquestioned  and  indisputable  fact.  Mr.  Sew- 
ard himself  acknowledged  it  with  apparent  satisfaction. 
I  once  heard  him  declare,  others  being  present, ''  Sew- 
ard is  Weed  and  Weed  is  Seward.  What  I  do.  Weed 
approves.  What  he  says,  I  endorse.  We  are  one." 
**  I  am  sorry  to  hear  the  remark,"  said  the  late  Chief 
Justice  Chase^  **  for  while  I  would  strain  a  point  to 
oblige  Mr.  Seward,  I  feel  under  no  obligations  to  do 
anything  for  the  special  benefit  of  Mr.  Weed.  The 
two  are  not  and  never  can  be  one  to  me." 
Mr.  Adams  declares,  as  historical  truth : 

"The  fact  is  beyond  contradiction  that  no  person 
ever  before  nominated,  with  any  reasonable  probability 
of  success  had  so  little  of  public  service  to  show  for  his 
reward.  .  .  .  The  President  elect  was  [in  the  winter  of 
1861]  still  at  home  in  Illinois  giving  no  signs  of  life.  .  . 
That  which  appeared  most  appalling  was  the  fact  that 
we  were  to  have  for  our  guide  through  this  perilous 
strife  a  person  sjelected  partly  on  account  of  the  absence 
of  positive  qualities,  so  far  as  was  known  to  the  public, 


24  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

and  absolutely  without  the  advantage  of  any  experience 
in  national  affairs,  beyond  the  little  that  can  be  learned 
by  an  occupation  of  two  years  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives  It  was  clear,  at  least  to  me,  that  our 

chance  of  success  would  rest  upon  an  executive  council 
composed  of  the  wisest  and  most  experienced  men  that 
could  be  found.  So  it  seemed  absolutely  indispensable 
on  every  account  that  not  only  should  Mr.  Seward  have 
been  early  secured  in  a  prominent  post,  but  that  his 
advice  at  least  should  have  been  asked  in  regard  to  the 
completion  of  that  organization.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  ast 
yet  knew  little  of  all  this.  His  mind  had  not  even 
opened  to  the  nature  of  the  contest.  From  his  secluded 
home  in  the  heart  of  Illinois,  he  was  only  taking  meas- 
ure of  his  geographical  relations  and  party  services,  and 
beginning  his  operations  where  others  commonly  leave 
off,  at  the  smaller  end.  Hence,  it  was  at  quite  a  late 
period  of  the  session  before  he  had  disclosed  his  inten- 
tion to  put  Mr.  Seward  in  the  most  prominent  place.  .  .  . 
It  is  the  duty  of  history,  in  dealing  with  all  human 
events,  to  do  strict  justice  in  discriminating  between 
persons,  and  by  no  means  to  award  to  one  honors  that 
clearly  belong  to  another.  I  must  then  affirm,  without 
hesitation,  that  in  the  history  of  our  government,  down 
to  this*hour,  no  experiment  so  rash  has  ever  been  made 
as  that  of  elevating  to  the  head  of  affairs  a  man  with  so 
little  previous  preparation  for  his  task  as  Mr.  Lincoln. 
....  Mr.  Lincoln  could  not  fail  soon  to  perceive  the 
fact  that  whatever  estimate  he  might  put  on  his  own 
natural  judgment,  he  had  to  deal  with  a  superior  in 
native  intellectual  power,  in  extent  of  acquirement,  in 
breadth  of  philosophic  experience,  and  in  the  force  of 
moral  discipline.     On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Seward  could 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  25 

not  have  been  long  blind  to  the  deficiencies  of  his  chief 
in  these  respects." 

Those  who  read  and  give  credit  to  these  represen- 
tations, and  others  of  similar  purport  through  the 
address,  will  receive  very  erroneous  impressions  of  the 
two  men  to  whom  they  relate,  as  well  as  of  the  admin- 
istration to  which  they  belonged,  and  in  which  each 
bore  an  important  part.  It  was  not  Mr.  Lincoln 
who  conformed  himself  and  his  policy  and  general 
views  to  Mr.  Seward,  but  it  was  Mr.  Seward  who 
adapted  himself  with  ease  and  address  to  Mr.  Lincoln, 
and,  failing  to  influence,  adopted  and  carried  out  the 
opinions  and  decisions  of  his  chief.  In  that  respect — 
flexibility  and  facility  of  change  among  friends — no 
person  possessed  greater  dexteritj^  and  tact  than  the 
Secretary  of  State.  It  made  him  a  pleasant  assistant, 
companion,  and  coadjutor  ;  but  his  character  not  being 
positive,  nor  his  convictions  absolute,  he  was  not 
always  reliable,  being  deficient  in  executive  will  and 
ability.  Mr.  Lincoln,  who  is  represented  as  ignorant 
of  the  condition  of  the  country  when  elected,  and 
*'  whose  mind  had  not  yet  opened  to  the  nature  of  the 
crisis,''  better  understood,  if  we  may  judge  from  what 
they  did,  the  popular  sentiment  and  the  public  require- 
ments than  senator  or  representative,  ambassador  or 
cabinet  minister.  In  his  "  secluded  home"  he  was  not 
an  inattentive  and  indifferent  observer,  but  watched 
and  studied  public  measures  and  public  necessities,  and 
more  correctly  appreciated  the  actual  condition  of 
affairs  than  the  heated  politicians  engaged  in  factious 
etrife  for  party  ascendency  m  the  national  and  state 


26  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

capitals.  While  statesmen  and  legislators  of  '^expe- 
rience "  in  Congress  were  waiting  and  watching  for 
new  appointments,  neglectful  of  the  coming  storm, 
anticipating  apparently  little  else  than  a  severe  party 
conflict,  "  utterly  without  spirit''  to  concert  measures 
— exhausting  their  time  and  energies  in  frivolous 
wragnles,  and  accomplishing  nothing — with  confessedly 
*'  no  leader  at  hand  equal''  to  the  emergency — the 
President  elect,  "in  the  heart  of  Illinois,"  compre- 
hended the  situation,  and  rose  above  merely  personal  , 
and  party  contentions  to  the  dangers,  necessities  and 
political  condition  of  the  country.  Wholly  powerless, 
however,  he  was  compelled  to  witness  without  being 
able  to  prevent  the  disintegration  in  progress,  and  the 
accumulating  embarrassments  that  were  soon  to  con- 
front him,  without  a  single  effective  demonstration 
from  any  of  his  professed  friends  in  Congress,  who 
prided  themselves  on  their  superiorit}',  and  on  an 
official  **  experience''  in  which  they  deemed  him  defi- 
cient, but  which  experience  they  considered  indispen- 
sable for  a  competent  executive.  Of  what  value  was 
the  "  exyjerience"  of  senator  or  representative  in  that 
crisis  ?  What  executive  or  legislative  ability  did  they 
exhibit  ?  Experience  rightly  improv-ed  is  valuable  in 
public  official  life,  but  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  it 
often  blunts  the  mind,  and  by  familiarizing  with,  ren- 
ders it  indifferent  to  evil. 

The  two  great  parties  of  Democrat  and  Whig  were 
in  their  day  scarcely  more  apart  in  their  character  or 
more  diverse  in  their  purposes  than  the  opposing  ele- 
ments which  met  in  convention  at  Chicago  in  1860. 
It  was  by  no  means  a  personal  contest  as  represented. 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  27 

Mr.  Adams  seems  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  there 
were  among  Republicans,  and  in  that  convention,  con- 
flicting views  and  policies ;  that  a  majority  was  oppo- 
sed to  corrupt  legislation  and  the  vicious  schemes  of 
managing  lobbies,  whether  at  Albany  or  Washington, 
as  well  as  hostile  to  the  extension  and  aggression  of 
slavery.  It  was  the  misfortune  of  Mr.  Sewar-d  that  he 
was  associated  with  and  the  candidate  of  the  most  of- 
fensive lobby  combination  of  that  date.  He  was  not 
accused  or  suspected  of  receiving  pecuniary  benefit 
himself  from  the  practices  of  that  class  of  jobbing  par- 
ty lobbyists,  but  he  was  thought  to  be  indifferent  if 
not  assenting  to  their  practices,  and  was  their  candi- 
date. They  were  active  in  his  favor,  were  conspic- 
uously instrumental  in  pressing  him  forward  as  the 
coming  man,  announcing  him  as  the  Kepublican  candi- 
date, and  used  extraordinary  means  to  secure  delegates 
to  the  nominating  convention  in  his  interest.  These 
party  managers  had,  like  Mr.  Seward,  adhered  to  the 
Whig  organization  so  long  as  it  existed.  After  its 
abandonment  they  became  active  members  of  the  Re- 
publican party,  and  strove  to  be  foremost  in  all  its  pro- 
ceedings. But  there  was  a  large  element — the  result 
showed  a  very  decided  majority — of  the  Republicans 
averse  to  any  nomination  or  movement  which  would 
tend  to  transfer  Albany  intrigues  to  Washington,  and 
introduce  the  debasing  practices  on  the  Hudson  into 
our  national  politics. 

When  the  convention  met  at  Chicago,  the  Albany 
programme  and  management  were  obvious.  jN^ew 
York  and  Michigan,  under  the  Whig  machinery  which 
with  all  its  appliances  was  still  in  force  in  those  states 


28  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

though  under  the  name  of  Republicanism,  pushed  sol- 
idly for  their  candidate.  Massachusetts  was  supposed 
to  have  been  as  thoroughly  attended  to,  but  a  small 
minority  dissented  and  went  with  the  majority  of  the 
states  and  delegates  from  Kew  England  in  opposition 
to  Mr.  Seward.  These  three  states  constituted  his 
substantial  strength,  but  under  Albany  manipulation 
and  management  some  of  the  small  frontier  and  bor- 
der states,  and  the  territories  which  were  introduced 
and  permitted  to  vote  in  convention,  though  they  could 
not  in  election,  added  to  his  force,  and  gave  him,  as 
the  address  states,  a  plurality  on  the  first  ballot.  *-  A 
second  ballot  increased  his  vote  but  eleven,  when  it 
was  evident  the  Albany  programme  could  not  suc- 
ceed, and  the  whole  personal  intrigue  was  demolished. 
The  lobby  measures  and  tactics,  and  all  the  dramatic 
parade  and  performance  in  the  streets  and  hotels  of 
Chicago,  failed.  Disappointed  and  overwhelmed. 
Weed  refused  to  return  to  New  York,  but  left  fur  the 
Northwest,  and  some  days  later  made  his  appearance 
far  south  at  Springfield,  where  he  had  an  interview 
with  Mr.  Lincoln  in  "his  secluded  abode."  It  was 
with,  fidiis  Achates  still  a  personal  matter,  and  if  Mr. 
Seward  could  not  be  President  he  wished  him  in  a  po- 
sition where  he  could  be  potetitial  in  the  coming  admin- 
istration, believing  with  Mr.  Adams  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  "  little  previous  preparation  for  his  task,"  and 
that  Mr.  Seward  was  his  superior  in  **  native  intellec- 
tual power."  A  very  serious  mistake  on  the  part  of 
both.  Members  of  Congress  had  also  expected,  and 
took  it  for  granted,  that  a  man  in  official  position  and 
of  political  experience,  with  hereditary  party  claims, 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  29 

and  a  personal  following  as  w^ell  as  pecuniary  backers, 
such  as  could  be  found  only  in  the  commercial  metro- 
polis, would  be  selected.  Others,  however,  wished  a 
liberal  candidate,  wedded  to  no  past  organization,  and 
untainted  by  and  wholly  disconnected  with  legislative 
or  congressional  corruption  and  intrigue. 

Mr.  Lincoln  became  the  choice  of  the  convention, 
not  only  from  a  belief  that  he  had  ability  for  the  place, 
but  because  he  was  a  Republican  from  the  start,  a  pri- 
vate citizen,  honest  sagacious,  and  iirm,  with  no  vicious 
connections  or  debasing  political  associations  or  ante- 
cedents. It  was  not  *'  the  ghosts  of  the  higher  law  and 
of  the  irrepressible  conflict "  which  made  Mr.  Lincoln 
a  candidate,  for  he  and  Mr.  Seward  stood  alike  in  that 
respect ;  nor  was  it  "  the  element  of  bargain  and  man- 
agement manipulated  by  adepts  at  intrigue''  which 
secured  his  nomination,  for  the  ''  adepts  at  intrigue" 
were  active  for  another. 

The  convention  and  the  people  preferred  Abraham 
Lincoln,  in  what  Mr.  Adams  calls  "  his  secluded  abode 
in  the  heart  of  Illinois ''  to  Senator  Seward,  with  all 
his  experience  and  metropolitan  surroundings,  because 
he  was  more  truly  the  representative  of  the  Republi- 
can movement.  Nor  did  the  country  regret,  or  ever 
have  cause  to  regret,  that  preference,  w^hatever  may 
have  been  the  disgust  of  disappointed  officials  and 
expectants  in  Washingtoi>  or  elsewhere.  Time,  and 
trials  far  greater  than  have  ever  been  the  lot  of  any 
other  chief  magistrate,  tested  and  proved  the  wisdom 
of  their  choice.  Mr.  Lincoln,  h%gst,-:i!ifelligent,  delib- 
erate, patriotic,  and  determined,  if  not  courtly  bred, 
had  the  executf\^e  ability  to  guide  the  ship  of  state 


30  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MK.    SEWARD. 

through  a  pitiless  storm.     Mr.  Seward,  with  his  rest- 
less flexible  mind,  prolific  in  expedients,  but  w4th  no 
well-defined  policy,  fixed  political  principles,  or  strong 
tenacity  of  purpose,  could  not  have  wielded  the  execu- 
tive power  successfully,  or  navigated  the  ship  of  state 
in  safety  at  that  period,  could  he  have  been  nominated 
and  elected,  of  which  last  there  are  very  grave  doubts. 
There  have  been  previous  occasions,  as  in  1828  and 
again  in  1840,  when  all  the  calculations  of  politicians, 
statesmen  of  experience,  and  men  in  place,  have  been 
wrecked   by  an  upheaval  of  popular  sentiment,  and 
candidates  taken  from  the  ranks — "  secluded  abodes  " — 
were  carried  forward  on  the  mighty  wave  of  public,  if 
sometimes  mistaken,  opinion  to  a  triumphant  election. 
Mr.  Adams  fails  to  mention,  and  probably  never 
realized,  the  primary  diflferences  in   the  Republican 
party  which  caused  results  so  unexpected  to  him  and 
the  politicians  in  Congress.   It  was  confidently  expected 
that  the  six  Eastern  states  which  had  been  the  strong- 
liold  of  the  whig  party  and  where  the  central  organiza- 
tion was  powerful,  would  concentrate  on  Mr.  Seward, 
but  though  many  of  the  party  leaders  were  committed 
to  his  support  he  was  never  a  favorite  with  the  people. 
No  manipulation  or  appliances  could  secure  him  their 
support.     On  the  first  ballot  at  Chicago,  Connecticut, 
Khode  island  and  Vermont  were  unanimous  against 
him — ISTew  Hampshire  gave  him  only  one  of  her  twelve 
votes.     Maine  and  Massachusetts  were  divided.     The 
delegrates  were  committed  to  no  one  of  the  several  can- 
didates  but  were  decided  against 'Mr.  Seward.     Before 
the  convention  met,  it  was  supposed  that  an  arrange- 
ment could  be  made  with  Cameron,  by  which  Pennsyl- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  31 

vania  could  be  brought  in  to  sustain  Mr.  Seward,  but 
althougli  that  politician's  influence  was  great  it  was 
totally  insufficient  to  attach  Pennsylvania  to  the  Al- 
bany movement. 

So  unaware  was  Mr.  Seward  of  the  true  condition 
of  things  when  the  convention  assembled  at  Chicago 
— so  convinced  that  the  Albany  programme  would 
succeed — tiiat  he  left  his  seat  in  the  Senate  and  re- 
paired to  Auburn  in  the  confident  expectation  of  there 
receiving  a  committee  which  would  inform  him  of  his 
nomination.  The  adverse  blow  was  severe ;  but  more 
readily  than  many  of  his  friends,  did  he  submit  to  the 
great  disappointment,  and  with  his  usual  tact  accepted 
and  acquiesced  in  results  which  he  could  not  control. 

The  '*  Memorial  Address"  represents  it  to  have 
been  an  error  that  Mr.  Seward  was  not  "  early  secured 
in  a  prominent  post"  by  the  President  elect,  and  says 
that  "  his  advice  at  least  should  have  been  asked  in 
regard  to  the  completion  of  the  organization."  The 
reverse  of  this  was  a  matter  of  duty,  for  the  views  and 
wishes  of  Mr.  Seward  and  his  special  friends  were  not 
the  policy  and  intention  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  Pe- 
publicans.  Mr.  Lincoln  knew  that  the  services  of  Mr. 
Seward  were  at  his  disposal  in  case  the  Pepublicans 
were  successful,  even  before  he  was  elected,  and  it 
was  impressed  upon  him  most  earnestly  as  a  necessity 
immediately  thereafter.  Twice  at  least  did  Thurlow 
Weed,  the  faithful  managing  friend  of  Mr.  Seward, 
\\\QJidus  Achates  '^  to  whom  he  owed  many  obliga- 
tions of  that  kind,"  visit  Springfield  in  Mr.  Seward's 
behalf.  The  views  of  Mr.  Lincoln  in  regard  to  the 
composition  of  his  executive  council,  and  the  material 


"32  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

of  whicli  it  should  be  constructed,  were  so  widely 
different  from  those  of  Mr.  Seward  and  his  Albany 
associates,  that  no  inclination  was  felt  to  ask  his  or 
their  advice  on  the  subject.  He  had  the  selection  of 
Mr.  Seward  in  his  mind  as  early  as  that  of  any  of  his 
associates,  but  he  had  no  more  thought  of  consulting 
liim  as  regarded  the  other  members  of  his  Cabinet 
than  of  advising  with  them  or  either  of  them  as  to  his 
Secretary  of  State.  The  members  were  to  be  his 
advisers,  not  Mr.  Seward's  ;  to  aid  and  assist  him  in 
the  administration  of  the  government,  instead  of  any 
one  of  his  subordinates,  all  of  whom  were  expected  to 
cooperate  for  the  general  welfare. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  modest,  kind,  and  unobstrusive, 
but  he  had  nevertheless  sturdy  intellectual  indepen- 
dence, wonderful  self-reliance,  and,  in  his  unpretending 
way,  great  individuality.  Though  ever  willing  to  lis- 
ten to  others  and  to  avail  himself  of  suggestions  from 
any  quarter  which  he  deemed  valuable,  he  never  for  a 
moment  was  unmindful  of  his  position  or  of  proper 
self-respect,  or  felt  that  he  was  "  dependent"  on  any 
one  for  the  faithful  and  competent  discharge  of  any 
duty  upon  which  he  entered.  He  could  have  dispensed 
with  any  one  of  his  cabinet  and  the  administration 
not  been  impaired,  but  it  would,  have  been  difficult  if 
not  impossible  to  have  selected  any  one  who  could 
have  tilled  the  office  of  chief  magistrate  as  successfully 
as  Mr.  Lincoln  in  that  troublesome  period.  In  admin- 
istering the  government,  there  were  details  in  each 
department  with  which  he  did  not  interfere  or  attempt 
to  make  himself  fiimiliar — a  routine  which  the  Secre- 
taries respectively  discharged.     Of  these  the  President 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  33 

had  a  general  knowledge,  and  the  executive  control 
of  each  and  all.  In  this  respect  the  Secretary  of 
State  bore  the  same  relation  to  the  President  as  his 
colleagues  in  the  other  departments.  Mr.  Lincoln 
well  understood  the  nature  of  the  differences  which 
existed  in  the  Republican  party — the  causes  which  had 
influenced  the  members  of  the  Chicago  Convention, 
and  the  policy  which  it  was  expected  would  character- 
ize his  administration.  His  sympathies,  feelings,  and 
views  were  in  harmony  and  full  accord  with  those  who 
had  secured  his, nomination  ;  and,  faithful  in  his  con- 
victions and  to  his  trust,  he  would  not  permit  those 
who  selected  him  to  be  disappointed,  nor  allow  him- 
self to  be  diverted  from  that  policy  nor  to  organize  a 
Cabinet  opposed  to  it. 

But  the  same  influences  which  operated  and  were 
defeated  at  Chicago  in  nominating  a  candidate,  early 
obtruded  themselves  on  the  President  elect  in  attempts 
to  control  his  selection  of  his  executive  council.  Mr. 
Seward  and  his  special  friends,  who  still  clung  to  the 
old  Whig  party,  and  hoped  by  some  device  to  renew 
and  prolong  it,  were  apprehensive  that  there  would 
be  too  strong  an  infusion  of  the  Democratic  element 
in  the  Cabinet.  They  did  not  propose  to  wholly  ex- 
clude men  of  Democratic  antecedents,  but  it  was  urged 
that  the  Whig  element  should,  for  the  sake  of  har- 
mony, and  efficient,  concerted,  united  action,  have  a 
decided  preponderance.  Mr.  Lincoln  quietly  listened 
to  these  representations,  but  he  well  understood  the 
object,  and  avoided  the  path  to  which  they  invited 
him.  Instead  of  yielding  to  them,  he  was  confirmed 
in  his  convictions  that  the  Republican  policy  which 


34  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

led  to  his  nomination  and  election  was  riglit,  and 
shonld  be  maintained  independent  of  old  parties  and 
old  organizations.  Discarding  the  importunities  of 
the  Albany  mission  which  visited  him  in  Springfield, 
he  brought  into  his  Cabinet  an  equal  number  from 
each  of  the  old  opposing  parties,  which  would  enable 
him  to  get  the  opinions  of  men  of  differing  political 
views.  It  was  with  two  exceptions  the  same  as  that 
with  which  four  months  later  he  commenced  his  ad- 
ministration. His  first  cast  of  the  persons  to  compose 
the  administration  was  as  follows  : 

Lincoln  Judd 

Seward  Chase 

Bates  Blair 

Dayton  Welles 

The  four  names  in  the  first  column,  including  that 
of  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  were  of  men  who  in  their 
political  antecedents  had  been  Whigs,  while  the  four 
in  the  opposite  parallel  column  were  Democrats  in 
their  principles  and  convictions  though  Mr.  Chase  had 
never  identified  himself  with  the  democratic  organiza- 
tion. He  was  distinctly  anti-slavery,  but  concurred 
with  the  democrats  in  supporting  the  rights  of  the 
states  and  was  an  advocate  of  a  strict  construction  of 
the  constitution. 

Norman  B.  Judd  of  Chicago,  was  an  active  and 
influential  politician  of  Illinois,  and  for  many  years  a 
leading  member  of  the  legislature  of  that  state.  He 
was  also  a  member  of  the  Kepublican  National 
Committee,  and  probably  did  more  than  any  other  one 
individual  to  bring  forward  and  secure  the  nomination 
of  Mr.  Lincoln,  for  whom  he  had  a  high  regard  and 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MK.    SEWARD.  35 

friendship,  which  was  fully  reciprocated.  The  Presi- 
dent informed  me  that  he  had  personally  a  stronger 
desire  that  Judd  should  be  associated  with  him  in  the 
administration  than  any  one  else  but  he  was  from 
Illinois,  and  there  were  political  and  other  circum- 
stances which  intervened.  Instead  of  a  Cabinet 
appointment  therefore,  Judd  received  the  Prussian 
Mission,  which  he  filled  during  Mr.  Lincoln's  adminis- 
tration, but  he  was  recalled  soon  after  Mr.  Lincoln's 
death,  on  representations  made  by  Mr.  Seward. 

William  L.  Dayton  of  New  Jersey,  who  was 
designated  for  a  position  in  the  original  cast  of  the 
Cabinet  was  appointed  Minister  to  France.  He  had 
been  the  successful  competitor  with  Mr.  Lincoln  for 
the  nomination  of  Yice  President  in  1858,  and  was 
held  in  especial  esteem  by  him.  There  was,  however, 
as  usual  a  strong  local  claim  for  Pennsylvania,  without 
any  distinguished  statesman  in  whom  the  President 
had  such  faith  and  confidence  as  he  had  in  Mr.  Dayton, 
but  the  pressure  from  without  as  well  as  from  within 
the  State,  with  certain  complications  of  his  friends  led 
to  the  substitution  of  Mr.  Cameron.  It  was  the  first  j 
intention  of  the  President,  as  I  have  understood,  after  ! 
this  substitution,  to  have  conferred  on  Mr.  Dayton  the  | 
mission  to  St.  James,  but  Mr.  Seward  who  was  to  have  \/(^ 
charge  of  Foreign  Affairs  preferred  and  urged  that  Mr. 
Adams  should  have  the  English  appointment,  and  Mr. 
Dayton,  therefore,  received  the  mission  to  France. 

These  changes  in  the  original  programme  or  cast 
of  the  Cabinet  did  not  affect  the  purpose  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  have  in  his  council  an  equal  number  of  men  of 
opposite  parties  in  the  past.     Caleb  Smith  a  Whig, 


36  ~         MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

and  Simon  Cameron  a  democrat  took  the  places  of  Jndd 
a  democrat  and  Dayton  a  whig. 

But  although  this  was  his  first  programme  he  was 
wisely  reticent,  and  kept  his  own  counsel.  When, 
however,  his  intentions  finally  became  known,  and  tlie 
names  of  the  gentlem.en  whom  he  proposed  to  call  to 
his  side  were  ascertained,  there  was  an  emphatic  dissent 
on  the  part  of  the  special  managing  friends  of  Mr. 
Seward.  Two  of  the  gentlemen  were  especially  ex- 
cepted to,  as  extreme  Democrats,  antagonistic  to  Mr. 
Seward,  who  had  been  instrumental  against  him, 
especially  at  Chicago,  and  to  whom  he  could  scarcely 
be  reconciled  in  administrative  duties.  But  objec- 
tionable as  these  men  were,  the  opposition  to  Mr. 
Chase  was  still  more  decisive ;  and  it  was  intimated 
that  if  these  gentlemen,  particularly  the  last  referred 
to,  were  to  receive  Cabinet  appointments,  Mr.  Seward 
might  decline  the  association.  This  intimation  had 
no  eflfect  on  Mr.  Lincoln,  nor  did  it  in  the  least  change 
his  determination.  While  willing  to  accept  and  desir- 
ous to  have  the  services  of  Mr.  Seward  and  the  sup- 
port of  his  friends,  he  did  not  feel  that  '^  it  was  abso- 
lutely indispensable  on  every  account  "  to  secure  him 
above  others,  or  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  or  to  be 
governed  by  him  and  his  likes  or  dislikes  in  the  choice 
of  confidants  or  the  make-up  of  his  political  family. 
In  point  of  fact,  there  was  strong  opposition  among 
his  friends  to  Mr.  Seward's  appointment.  He  had  no 
apprehensions  whatever  that  he  should  not  be  able  to 
have  Mr.  Seward  in  his  council ;  and  if  the  gentlemen 
whom  he  selected  had  not  in  their  party  antecedents, 
or  in  certain  fundamental  political  opinions  agreed,  but 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 


(B 


were  now  Republicans  in  accord  with  him  on  present 
questions,  that  was  sufficient  for  his  purpose.  Old 
things  in  parties  were  with  him  done  away.  There 
was  a  new  depr.rture  in  political  organizations.  His 
administration  and  his  Cabinet  were  to  be  Republican 
irrespective  of  past  parties.  But  schemes  to  secure  a 
Seward  Cabinet  commenced  early,  and  were  persist- 
ently followed  up  to  the  inauguration.  Weed,  as 
already  remarked,  did  not  return  to  Albany  after  the 
Chicago  nomination  until  hennsited,  and  had  an  inter- 
\^iew  with  Mr.  Lincoln  in  his  "secluded  abode/'  at 
Springfield,  the  capital  of  Illinois.  This  was  the  begin- 
ning, and  nothing  was  accomplished.  "  Late  in  the  Sum- 
mer, Weed  met  certain  gentlemen  in  Saratoga,  when 
something  definite  respecting  the  Cabinet  in  the  event 
of  Mr.  Lincoln's  election  was  attempted.  After  the  elec- 
tion Mr.  Lincoln  was  urged  to  visit  Auburn  and  consult 
Mr.  Seward,  who  "  had  a  plurality  of  votes  on  the  first 
ballot"  at  Chicago,  but  he  declined  the  invitation.  It  was 
winter,  the  address  says,  "  at  quite  a  late  period  of  the 
session,  before  he  had  disclosed  his  intention  to  place  Mr. 
Seward  in  the  most  prominent  place  in  the  Cabinet." 

Most  of  the  facts  in  relation  to  the  formation  of 
the  Cabinet  I  received  from  the  mouth  of  Mr.  Lin- 
coln, who  had  apparently  no  concealments  on  the  sub- 
ject. On  the  day  of  the  presidential  election,  I^ovem-'^ 
ber  3d,  1860,  he  said,  the  telegraph  operator  at  Spring- 
field invited  him  to  occnpy  his  room  and  obtain  intel- 
ligence of  the  result  as  it  was  received.  About  two 
o'clock  on  Wednesday  morning  sufficient  information 
had  come  in  to  leave  no  doubt  of  his  election.  He 
then  retired,  but  hardly  to  sleep.     x\lthough  fatigued 


38  MK.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

and  exhausted,  he  got  but  little  rest.     Oppressed  with 
the  overwhelming  responsibility  that  was  upon  hira, 
which  in  the  excitement  of  the  campaign  he  had  not 
fully  realized,  he  felt  the  necessity  of  reUef  and  assist- 
ance to  sustain  him  in  the  not  distant  future.     He  did, 
he  said,  what  probably  all  his  predecessors  had  done — 
looked  about  him  at  once  for  the  men  on  whom  he  could 
depend,  and  who  would  be  his  support  in  the  trials 
that  were  before  him.     The  reliable  and  marked  men 
of  the  country  were  in  his  mind,  but  there  were  many 
other  things  to  be  taken  into  consideration — differeu-t 
influeDces,  sectional   and   political,  to  be   reconciled. 
He  did  not  again  sleep  until  he  had  constructed  the 
framework  of  his  Cabinet.    It  was  essentially  the  same 
as  that  with  which  four  months  later  he  commenced 
.   his  administration.     This  voluntary  and    unsolicited 
statement  was  from  the  man  whose  mind,  Mr.  Adams 
says,  months  after  his  election,  ''  had  not  even  opened 
to  the  nature  of  the  crisis."     Circumstances  and  ex- 
tended details  which  Mr.  Lincoln  gave,  relating  to  in- 
dividuals and  movements,  Cabinet  and  other  appoint- 
ments need  not  be  here  introduced.     This  generaliza- 
tion is  evidence  that  even  at  that  period  he  had  a  pol- 
icy and  purpose,  which  he  carried  into  effect,  wholly 
distinct  from  and  independent  of  the  plans  which  Mr. 
\    Seward  and  his  friends  had  marked  out.     He  prefer- 
\  red  to  select  his  own  advisers,  and  did  so  instead  of 
1  permitting  Mr.  Seward  to  do  it  for  him.     He  had  in 
\  view  a  Republican,  not  a  Whig  administration,  and 
\therefore  required  and  formed  a  Republican  Cabinet. 
VThere  was  but  one  member  of  it  appointed  on  the  spe- 
cial, urgent  recommendation  and  advice  of  Mr.  Seward 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  39 

and  his  friends,  who  preferred  him  to  Mr.  Chase. for 
the  Treasury,  but  that  gentleman  was  soon  with  Mr. 
Seward's  approval,  transferred  to  hyperborean  regions, 
in  a  way  and  for  reasons  never  publicly  and  distinctly 
made  known. 

The  unhappy  condition  of  the  country  during  the 
winter  of  186.1  is  not  overstated  in  the  "  Memorial 
Address."  It  was  as  well  understood  and  as  deeply 
deplored  at  Springfield  and  in  remote  sections  as  at 
Washington,  where  Congress  frittered  away  its  time, 
%nd  pursued  a  course  as  unpatriotic  as,  and  scarcely  less 
reprehensible  than,  the  Administration  which  proclaim- 
ed its  inability  to  coerce  a  state.  The  President  elect 
witnessed  the  factious  and  disunion  proceedings  with 
■unutterable  distress,  but  he  was  powerless;  and  it  was 
among  the  most  painful  afflictions  of  his  varied  and 
eventful  life,  to  know  and  feel  that  he  could  do 
nothing  to  arrest  threatened  and  impending  calamities. 
Through  the  weary  winter  months  that  intervened  be- 
tween the  election  in  November  and  the  inauguration 
in  March,  he  beheld  the  executive  authority  paralyzed 
or  wielded  in  the  interest  of  those  who  threatened  the 
integrity  of  the  Union.     Mr.  Adams  says : 

"  Treason  had  crept  into  the  very  heart  of  the  Cabinet, 
and  a  policy  had  been  secretly  at  work  to  paralyze 
rather  than  to  fortify  the  resources  of  the  Executive. 
Everything  was  drifting  at  the  mercy  of  the  wind  and 
waves.  ...  A  message  was  sent  to  Congress  by  Mr. 
Buchanan  lamenting  the  fact  of  what  he  chose  to  call  a 
secession  of  several  States,  but  coupling  with  it  a  deni- 
al of  any  power  to  coerce  them.  This  was  in  its  essence 
an  abandonment  of  all  right  to  control  popular  resist- 


40  MR.    Li:SCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

ance  in  that  form.  In  the  condition  things  were  at  that 
moment,  with  a  Cabinet  divided  and  both  branches  of 
the  legislatnre  utterly  without  spirit  to  concert  meas- 
ures, the  effect  was  equivalent  to  disintegration." 

What  executive  or  legislative  energy  or  ability 
was  manifested  by  Congress  at  that  crisis  ?  Mr.  Lin- 
coln was  a  private  citizen,  "  at  home  in  Illinois,"  while 
this  "  secession  of  several  states"  was  going  on,  hold- 
ing no  office,  exercising  no  authority,  "giving  no 
signs  of  life,"  Mr.  Adams  says;  but  well  aware  thap 
every  movement  and  every  expression  of  his  were 
watched  and  weighed  not  only  by  secessionists,  but 
by  men  in  place  who  did  nothing  to  relieve  but  much 
to  oppose  and  embarrass  him  in  the  duties  upon  which 
he  was  soon  to  enter.  Mr.  Seward  was  at  that  time 
in  the  Senate,  in  a  position  where  a  disinterested  and 
patriotic  statesman  of  experience,  sagacity,  and  fore- 
sight, possessed  of  an  energetic,  capable,  and  master 
mind,  and  of  executive  power,  would  be  expected  to 
detect  and  expose  error  and  make  a  decisive  stand 
against  avowed  and  approaching  treason — treason 
which  had  in  fact  already,  says  th6  address,  crept 
"into  the  very  heart  of  the  Cabinet."  But  there 
was  not  a  measure  of  resistance,  scarcely  a  note  of 
alarm  or  even  of  apprehension,  from  the  'New  York 
Senator,  who  "  received  a  plurality  of  votes"  for  Presi- 
dent on  the  first  ballot  in  the  Chicago  Convention, 
and  who  was  at  the  time  not  only  a  Senator  but  the 
accredited  Secretary  of  State  of  the  incoming  Adminis- 
tration. To  him,  an  actor  in  an  exalted  official  posi- 
tion, a  Senator  of  reputed  sagacity  and  known  expe- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  41 

rience,  who  was'  in  daily  personal  and  official  inter- 
course with  men  of  all  parties,  at  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment, the  President  elect  from  his  "secluded  abocie," 
and  the  whole  country  indeed,  naturally  looked  with 
some  degree  of  expectation,  if  not  of  great  confidence, 
for  decisive  action,  or  at  least  correct  information  as  to 
the  state  of  affairs  and  probable  results.  Mr.  Seward*.^ 
had  a  theory,  but  not  such  as  to  either  inspire  hope  or 
create  alarm.  It  was  of  a  pacific  tendency,  and  calcu- 
lated to  calm  apprehensions  in  that  "  perilous  emer- 
gency." He  anticipated,  and  said,  there  would  be 
harmony  and  reccmciliation  within  ninety  days.  If 
sincere  in  his  prophetic  assertions,  he  did  not  exhibit 
intelligence  or  statesmanship  superior  to  Mr.  Lincoln  ; 
if  insincere,  he  was  even  less  reliable  and  faithful. 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  the  inclination  and  certainly  the 
wish  to  believe  that  his  selected  counsellor,  who  was 
in  the  Senate,  with  opportunities  at  the  time  superior 
to  himself  or  any  other  man  to  know  the  facts,  was 
correct  in  his  predictions  and  conclusions.  Unfor- 
tunately Mr.  Seward  was  mistaken.  Mr.  Adams 
says :  "  Wiseacres  have  commented  on  his  failure  of 
sagacity  in  making  over-confident  predictions.  But 
what  was  he  to  do  in  the  face  of  all  the  nations  of  the 
earth?"  Ele  certainly  was  not  to  falsify  the  truth ; 
he  -was  not  to  sacrifice  his  integrity,  nor  did  the  "  wise- 
acres" accuse  him  of  any  such  sacrifice  when  they 
"  commented  on  his  failure  of  sagacity."  It  is  to  be 
presumed  that  he  believed  what  he  asserted,  even  if  it 
makes  him  a  less  ^'  sagacious  statesman"  than  is  repre- 
sented in  the  "  Memorial  Address."  His  sagacity  is 
not  to  be  fortified    at   the  expense   of  his   veracity. 


42  MR.    LINCOLX    AKD    MR.    SEWARD. 

The  truth  is,  Mr.  Seward  did  not,  even  at  that  late 
day,  reah'ze  to  its  full  extent  the  nature  of  the  impend- 
ing conflict,  but  viewed  it  as  a  severe  and  embittered 
party  controversy,  not  unlike  others  the  country  had 
experienced,  and  which,  being  really  causeless,  he 
hoped  and  believed  time  and  the  change  of  administra- 
tion would  pacify.  Many  of  his  associates  as  well  as 
himself  were  of  the  party  of  expedients,  and  persuaded 
him  and  themselves  that  if  once  in  power  he  could  so 
manage  as  to  allay  dissension,  prevent  secession,  and 
effect  a  restoration  of  Union  feeling.  Hence,  withonfc 
any  avowed  reason,  nothing  but  past  "  experience," 
he  predicted  the  speedy  peaceful  solution  of  a  dispute 
or  controversy  that  to  others  looked  formidable,  and 
which  soon  not  only  threatened  but  assailed  the  Union. 
His  predictions  were  in  harmony  with  the  policy,  so 
far  as  he  had  a  policy,  of  himself  and  friends.  He 
was  for  peace,  and  had  faith,  hope,  and  confidence 
that  peace  would  be  preserved  by  some  expedient, 
device,  or  luck — he  knew  not  how — and  he  therefore 
predicted  it. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  comforted  by  the  assurances  and 
predictions  of  his  future  minister  then  in  the  Senate, 
but  he  had  apprehensions  which  no  prophetic  declara- 
tions could  entirely  put  at  rest.  Results  have  shown 
that  ''  in  this  perilous  interval,''  he,  "  in  his  secluded 
abode  in  the  heart  of  Illinois,''  with  unpretending  yet 
undoubted  sagacity,  had  a  more  correct  knowledge 
and  better  appreciation  of  the  condition  of  affairs — 
foresaw  with  more  accurate  perception  the  threatened 
difficulties — than  the  experienced  politicians  who  pre- 
dicted  and  promised   peace.     Those  who  best  knew 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  43 

the  two  men  are  aware  that  their  minds  were  widely 
different  inherently  and  in  their  organization.  The 
President  was  greatly  superior  in  intellectual  strength 
and  vigor,  had  the  more  solid  and  substantial  qualities, 
more  earnestness  and  sincerity,  a  greater  grasp  and 
comprehension,  a  more  intuitive  and  far-seeing  sagaci- 
ty, came  almost  instinctively  to  right  conclusions,  had 
more  correct  convictions,  greater  self-reliance,  greater 
firmness  of  purpose,  a  stricter  adherence  to  principles 
which  he  believed  to  be  correct ;  points  that  were  best 
'^ifiderstood  by  those  who  knew  him  best. 

The  Secretary  of  State  had,  with  higher  culture 
and  scholastic  attainments,  quickness  of  apprehension, 
wonderful  facility  and  aptness  in  adapting  himself  to 
circumstances  and  exigencies  which  he  could  not  con- 
trol, and  a  fertility  in  expedients,  with  a  dexterity  in 
adopting  or  dismissing  plans  and  projected  schemes, 
unsurpassed  ;  qualities  which  made  him  an  acceptable 
companion,  if  not  always  a  safe  adviser,  but  never  the 
superior  and  controlling  executive  mind.  His  train- 
ing and  habit  were  partisan,  and  his  acts  often  impul- 
sive ;  but,  accustomed  through  his  whole  official  life  to 
consult  a  faithful  friend,  to  whose  judgment  and  guid- 
ance he  deferred,  he  had  not  in  great  emergencies  the 
self-reliance,  energy,  will,  and  force  of  character  which 
are  essential  to  a  truly  great  and  strong  executive. 
He  sometimes  acted  rashly,  not  always  wisely.  But 
if  he  had  not  the  will  which  is  necessary  for  a  chief, 
he  had  the  sustaining  qualities  which  are  valuable  in 
serving  a  capable  leader  with  whom  he  might  be  iden- 
tified. He  was  subordinate  to  Abraham  Lincoln,  and 
deferred  to  him  as  he  had  deferred  to  Thurlow  Weed 


44  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

— conformed  to  the  views  of  the  former  as  he  had  for 
thirty  years  to  those  of  the  latter — and  assumed  credit 
in  the  one  case  as  it  had  always  been  given  him  in  the 
other,  without  being  the  originating  and  directing 
mind  in  either.  After  the  subsidence  of  the  anti-ma- 
sonic excitement  on  which  he  was  first  carried  into 
office,  he  became  a  Whig,  and  through  all  its  changes 
and  mutations,  until  the  organization  was  extinguish- 
ed, he  *'  adhered  to  the  party." 

Mr.  Lincoln,  on  the  contrary,  was  divested  of 
partisanship  beyond  almost  any  man  in  active  publii^ 
life  ;  not  that  he  was  insensible  to  party  and  its  claims, 
but  they  were  secondary  and  subordinate  to  principles 
— the  means  rather  than  the  end.  He  ^'  drifted,"  as 
he  used  to  say,  into  the  Whig  organization  at  the  be- 
ginning; his  associations  were  chiefly  there,  but  he 
had  no  particular  veneration  for  the  party  or  regard 
for  many  of  its  professed  doctrines.  Time,  experience, 
reflection,  and  observation  weakened  whatever  feeling 
or  sympathy  he  once  entertained  for  mere  party.  Un- 
like Mr.  Seward,  he  had  no  reluctance  in  giving  up  the 
Whig  organization  ;  no  lingering  affection  for  it,  nor 
any  hesitation  to  participate  in  and  urge  on  the  Re- 
publican movement  from  its  inception.  Mr.  Seward 
was  an  adroit  and  skilful  party  tactician,  familiar  with 
the  tricks  and  contrivances  in  which  his  Jldus  Achates 
indulged  to  carry  an  election  ;  while  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
no  taste,  inclination,  or  respect  for  such  practices,  and 
would  not,  to  secure  party  success,  intentionally,  even 
in  the  most  excited  election,  deceive  or  permit  others 
to  deceive  those  who  trusted  him.  The  minds  of  the 
two   men  ran  in   different  channels,  and  when  they 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWARD .  45 

came   together  on   important   questions,  that  of  the 
President  was  the  principal,  and  not,  as  represented  in 
the  address,  the  tributary. 
Mr.  Adams  says : 

*'  Mr.  Lincoln  could  not  fail  soon  to  perceive  the  fact 
that  whatever  estimate  he  might  put  on  his  own  natural 
judgment,  he  had  to  deal  with  a  superior  in  native 
intellectual  power,  in  extent  of  acquirement,  in  breadth 
of  philosophic  experience,  and  in  the  force  of  moral 
' 'liscipline.  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Seward  could  not 
have  been  long  blind  to  the  deficiencies  of  the  chief  in 
these  respects,  however  highly  he  might  value  his 
integrity  of  purpose,  his  shrewd  capacity,  and  his 
generous  and  amiable  disposition.  .  .  .  Thus  it  happened 
th;it  Mr.  Seward  voluntarily  dismissed  forever  the 
noblest  dreams  of  an  ambition  he  had  the  clearest  right  .. 
to  indulge,  in  exchange  for  a  more  solid  power  to  direct 
affairs  for  the  benefit  of  the  nation,  through  the  name 
of  another,  who  should  yet  appear  in  all  later  time  to 
reap  the  honors  due  chiefly  to  his  labors." 

On  no  consideration  would  I  detract  one  iota  from    j 
the  just  merits  of  the  late  Secretary  of  State,  with    I 
whom,  though  sometimes  differing,  I  for  eight  years,    j 
under  two  Executives,  enjoyed  uninterruptedly  pleas- 
ant, social  and  official  intercourse ;  nor  am  I  willing  to  , 
see  the  memory  of  the  distinguished  Chief  Magistrate 
who  served  his  country  so  faithfully  and  so  well,  and  ^ 
finally  died  in  her  cause,  unjustly  obscured,  and  his  J 
abilities  and  deeds  belittled  and  wronged.     As  is  else- 
where said  in  the  address,  "It  is  the  duty  of  history, 
in  dealing  with  all  human  action  to  do  strict  justice  in 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

discriminating  between  persons,  and  by  no  means  to 
award  to  one,  honors  that  clearly  belong  to  another.'' 
Yet  a  more  flagrant  violation  of  "  the  duty  of  history" 
in  that  respect,  a  moro  erroneous  and  unjust  discrimi- 
nation, or  a  more  unrighteous  ''award  to  one  honors 
that  clearly  belong  to  another,"  is  scarcely  to  be  found 
in  all  history  than  in  the  assumption  that  Mr.  Seward 
directed  the  affairs  of  the  nation  through  the  name  of 
Mr.  Lincoln.  Mr.  Adams  omits  to  state  in  what 
particular  Mr.  Seward,  aside  from  his  own  department,^ 
"  exercised  the  more  solid  power  to  direct  affairs  fot**' 
the  benefit  of  the  nation"  of  which  Mr.  Lincoln  was 
*'  in  all  later  time  to  receive  the  honors."  It  was  not 
in  the  management  of  the  finances  and  establishing 
and  maintaining  the  credit  of  the  Government  through 
a  wasting  war.  I  am  not  aware  that  he  ever  made  a 
suggestion,  proposed  a  measure,  or  in  any  way 
attempted  to  interfere  with,  or  direct  the  affairs  of  the 
Treasury  Department.  There  was  a  personal  intimacy 
between  him  and  the  Secretar}^  of  War,  but  I  do  not 
remember  that  he  proposed  or  directed  the  conduct  of 
a  single  campaign,  or  originated  any  military  or  army 
movement,  save  some  unfortunate  and  irregular  pro- 
ceedings early  in  the  administration,  when  he  took 
upon  himself,  as  Secretary  of  State,  to  perform  secretly 
and  improperly  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  War  without 
the  knowledge  of  that  officer.  On  one  or  two  occa- 
sions when  he  attempted,  in  total  disregiyrd  of  good 
government  and  correct  administration,  to  intermeddle 
with  naval  matters,  the  proceedings  were,  as  with  the 
War  Department,  disapproved  as  irregular,  improper, 
and  reprehensible.     In  the  administration  and  opera- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  47 

tions  of  the  Navy  Department  he  had  no  part;  not  a 
single  naval  expedition  was  undertaken  on  his  recom- 
mendation, and  the  most  important  ones  were  in 
progress  without  his  knowledge  and  far  advanced 
before  he  was  informed  of  them.  In  the  affairs  and 
management  of  the  other  three  departments  he  partici- 
pated no  more  than  in  those  mentioned,  or  than  did 
other  members  of  the  Cabinet.  The  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs  was  of  course,  intrusted  to  him  under  "' 
4.tbe  supervision  and  control  of  the  President,  who 
'directed  the  governmental  policy,  and  sometimes  over- 
ruled, modified,  and  improved  the  dispatches  which 
the  Secretary  had  with  great  industry  prepared.  Mr. 
Seward  held  a  ready  and  prolific  pen,  and  had  a  mind 
fertile  in  expedients,  but  his  judgment  and  conclusions 
were  not  always  so  sound  and  reliable  as  to  pass  with- 
out revision  and  Executive  emendations  and  approval. 
Measures  and  important  movem^^ptft  o^  ^"^^'^^  ^'^  ^^^^ 
departments  were  gen erally,  but  not  always,  submitted 
to  the  Cabinet.  The  President  was  invariably  con-  \ 
suited,  but  the  Secretary  of  State  stood  in  this  respect  i 
like  his  colleagues,  and  his  opinion  and  judgment,  like  I 
theirs,  was  taken  as  were  the  others  for  what,  in  the  | 
estimation  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  they  were  worth.  The 
policy  of  the  President  and  the  course  of  administra- 
tion were  based  on  substantial  principles  and  convic- 
tions to  which  he  firmly  adhered.  Mr.  Seward  relied 
less  on  fixed  principle  than  expedients,  and  trusted  to 
dexterity  and  skill  rather  than  the  rightfulness  of  a 
cause  to  carry  him  through  emergencies. 


48   /  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWAED. 


The  construction  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabinet  was,  with 
perhaps  one  exception,  his  own  work.  He  would  have 
been  glad  to  call  into  his  council  a  statesman  from  the 
South  of  marked  ability  and  influence,  but  there  were 
difficulties  which  prevented.  The  gentlemen  whom 
he  finally  selected  had  no  previous  intimacy,  personal 
or  political,  nor  were  there  antagonisms  to  prevent 
harmony  and  concerted  action.  Between  Seward  and 
Chase  there  was  imputed  rivalry,  and  until  within  two 
days  ofjhe  inauguration  the  opposition  of  the  friends 
of  the  lormer  to  placing  Mr.  Chase  in  the  Treasury 
was  active  and  persistent.  Each  of  these  gentlemen 
had  Irigh  aspirations.  Each  had  been  the  chief  Execu- 
tive of  his  State.  Each  had  represented  his  State  in 
the  Senate,  and  each  had  a  distinct  party  position, 
and,  to  some  extent,  a  personal  following,  which  made 
the  competition  interesting.  Mr.  Seward  was  a  Re- 
publican with  centralizing  tendencies,  and  had  been 
prominent  in  the  once  powerful  Whig  organization 
which  had  fallen  into  decay.  Mr.  Chase  was  a  federal 
liepublican,  favorable  to  State  rights,  not  attached  to. 
nor  strictly  identified  with,  either  of  the  old  party  or- 
ganizations, but  had  been  for  years  a  conspicuous  leader 
in  the  anti-slavery  movement  which  w^as  rising  on  the 
ruins  of  the  Whig  party.  Their  colleagues,  aware  of 
these  differences  and  rivalries,  were  indifierent  to 
them,  and  arrayed  themselves  under  the  banners  of 
neither.  It  would  be  invidious  to  attempt  to  institute 
a  comparison  between  these  two  gentlemen  thus  sit- 
uated and  associated  ;  but  the  "  Memorial  Address  " 
of  Mr.  Adams  places  Mr.  Seward  in  the  front  rank  of 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MK.    SEWAKD. 


Q) 


the  anti-slavery  movement — a  "  veteran  reformer  " — 
when,  in  fact,  lie  had  been  one  of  the  prominent  mem- 
bers of  a  very  different  party,  vi^hich,  like  the  Demo- 
cratic organization,  carefully  abstained  from  connec- 
tion with  that  movement,  while  Mr.  Chase  was  for 
years  a  prominent  anti-slavery  champion — openly, 
boldly,  and  irrespective  of  all  other  parties  or  organi- 
zations, its  active  and  efficient  advocate.  In  the  ap- 
pointment of  these  two  men,  Mr.  Lincoln,  who  adopted 
the  policy  of  Washington  in  bringing  men  of  oppo- 
sijig  principles  into  his  Cabinet,  provided  they  harmo- 
nized  in  measures  ot  administration,  reversed  the 
oriffliial  arrangement  by  giving  to  Seward,  a  Republi- 
can centralist,  the  post  of  Jefferson^  a  State  rights_ 
federal  Republican,  and  to  Chase,  a  federal  Republi- 
can, the  post  which  Washington  assigned  to  Hamilton, 

a  centralisiL 

Mr.  Seward  entered  upon  his  duties  with  the  im- 
pression, undoubtedly,  which  Mr.  Adams  seems  to 
have  imbibed,  that  he  was  to  be  de  facto  President, 
and,  as  the  premier  in  the  British  Government,  to 
"  direct  the  affairs  of  the  nation  in  the  name  of 
another.''  The  consequences  were  that  confusion  and 
derangement  prevailed  to  some  extent  at  the  commence- 
ment by  reason  of  the  mental  activity,  assumptions, 
and  meddlesome  intrusions  of  the  Secretaiy  of  State  in 
the  duties  and  affairs  of  others,  which  were,  if  not  dis- 
organizing, certainly  not  good  administrationi/  Confi- 
dence and  mutual  frankness  on  public  affairs  and  mat- 
ters pertaining  to  the  Government,  particularly  on 
what  related  to  present  and  threatened  disturbances, 
existed  among  all  the  members,  with  the  exception  of 
3 


<^d)  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWAHD. 

Mr.  Seward,  who  had,  or  affected,  a  certain  mysterious 
knowledge  which  lie  was  not  prepared  to  impart. 
Tliis  was  accepted  as  a  probable  necessity  by  his 
associates,  for  he  had  been  in  a  position  to  ascertain 
tacts  which  it  was  intimated  he  could  not  perhaps  well 
disclose.  It  early  became  apparent,  however,  that  the 
Secretary  of  State  had  ideas  and  notions  of  his  own  po- 
sition and  that  of  his  colleagues,  as  well  as  of  the  char- 
acter and  attitude  of  the  President,  that  others  could 
not  admit  or  recognize.  Secretiveness,  subtle  expedi- 
ents, and  mysterious  management,  which  limited  the 
knowledge  of  certain  important  transactions  to  the 
State  Department,  but  of  which  the  President  was  in 
some  degree  and  from  time  to  time  partially  informed, 
were  the  initiative  Albany  methods  of  executive  gov- 
ernment. This  reserve  it  appeared  from  subsequent 
disclosures  consisted  of  an  understanding  between  him- 
self and  certain  leading  opponents  with  whom  he  had 
held  private  conference  during  the  winter,  the  main 
purpose  of  which  was  to  prevent  any  collision  or  deci- 
sive movement  during  the  remnant  of  Mr.  Buchanan's 
administration.  The  motives  of  Mr.  Seward  in  promo- 
ting delay,  were  undoubtedly  well-intentioned,  founded 
on  faith  that  he,  if  in  power,  could  in  some  way,  by 
some  expedient  reconcile  differences.  The  secession- 
ists had  other  objects.  They  knew  it  would  be  more 
difficult  to  unite  the  southern  people  in  a  war  against 
the  Buchanan  administration  than  against  Lincoln,  the 
"  black  republican  '*  whose  election  they  had  opposed 
and  whom  they  declared  and  caused  those  who  confided 
in  them  to  believe  to  be  an  enemy  to  the  South.  The 
politicians,  in  Congress  and  out  of  it,  who  gathered  in 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

and  about  Washington  that  winter  were  willing  to 
postpone  action  during  the  few  remaining  days  of  the 
expiring  administration,  and  none  more  so  than  the 
feeble  and  irresolute,  but  not  unintelligent  or  unpatri- 
otic President  who  felt  himself  incapable  of  firmly 
holding  the  reins  and  successfully  guiding  the  govern- 
ment in  that  crisis.  Ill-advised,  bewildered,  paralyzed 
and  betrayed,  he  readily  caught  at  any  plan  which 
would  give  him  quiet,  and  enable  him  to  tide  over  the 
short  remnant  of  his  official  life.  The  private  confer- 
ence of  the  leaders  during  this  winter  led  to  temporary 
arrangements,  armistices  and  humiliating  terms  with 
avowed  disunionists,  acquiescence  in  the  seizure  of 
forts,  arsenals  and  other  public  property.  The  govern- 
ment was  to  do  nothing  to  preserve  the  union  while 
the  rebels  were  active  and  permitted  to  organize  and 
do  everything  to  resist  the  national  authority  after  the 
4th  of  March,  should  the  secession  demands  not  be  com- 
plied with,  and  exaction  not  be  met  by  concession.. 

The  failures  to  take  prompt,  energetic,  and  decisive 
measures  against  the  secession  movements  at  the  com- 
mencement, and  thus,  like  Andrew  Jackson  in  1832, 
to  "resist  the  beginning  of  evil,"  displayed  on  the  part 
of  Mr.  Buchanan  great  want  of  executive  ability. 
The  indecision  of  the  president,  and  the  efforts  of 
others  to  put  off  for  a  few  weeks  the  evil  day,  was, 
from  whatever  motive,  unfortunate  for  the  reputation 
of  President  Buchanan,  but  more  unfortunate  for  the 
country.  In  every  point  of  view  the  temporizing 
policy  of  the  winter  of  1861  may  be  considered  a  mis- 
take, a  national  misfortune.  Not  that  a  war  could 
have  been  prevented.     The  conflict  which  had  been 


52  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

thirty  years  maturing  was  so  deep  seated,  its  pro- 
portions were  so  vast,  the  passions  had  become  so 
excited  that  no  earthly  power  could  have  saved  the 
country  from  war.  The  men  who  combined  against 
the  government  for  alleged  grievances  had,  after  long 
preparation,  finally  succeeded  in  obtaining  control  of 
the  civil  organization  of  the  states  in  one  section  of  the 
union  and  were  determined  to  have  the  ascendency  in 
the  general  government,  or  a  new  confederacy  of  their 
own.  But  if  hostilities  could  not  have  been  pre- 
vented, it  is  scarcely  to  be  doubted  they  would  have:' 
been  of  less  proportions  had  the  administration  of 
Mr.  Buchanan  put  forth  the  strong  hand  of  power 
against  the  iirst  organization  to  disorganize,  and  pro- 
tected, defended  and  held  the  fortresses  and  public 
property  intrusted  to  its  keeping.  But  the  friends  of 
the  incoming  and  outgoing  administrations  in  Wash- 
ington concurred  in  acting  on  a  difierent  policy, 
thouorh  from  different  motives.  The  secessionists  felt 
truly  that  to  them  delay  was  important,  that  it  would 
be  an  embarrassing  and  unhappy,  if  not  a  disastrous 
complication  for  them  to  make  open  war  on  the  govern- 
menf  while  it  was  administered  by  a  man  of  their  own 
selection  and  whose  general  course  they  approved. 
Mr.  Seward  who  was  in  pretty  free  communication 
with,  though  politically  opposed  to  them,  persuaded 
himself  that  if  the  contestants  did  not  take  the  field 
until  there  was  a  change  of  administration,  he  could 
then,  with  his  fertility  of  resources,  expedients  and 
means,  tranquillize  the  country.  In  this  he  was  as  sincere 
as  in  any  political  act  of  his  life.  Those  who  charge 
him  with  unpatriotic  and  ulterior  designs  against  the 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND    MK.    SEWARD.  't^Oj 

government  and  the  union,  do  liini  injustice  ;  he  was  a 
centralist  in  his  tendencies,  not  a  disunionist,  and  in 
his  efforts  to  delay  action  he  was  on  what  Mr.  Adams 
calls  "  the  delusive  track  of  expediency,"  without 
fixed  principles,  or  any  clear  and  well  detined  policy. 
His  prophecies  of  pacification  within  ninety  days,  iter- 
ated and  reiterated,  were  based  on  no  facts.  He  never 
made  known  what  he  proposed  to  do  to  reconcile  differ- 
ences except  as  declared  in  his  speech  of  the  twelfth 
of  Januar}^,  by  meeting  exaction  with  concession,  sub- 
mitting to  the  doctrine  of  coercion  and  evacuating  the 
national  fortresses  in  the  seceding  states.  With  faith 
in  expedients  he  expressed  his  readiness  for  a  national 
convention  to  revise  the  constitution,  and  also  for  an 
amendment  to  prohibit  forever,  beyond  revocation,  any 
authority  in  Congress  to  interfere  with  the  subject  of 
slavery.  As  the  war  was  inevitable  and  soon  came 
*'  with  all  its  horrid  cost,"  it  was  fortunate  for  the, 
country  that  so  honest,  so  determined,  so  sagacious 
and  capable  a  man  as  Lincoln  was  President  to  meet 
it,  witt  his  comprehensive  ability,  human  instincts, 
fixed  principles,  calm  forbearance  and  regard  for  Fed- 
eral and  state  rights. 


For  several  weeks  after  the  inauguration,  no  stated  "^ 
Cabinet  meetings  were  held,  though  the  members 
were  frequently  assembled  incounc;il — sometimes  only 
a  part ;  but  whenever  convened,  it  was  by  special  no- 
tice from  the  Secretary  of  State.  This  irregular  prac- 
tice, initiated  and  pressed  by  the  Secretary  of  State, 
who  was  supposed  to  be  familiar  with  usage  and  to 
have  great  executive  experience,  was  after  some  weeks 
corrected,  and  stated  meetings  on  Tuesdays  and  Fri- 


lOtB  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

days  were  ordered,  against  the  remonstrance  of  Secre- 
tary Seward,  who  thought  stated  meetings  caused  un- 
necessary interruptions  of  business,  and  that  often 
only  a  part  of  the  members,  such  as  were  specially  in- 
terested in  the  subjects  under  consideration,  need  be 
called  to  meet  him  and  the  President.  It  is  mention- 
ed in  the  "Memorial  Address,"  that  "Mr.  Seward 
himself  came  into  the  State  Department  with  no  ac- 
quaintance with  the  forms  of  business  other  than  that 
obtained  incidentally  through  his  services  in  the  Sen- 
ate.'' This  was  soon  obvious  to  the  whole  council, 
who  were  much  annoyed  for  a  time  by  this  want  of 
proper  system  and  that  correct  administration  which 
is  essential  to  intelligent  unity  in  the  Government. 
Under  evident  misapprehension  of  his  own  powers 
and  duties,  and  in  disregard  of  what  belonged  to  oth- 
ers, the  Secretary  of  State  undertook  too  much,  found 
^himself  embarrassed  by  promises  and  assurances  in- 
considerately given  ;  and  with  no  clear  and  well-defined 
policy,  but  with  assumption  of  pretty  unlimited  au- 
thority and  faith  in  expedients,  on  which,  rather  than 
substantial  principles,  he  relied,  there  were  for  a  brief 
period  some  singular  proceedings.  President  Lincoln 
horjd  with  these  things  patiently,  though  greatly  em- 
barrassed, for  the  omens  abroad  were  portentous.  In- 
cidents and  occurrences  which  actually  took  place  will 
best  illustrate  the  condition  of  affairs,  the  men,  and 
their  relative  positions  in  administering  the  govern- 
ment. 

Within  a  month  after  the  advent  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  the  organization  of  his  Cabinet,  the  Secretary  of 
State  exhibited  bis  loose  ideas  of  government,  his  want 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 


<S) 


of  system  and  defect  of  correct  executive  and  admin-' 
istrative  talent  by  preparing  and  sending  out  an  irreg- 
ular military  expedition  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Pickens, 
without  consulting  the  Secretary  of  War  and  without 
his  knowledge  or  that  of  any  of  his  associates.  There 
is  not  in  the  archiv^es  and  history  of  the  Government 
a  record  of  such  mischievous  maladministration,  when 
all  the  circumstances  are  considered,  as  this  secret 
scheme  of  the  Secretarj^  of  State  to  send,  without  con- 
sulting the  War  Department  or  the  General-in-Chief, 
a  military  expediti^  to  Pickens,  which  had  already 
been  relieved.  ^"TVTilitary  and  naval  appropriations 
were  not  at  liis  disposal,  but  he  assumed  their  expen- 
diture. Officers  and  men  of  both  the  War  and  Navy 
Departments  were  surreptitiously,  and  without  the 
knowledge  of  either  the  Secretary  of  War  or  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  withdrawn  from  legitimate  duty  ;  the 
funds  and  means  provided  for  their  respective  depart- 
ments by  Congress,  and  legally  under  their  control, 
for  which  they,  and  not  the  Secretary  of  State,  were 
responsible,  and  which  were  destined  by  them  and  the 
government  for  different  objects,  were  secretly  ab- 
stracted and  diverted  to  purposes  of  which  neither  of 
them,  nor  any  member  of  the  Cabinet,  was  informed. 
In  consequence  of  this  strange  misgov^ernment  there 
was  confusion,  disorganization,  and  demoralization  ;  - 
the  records  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  were 
made  unreliable  and  apparently  false  ;  officers  were 
away  from  their  assigned  duty  ;  funds  were  misap- 
plied ;  important  movements  were  paralyzed  and  de- 
feated ;  the  course  of  the  Administration  was  inter- 
rupted and  incomprehensible,  and  it  is  not  surprising 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

that  it  was  accused  of  weakness  and  mismanagement. 
No  satisfactory  solution  was  ever  made  or  attempted 
for  these  erratic  and  intrusive  proceedings,  other  than 
rumors  or  charges  that  the  Secretary  of  State  had 
given  assurances  in  regard  to  Fort  Sumter  that  were 
unauthorized,  and  which  could  in  no  other  way  be 
earned  out. 

^^^L---^^^(3  condition  of  Fort  Sumter  and  the  necessity  of 
measures  for  its  relief  were  the  firsL_matters  pressed 
upon  the  President,  even  before  hi^C^binej)was  organ- 
ized. In  his  Inaugural  Address  he  had  said,  "  The 
power  coniided  to  me  will  be  used  to  hold,  occupy,  and 
possess  the  property  and  places  belonging  to  the  Gov- 
ernment." This  was  his  policy ;  but  the  Secretary  of 
State,  who  had  different  views,  opposed  sending  rein- 
forcements to  Sumter,  and  in  his  opposition  he  was 
sustained  by  General  Scott,  to  whom  the  subject  was 
first  properly  referred  as  a  military  question.  General 
Scott  gave  his  "hearty  cooperation,"  to  Mr.  Seward, 
and  reported  against  sending  supplies.  All  the  Cab- 
inet, except  Mr.  J3lair,  acquiesced  in  the  military  rec- 
ommendation ;  but  the  President,  after  repeated  dis- 
cussions, rejected  the  advice  of  Mr.  Seward  and  ad- 
hered to  his  own  original  policy.  The  decision  was  a 
great  disappointment  to  the  Secretary  of  State.  It 
was  subsequently  alleged,  and  has  never  been  denied, 
that  he  had  promised  the  rebels  that  Sumter  should  be 
evacuated.  Thurlow  Weed  admitted  in  the  Albany 
Evening  Journal  that  such  a  promise  had  been  made, 
but  though  Mrj_Weed  appears  to  have  been  informed 

—    of  the  fact,  thevgabinej)  was  not.     The  President  was 
not  a  party  to  any  such  assurance,  knew  not  of  it,  and 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND    MR.    SEWARD.  /(f  57 


never  gave  it  his  sanction.  Here,  at  the  very  eom-\ 
mencement  of  the  Administration,  the  two  minds  were' 
in  direct  antagonism  on  a  subject  of  momentous  na- 
tional interest.  The  president,  wlio  is  represented  as 
*'  having  been  selected  partly  on  account  of  the  absence 
of  positive  qualities,"  with  a  ''  mind  not  opened  to  the 
nature  of  the  crisis,"  as  subordinate  and  deficient  in 
"  native  intellectual  power,"  had  a  policy  of  his  own 
in  which  he  persisted,  though  opposed  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  aided  by  the  General-in-Chief  and  the 
^acquiescence  of  all  but  one  of  the  Cabinet.  His 
countrymen  were  with  him  and  his  views,  not  with 
the  Secretary  of  State. 

One  evening  in  the  latter  part  of  the  month  of 
March  there  was  a  small  gathering  at  the  Executive 
Mansion  while  the  Sumter  question  was  still  pending. 
The  members  of  the  Cabinet  were  soon  individually 
and  quietly  invited  to  the  cduncil-chamber,  where,  as 
soon  as  assembled,  the  President  informed  them  he 
had  just  been  advised  by  General  Scott  that  it  was  ex- 
pedient to  evacuate  Fort  Pickens  as  well  as  Fort  Sum- 
ter, which  last  was  assumed  at  military  headquarters 
to  be  a  determined  fact  in  conformity  with  the  views 
of  Secretary  Seward  and  the  General-in-Chief.  This 
astounding  announcement  was  the  more  surprising 
from  the  fact  that  the  Kavy  Department  had,  about  a 
fortnight  previously,  on  the  12th  of  March,  on  the  spe- 
cial application  of  General  Scott,  sent  the  steamer 
Mohawk  to  the  squadron  off  Pensacola  with  orders  to 
land  Captain  Vogdes  and  his  command,  and  thus  rein- 
force Pickens.  Ko  word  had  been  received  from  the 
fort,  or  from  any  quarter,  that  rendered  ne  essary  or 


5S  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

even  expedient  this  unaccountable  change  of  military 
operations.  A  brief  silence  followed  the  announce- 
ment of  the  amazing  recommendation  of  General 
Scott,  when  Mr.  Blair,  who  had  been  much  annoyed 
by  the  vacillating  course  of  the  General-in-Chief  in  re- 
gard to  Sumter,  remarked,  looking  earnestly  at  Mr. 
Seward,  that  it  was  evident  the  old  general  was  play- 
ing politician  in  regard  to  both  Sumter  and  Pickens  ; 
for  it  was  not  possible,  if  there  was  a  defence,  for  the 
rebels  to  take  Pickens  ;  and  the  Administration  would, 
not  be  justified  if  it  listened  to  his  advice  and  evacua- 
ted either.  Yery  soon  thereafter,  I  think  at  the  next 
Cabinet  meetino^,  the  President  announced  his  decision 
that  supplies  should  be  sent  to  Sumter,  and  issued  con- 
fidential orders  to  that  effect.  All  were  gratified  with 
this  decision  except  Mr.  Seward,  who  still  remonstra- 
ted, but  preparations  were  immediately  commenced  to 
fit  out  an  expedition  to  forward  supplies.  To  the 
surprise  of  the  Administration,  information  of  the  con- 
fidential order  to  reinforce  Sumter  was  promptly  sent 
to  Charleston.  It  was  subsequently  ascertained  that 
this  telegram  was  sent  by  Mr.  Harvey,  a  newspaper 
correspondent,  who  was  intimate  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment. Mr.  Harvey  himself  was  soon  after  appointed 
Minister  to  Portugal,  on  the  recommendation  and  by 
request  of  Mr.  Seward. 

It  was  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  March  that  the 
President  informed  the  Qabinet  of  his  determination 
to  relieve  the  garrison  in  Fort  Sumter.  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  the  twenty-ninth  of  March,  Mr.  Seward  in- 
stituted his  secret  military  expedition,  without  consult- 
ing the  Secretary  of  War  or  General  Scott.     Until 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWARD.  59 

this  time  there  had  been  ^*  hearty  cooperation"  be- 
tween them,  but  on  the  twenty-ninth  Mr.  Seward 
took  Montgomery  C.  Meigs,  then  a  captain  of  en- 
gineers, to  the  President,  saying,  "  he  thought  the  Presi- 
dent ought  to  see  some  of  the  younger  officers,  and  not 
consult  only  with  men  who,  if  the  war  broke  out, 
could  not  mount  a  horse,"  as  General  Scott  could  not. 
The  General  had  from  some  cause  or  influence  during 
the  winter  abandoned  his  original  Jacksonian  recom- 

*^ ,  mendation  to  President  Buchanan  that  the  forts  in  the 
-'  v. 
'South  should  be  occupied  and  strengthened.     He  now 

advised  President  Lincoln  to  a  different  policy,  and 
that  Sumter  and  Pickens  should  be  evacuated.  Two 
days  before  the  inauguration  he  had  so  far  yielded  to 
the  secession  movement  as  to  propose  in  a  private  let- 
ter to  Mr.  Seward  as  a  last  alternative,  to  permit 
"  the  wayward  sisters  to  go  in  peace.'' 

This  letter  of  the  second  of  March  was  addressed  to 
Mr.  Seward  who  does  not  appear  to  have  dissented 
from  it.  On  the  contrarj^  knowing  the  position  of 
General  Scott,  consulting  and  advising  with  him 
through  the  winter,  aware  of,  if  he  was  not  instru- 
mental in,  inducino^  the  General  to  cliano:e  his  o'rio:inaI 
recommendation  to  President  Buchanan  that  the  forts 
at  the  South  ought  to  be  garrisoned  and  strengthened, 
Mr.  Seward,  when  the  question  of  reinforcing  Fort 
Sumter  was  under  consideration  advised  that  the  whole 
subject  should  be  referred  to  General  Scott  and  that 
his  report  should  be  conclusive.  At  the  time  he  so] 
advised,  Mr.  Seward  was  aware  of  the  altered  views  or 
position"  of  General  Scott,  but  no  other  member  of  the 
Cabinet  was  informed  of  the  fact.     On  the  eleventh 


60  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

of  March,  General  Scott  made  special  personal  and 
urgent  application  for  a  naval  vessel  to  convey  an 
officer  who  would  be  a  bearer  of  dispatches  with  instruc- 
tions to  Captain  Yogdes  on  the  steamer  Brooklyn  off  the 
harbor  of  Pensacola  to  disembark  his  men  and  reinforce 
Fort  Pickens.  After  orders  had  gone  forward  to  l^ew 
York  to  receive  and  convey  this  officer,  I,  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  succeeding  day,  the  twelfth,  received  a  note 
from  the  general  stating  he  would  not  send  an  officer 
but  a  Avritten  order  which  would  be  sufficient.  The 
earnest  zeal  of  the  preceding  day  had,  from  some  cause 
for  which  I  could  not  account,  abated ;  the  change  in 
that  emergency  for  which  he  gave  no  reason  struck 
me  with  surprise,  nevertheless  I  sent  directfons  for 
Commander  Strong  of  the  Mohawk  to  carry  and 
deliver  the  dispatch,  if  Commander  Craven  of  the 
Crusader  had  sailed. 

Kot  until  the  President,  a  fortnight  later  made 
known  to  the  Cabinet  the  recommendation  of  General 
Scott  to  evacua^S^^i^kens  as  well  as  Sumter,  and  I 
heard  the  remark  from  Mr.  Blair  that  he  was  playing 
politician  instead  of  general  could  I  account  for  the 
change  from  the  programme  of  the  twelftli. 

The  unanimous  rejection  of  his  proposition  to 
evacute  Pickens,  and  the  decision  to  reinforce  Sumter, 
weakened  the  influence  of  General  Scott  and  changed 
Mr.  Seward's  tactics.  Captain  Meigs  was  substituted 
as  military  adviser  of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  man- 
ager of  details  in  his  secret  military  operations.  This' 
method  of  taking  subordinates  into  the  confidence  of 
the  Secretary  of  State,  ignoring  the  whole  Cabinet,  and 
of  administering  the  difierent  departments  of  the  gov- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  61 

ernment,  was  never  before  practised, land  will  at  no 
time  bear  very  close  inspection.  General  Scott,  who 
had  primarily  confided  implicitly  in  Mr.  Seward  was 

^   more  surprised  than  any  other,  at  the  course  things  had 
fflvcn. 

The  President,  in  the  legitimate  discharge  of  his 
functions  as  the  chief  executive  officer  of  the  govern- 
ment, directed  that  supplies  should  be  sent  to  Sumter, 
and   his    coniidential   executive   orders  to  that  effect 

^  .became  an  absorbing  administration  measure.  Military 
preparations  were  made,  and  a  squadron  was  promptly 
iitted  out  by  the  Navy  Department  within  one  week 
from  the  date  of  the  executive  order  to  cooperate  with 
the  military,  and  instructions,  sanctioned  and  approved 
by  the  President,  were  given  to  Captain  Mercer,  of 
the  steam  frigate  Powhatan,  to  command  the  squadron 
and  proceed  off  Charleston  harbor.  The  other  vessels 
were  directed  to  report  to  him  on  the  11th  of  April 
ten  miles  due  east  from  Charleston  lighthouse.  But 
the  whole  plan  and  arrangement  were  defeated.  JSTot 
only  were  the  rebels  advised  of  the  confidential  move- 
ments'of  the  Administration  by  Harvey,  and  Governor 
Pickens  by  particular  request  of  Mr.  Seward  informed 
of  the  intentions  of  the  President  to  send  supplies  but 
not  troops,  if  the  supplies  were  peaceably  received  ;  but 
at  the  moment  of  sailing  the  expedition  was  deprived 
of  its  commander  and  flagship.  Captain  Mercer  was 
displaced  from  the  command  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Kavy  and  the  entire  squadron, 
when  it  arrived  at  the  place  of  rendezvous,  was  desti- 
tute of  a  naval  commander,  flagship,  and  instructions. 
The  Powhatan,  with  boats,  supplies,  and  men  destined 


62  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

for  Sumter,  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  service  to 
which  she  was  especially  ordered,  and  sent,  without 
naval  orders  or  record,  under  a  different  and  junior 
commander,  on  a  secret  and  useless  mission  to  Pensa- 
cola,  by  the  Secretary  of  State.  None  of  these  orders 
emanated  from,  passed  through,  or  were  known  to  the 
Xavy  or  War  Departments.  The  whole  proceeding,  in 
all  its  parts,  w^as  irregular,  disorganizing,  bad  adminis- 
tration, and  deiicient  in  executive  abilitv.  The  Presi- 
dent,  who,  without  giving  the  subject  much  considera-. 
tion,  had  assented  to  the  scheme  of  the  Secretary  of 
State  to  reinforce  Pickens,  was  not  aware  that  the  flag- 
ship of  the  squadron  to  Charleston  had  been  detached, 
and  its  commander  superseded,  until  the  evening  of  the 
6th  of  April,  on  which  da\^  the  Powhatan  sailed  under 
a  different  officer  for  a  distant  destination,  carrying 
off  supplies,  munitions,  and  boats  which  the  Navy  De- 
partment had  ordered  for  Sumter.  I  was  not  made 
acquainted  with  this  secret  proceeding  until  the  Pow- 
hatan sailed,  when  I  immediately  informed  the  Pres- 
ident. So  soon  as  aware  of  the  fact,  he  directed  Mr. 
Seward,  although  it  was  then  midnight,  to  telegraph 
forthwith  and  countermand  the  orders  which  detached 
that  vessel ;  to  reinstate  Mercer,  and  in  no  way  to  inter- 
fere with  the  arrangements  of  the  Secretarv  of  the 
Navy.  Mr.  Seward  remonstrated,  claimed  that  tlie 
Powhatan  was  essential  to  reinforce  Pickens,  but  the 
President  was  decided.  A  brief  and  curious  telegram 
was  sent  by  Mr.  Seward  in  his  own  name  to  New 
York,  and  a  fast  boat  despatched  from  the  Navy  Yard 
which  overtook  the  Powhatan  at  Staten  Island,  but 
nothing  was  accomplished.     The   Sumter   expedition 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  G3 

sailed  without  a  naval  commander,  the  squadron  had 
no  head,  and  the  Powhatan,  one  of  the  three  naval 
vessels  on  the  Atlantic  coast  on  which  the  government 
relied  in  that  "  perilous  emergency,"  w^ith  her  large 
crew  and  armament,  was  sent  to  the  Gulf,  where  she 
was  not  wanted,  and  where  almost  the  whole  home 
squadron  was  concentrated,  while  the  whole  maritime 
frontier  north  of  Cape  Florida  was  left  destitute.  It 
was  on  the  night  of  the  6th  of  April  that  the  Powhatan 
sailed  for  Pickens.  On  the  next  day  Mr.  Seward  sent 
to  Judge  Campbell,  a  leading  secessionist  on  the  Su- 
preme bench  :  "  Faith  as  to  Sumter  fully  kept.  Wait 
and  see." 

In  these  proceedings  the  administration  and  execu- 
t've  management  of  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
State,  respectively,  may  be  seen.  The  merits,  sincerity, 
acts,  and  policy  of  each  are  disclosed,  and  from  them  a 
more  correct  estimate  may  be  formed  of  their  ability, 
respective  fitness,  and  peculiar  qualities  to  discharge 
the  duties  of  chief  magistrate,  than  from  the  partial  and 
prejudiced  assertions  of  interested  partisans. 

I  h'ave  made  mention  of  only  certain  general  meas- 
ures of  administration  in  regard  to  the  relief  of  Sumter, 
but  it  may  be  said  in  passing  that  there  is  an  unwritten 
historv  of  the  transaction — of  vacillatina:  chano^es  on 
the  part  of  General  Scott ;  of  the  singular  notice  of 
Major  Anderson  to  Mr.  Buchanan  on  the  morning  of 
the  4th  of  March,  an  hour  or  two  before  the  inaugura- 
tion of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  of  the  stirring  tidings  to  Mr. 
Lincoln  on  his  taking  the  inaugural  oath,  of  the  prep- 
arations and  non-preparations  for  defence,  and  other 


64  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

planning — which  is  yet  to  be  analj^zed  and  developed, 
but  would  be  inappropriate  in  this  place. 


The  followino^  letter  from  ex-Postmaster-General 
Blair,  one  of  the  surviving  members  of  the  first  Cabi- 
net of  Mr.  Lincoln,  corroborative  of  the  foregoing 
statement,  and  illustrative  of  the  character  and  course 
of  the  late  Secretary  of  State  in  other  respects  will  be 
read  with  interest : 

"Washington,  May  17,  1873. 

"My  Dear  Mr.  Welles:  I  duly  received  yours 
of  the  14th.  You  will  have  seen  ere  this  that  I  have 
anticipated  your  advice  and  made  a  statement  in  reply 
to  Mr.  Adams  on  the  relations  of  Messrs.  Lincoln  and 
Seward.  I  know  that  a  fuller  statement  would  be  read 
with  interest,  but  I  prefer  to  leave  that  to  you.  I  am 
tempted,  however,  to  contribute  a  short  chapter  to  your 
exposition,  and  to  illustrate  Mr.  Seward's  character  by 
giving  an  account  of  his  intrigue  to  surrender  the  forts 
and  allow  secession  to  take  its  course,  and  his  sudden 
change  of  policy  when  he  found  that  Mr.  Lincoln  would 
resist  secession. 

General  Scott  was  his  great  card  at  the  outset. 
Lincoln,  having  been  a  Whig  and  a  supporter  of  Scott 
for  the  Presidency,  had  persuaded  himself  in  the  canvass 
that  the  old  general  was  a  great  military  man ;  and  the 
general  being  really  patriotic,  and  having  learned  from 
General  Jackson  how  to  deal  with  secession,  would  have 
given  good  advice,  if,  unfortunately,  he  had  not  fallen 
into  Mr.  Adams'  error  in  regarding  Mr.  Seward  as  the 
head  of  the  government,  and  for  this  reason  surrendered 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  65 

his  own  better  judgment  to  that  of  Mr.  Seward.  This 
IS  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  had  advised  Mr.  Buchanan 
to  reinforce  the  forts.  But  in  deference  to  Mr.  Seward 
^e  changed  all  this,  gave  up  his  own  opinions,  and  said, 
*'Let  the  wayward  sisters  go  in  peace  ;  "  and  actually 
advised  the  surrender  of  Fort  Pickens  at  Pensacola  as 
well  as  Fort  Sumter  at  Charleston  ! 

I  never  shall  forget  the  President's  excitement  when, 
after  a  Cabinet  dinner  at  the  White  House,  he  called 
the  Cabinet  into  a  separate  room,  and  informed  us  that 
General  Scott  had  told  him  it  would  be  necessary/  to 
evacuate  Fort  Pickens  as  well  as  Fort  Sumter.  It  was 
while  the  question  of  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  was 
undecided  ;  but  at  a  time  when  it  was  believed  the  fort 
would  be  surrendered,  and  after  the  way  had  been  pre- 
pared for  it  by  statements  in  the  Press  that  the  fort  was 
untenable.  A  very  oppressive  silence  succeeded  the 
President's  statement  of  what  General  Scott  had  said. 
At  length  it  was  said  this  advice  of  the  general's  was 
enough  of  itself  to  show  that  he  was  playing  politician 
and  not  general  as  respects  Fort  Sumter,  as  well  as  with 
respect  to  Fort  Pickens,  for  there  was  no  reason  to 
believe  that  Fort  Pickens  could  be  taken  from  us." 

"  Mt.  Seward  had  overshot  the  mark  this  time*  The 
Cabinet  generally  had  been  convinced  that  Fort  Sumter 
was  untenable,  and  acquiesced  in  its  surrender,  submit- 
ting to  the  inevitable.  But  there  was  no  apprehension 
felt  about  Fort  Pickens.  The  fort  was  well  supplied, 
and  was  actually  impregnable  while  we  commanded  the 
sea,  and  we  then  had  a  large  naval  force  there.  Hence, 
when  the  general  said  we  must  give  up  this  fort  too, 
the  President's  confidence  in  him  was  staggered,  _and 
from  that  rnnmpnt  T  \m\m(^.  always  thonght  his  power  with  ( 
the  President  waned.  T 


06  MR.    LIXCOLX    AXD    ME.    SEWAED. 

"  When  Mr.  Seward  saw  that  his  policy  of  meeting 
"exaction  with  concession"  and  "violence  with  peace," 
announced  in  his  speech  of  January  12,  1861,  had  failed, 
and  that  the  President  would  not  agree  to  surrender 
the  forts,  as  Mr.  Seward  had  induced  General  Scott  to 
recommend  him  to  do,  he  immediately  telegraphed  Gov- 
ernor Pickens,  by  the  hands  df  Mr.  Harvey,  his  Portu- 
guese minister,  that  an  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  rein- 
force Sumter.  General  Anderson  had  made  no  prepa- 
rations to  defend  it,  but  left  his  barracks  standing,  to  be 
fired  at  the  first  shot,  instead  of  pulling  them  down  and  ^^ 
taking  to  his  casemates,  as  he  certainly  would  have 
done  if  he  had  not  been  authoritatively  told  that  the  fort 
teas  to  be  evacuated  as  soon  as  the  small  su])ply  of2yroviS' 
io7is  on  hand  had  been  consumed.  But  for  this  negli- 
gence for  which  he  was  never  chided^  the  fort  was  im- 
pregnable, as  events  proved,  for  we  could  never  take  it 
from  the  Confederates.  To  make  sure  of  defeating  the 
relief,  however,  the  Powhatan,  on  whose  seamen  and 
guns  the  success  of  this  expedition  wholly  depended, 
was  secretly  detached,  by  an  order  surreptitiously  ob- 
tained from  the  President,  on  the  pretext  of  relieving 
Fort  Pickens,  which  was  in  no  danger,  for  the  defence 
of  which  ample  provision  had  already  been  matfle,  and 
to  whose  relief  the  Powhatan  was  wholly  unnecessary 
and  in  no  way  contributed. 

"  Mr.  Seward  had  two  objects  in  detaching  this  ves- 
sel :  1st,  It  defeated  the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter,  which 
he  was  pledged  to  surrender,  and  the  failure  to  relieve 
it  would  vindicate  his  judgment  in  advising  against  the 
attempt.  2d,  Fort  Pickens  could  be  claimed  as  having 
been  saved  by  an  expedition  conceived  and  carried  into 
execution  under  his  orders,  and  so,  though  he  would  by 
this  movement  abandon  his  method  of  meeting  "  exac- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  67 

tion  with  concession"  and  "violence  with  peace,"  he. 
would  signalize  his  abandonment  of  his  peace  policy  by- 
such  a  success  in  administering  the  force  policy,  as  to 
put  himself  per  saltum  at  the  -head  of  his  opponents, 
discomfited  by  the  failure  of  their  attempt  at  resistance. 
And  accordingly,  though  the  Powhatan  did  but  sail  to 
Pensacola  and  back  again,  it  was  heralded  as  a  great 
achievement. 

"  The  result  of  this  scheming  was  sad  indeed.  Our 
flag  on  Fort  Sumter  held  Beauregard  at  Charleston. 
When  it  fell  he  marched  into  Virginia  and  precipi- 
tated secession  there.  If  we  could  have  held  Fort  Sum- 
ter there  never  would  have  been  a  drop  of  blood  shed. 
It  was  the  coercion  of  Virginia  into  the  Confederacy  by 
Beauregard's  army  that  made  the  war.  General  Jack- 
son held  nullification  in  check,  and  compelled  the  repeal 
of  the  South  Carolina  ordinance,  simply  by  sending 
Scott,  with  one  thousand  men,  to  hold  Fort  Moukrie. 
Sumter  was  infinitelv  strono;er,  and  the  North  was  rela- 
tively  as  much  stronger  than  the  South  in  1860  as  Sum- 
ter was  stronger  than  Moultrie  in  1833.  Fortunately, 
the  country  w*as  not  cursed  in  Jackson's  day  with  a 
meddling  Secretary  of  State,  to  invite  secession  by 
agreeing  to  yield  to  its  exactions  and  disarm  the  force 
ordered  for  its  suppression,  which  was  all-sufficient  for 
the  purpose  at  the  start — using,  without  stint,  his  pa- 
tronage and  power  to  palm  off  through  the  Press  the  blun- 
dering intrigcues  which  brousrht  on  a  disastrous  war,  as 
statesmanship,  and  holding  on  to  place  by  abandoning 
any  policy  which  stood  in  the  way  of  it,  or  by  adopting 
any  which  might  be  required  to  retain  it.  I  may  misjudge 
Mr.  Seward,  but  if  I  do  it  is  not  because  I  have  ever  had 
the  least  unkind  feeling  toward  him  personally.  He 
never  gave  me  the  slightest  reason  for  personal  ill-will  to 


68  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

him.  My  opposition  to  him  has  always  been  political, 
and  because  I  regarded  him  as  a  most  unsafe  puV>lic 
man.  He  was  a  kindly  man  in  his  social  relations,  and 
when  I  met  him  in  his  home  and  family  I  enjoyed  his 
society  and  was  interested  in  him  and  them,  and  had  a 
warm  and  sympathetic  feeling  for  all  that  pertained  to 
his  domestic  life.  In  that  sphere  I  think  he  was  a  good 
and  pure  man.  There  was  a  freshness  and  heartiness  in 
his  manner,  and  his  conversation  so  abounded  in  humor, 
and  there  was  such  an  endless  flow  in  his  spirits,  that  I 
always  found  his  society  attractive.  It  was  only  against 
the  political  man  that  my  nature  revolted.  He  was  to 
me  the  personification  of  old  Polonius'  politician,  who 
"  by  indirection  found  direction  out."  Nor  is  this  ver- 
sion of  his  character  the  result  merely  of  my  own  obser- 
vation of  his  conduct,  or  derived  from  the  reports  of 
others  who  have  been  associated  with  him.  I  have  seen 
much  of  him,  and  much  of  those  who  have  associated 
long  with  him.  But  the  familiar  facts  of  his  life,  deriv- 
ed from  these  sources,  accord  exactly  with  the  political 
philosophy  I  have  heard  him  propound  over  and  over 
asrain.  No  one  has  ever  associated  Ion 2:' with  him  who 
has  not  heard  him  recount  by  the  hour  his  successful 
political  strategy.  I  could  fill  a  volume  with  his  narra- 
tives of  the  tricks  he  has  played,  if  I  could  recall  the 
half  part  of  what  I  have  heard  from  him.  He  really 
thought  that  politics  was  but  a  game.  I  shall  never 
forget  how  shocked  I  was  at  his  tellincj  me  that  he  was 
the  man  who  put  Archy  Dixon,  the  Whig  Senator  from 
Kentucky  in  1854,  up  to  moving  the  repeal  of  the  Mis- 
souri Compromise,  as  an  amendment  to  Douglas's  first 
Kansas  bill,  and  had  himself  forced  the  repeal  by  that 
movement,  and  had  thus  brought  to  life  the  Republican 
party.     Dixon  was  to  out-herod  Herod  at  the  South, 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  69 

and  he  would  out-herod  Herod  at  the  North.     He  did 

not  contemplate  what  followed.     He  did  not  believe  in 

the  reality  of  the  passions   he  excited,  because  he  felt 

none  himself.     He  thought  it  all  a  harmless  game  for 

power. 

"  Yours  truly, 

"Montgomery  Blair." 


The  crowded  incidents  of  the  early  days  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's  Presidency,  while  the  members  of  the  Cabi- 
net were  new  to  each  other,  and  their  relative  stand- 
ing and  authority  apparently  unsettled,  the  character 
of  the  Administration  not  yet  defined,  and  the  ^ov- 
ernment  and  countrymuch  demoralized)  are  deeply 
interesting,  and  some  of  them  of  a  singular  description. 
In  his  confiding  nature  the  President  doubtless  trusted 
much  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

On  the  evening  of  the  1st  of  April,  Mr.  Nicolay, 
the  private  secretary  of  the  President,  brought  me  a 
package  containing  papers,  instructions,  and  executive 
orders  of  a  most  extraordinary  character.  One  of 
them  directed  me  to  detach  Commodore  Stringham,  a 
patriotic  ofiicer  whom  I  had  called  to  special  duty  in 
the  Navy  Department,  where  he  was  employed  in 
confidential  trusts,  and  send  him  to  Pensacola.  Com- 
modore Pendergrast,  who  had  just  arrived  at  Hamp- 
ton Roads  from  the  West  Indies  with  the  Cumberland, 
was  ordered  to  repair  forthwith  to  Yera  Cruz  on 
account  of  alleged  complications.  Why  these  two 
officers  in  whom  I  confided  were  selected  to  be  sent 
SiWSLj  was  a  mystery.  On  the  Cumberland  and  the 
Powhatan  the  Navy  Department  was  relying  to  co- 


70  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.'  SEWARD. 

operate  with  the  military,  for  the  protection  of  the 
Navy  Yard  at  Norfolk  in  case  of  diflSculty.  All  these 
orders  relating  to  the  brvj  were  issued  by  the  Secre- 
tary^ of  State  without  consultation  with  the  Secretary 
of  the  Nav^y  or  any  Cabin^  consultation  whatever. 
But  the  most  extraordinary  and  irregular  if  not  illegal 
order  in  that  remarkable  package  directed  a  reorgani- 
zation of  the  Navy  Department,  and  the  establish- 
ment of  a  new  bureau,  in  which  I  was  commanded  to 
place  in  the  most  confidential  relations,  where  he 
should  have  knowledge  of  all  the  iniportant  transac- 
tions of  the  navy  and  Navy  Department,  and  the 
government,  Samuel  Barron,  a  finished  courtier  and 
shrewd  secessionist.  On  looking  over  these  documents 
it  was  evident  to  me  that  the  President  had  been  the 
victim  of  misplaced  confidence  and  was  sadly  imposed 
upon,  or  that  he  was  as  unfit  for  the  office  of  Chief 
Executive  as  is  represented  in  the  "  Memorial  Address." 
I  lost  not  a  moment  in  waiting  upon  him,  and  reading 
to  him  these  extraordinary  papers.  He  promptly  and 
emphatically  disavowed  them ;  said  he  had  hurriedly 
and  without  examination  signed  a  large  number  of 
papers  which  had  been  brought  to  him  by  Secretary 
Seward  for  a  very  different  purpose,  and  which  he 
had  supposed  were  merely  formal ;  that  he  was  not 
aware  of  their  contents ;  had  trusted  entirely  to  Mr. 
Seward  ;  and  whom  could  he  trust  if  not  the  Secretary 
of  State  ?  He  requested  me  to  return  him  the  orders 
or  treat  them  as  nullities.  The  result  was,  no  new 
bureau  was  organized  without  law;  Barron  was  not 
taken  into  the  confidence  of  the  Navy  Department, 
but  soon  deserted  and  was  the  first  naval  officer  cap- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SKWARD.  71 

tured  in  the  rebel  service ;  Stringham  never  went  to 
Pensacola  nor  Pendergrast  again  to  Yera  Cruz,  nor 
was  there  any  complication  that  required  it. 


It  is  stated  that  President  Lincoln  was  ^'  quite  de- 
ficient in  his  acquaintance  with  the  character  and 
qualities  of  public  men,  or  their  aptitude  for  the  posi- 
tions to  which  he  assigned  them.  Indeed,  he  never 
selected  them  solely  by  that  standard.''  The  authori- 
ty for  this  statement  is  not  given.  It  relates,  apparent- 
ly, chiefly  to  appointments  abroad,  and  these  appoint- 
ments for  which  the  President  is  held  responsible, 
were  most  of  them  made  on  the  recommendation  of 
Mr.  Seward,  to  whose  department  they  properly  ap- 
pertained, and  who  was  vigilant  and  tenacious  in  dis- 
pensing the  patronage  of  the  State  Department,  often 
without  consulting  others. 

On  this  point  of  selecting  officials,  or  being  con- 
sulted in  regard  to  appointments  which  came  within 
the  purview  of  his  department,  no  man  was  more  sen- 
sitive than  Mr.  Seward,  though  himself  not  always  re- 
gardful of  what  in  this  respect  was  due  to  others. 

In  March  1861,  while  the  Senate  was  in  extra 
session,  differences  existed  between  the  Secretary  of 
State  and  the  Senators  from  New  York  relative  to  the 
local  appointments  in  that  state.  These  differences 
resulted  in  a  conference  at  the  State  Department,  to 
w^hich  the  President  was  specially  invited,  and  con 
sented  with  some  reluctance  to  be  present.  It  was  an 
evening  consultation,  and  he  thought  proper  to  invite 
me   to   accompany   him.     The   President,    Secretary 


<2  MR-.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWAKD. 

Seward,  and  Senators  King  and  Harris  were  the  only 
persons  besides  myself  in  attendance.  Before  taking 
np  the  list  of  names  the  President  said  he  would  re- 
lieve them  of  any  difference  in  regard  to  the  most  im- 
portant office,  that  of  Collector,  by  appointing  on  his 
own  responsibility  and  from  personal  knowledge,  Hi- 
ram Barney,  who  had  his  confidence  and  was  a  man 
of  integrity.  There  was  but  a  single  civil  appoint- 
ment, that  of  Kavy  Agent,  connected  with  the  ]^avy 
Department  to  be  made.  No  disagreement  existed 
concerning  that,  which  was  soon  disposed  of,  when  ^ 
Mr.  Seward  remarked  it  would  be  unnecessary  to  de- 
tain me  longer,  but  the  President  and  the  Senators 
desired  me  to  remain.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into 
the  particulars  of  that  conference,  which  seemed  to 
cover  most  of  the  important  appointments  in  the  city 
and  State  of  New  York.  After  listening  to  the  dis- 
position of  some  collectorships  and  other  offices  in 
which  there  was  an  approximation  to  agreement,  an 
intimation  was  thrown  out  by  Mr.  Seward  that  he 
wished  the  list  which  he  had  made  out,  and  which  was 
somewhat  extended,  might  be  completed  and  the  nom- 
inations sent  forthwith  to  the  Senate.  This  embarrassed 
the  two  Senators  who  were  unprepared  for  so  hast}^  a 
movement.  1  inquired  if  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury and  Attorney  General  had  been  consulted,  and 
concurred  in  the  selection.  Mr.  Seward  said  they  had 
not ;  that  it  was  unnecessary ;  that  these  were  New 
York  appointments,  and  he  and  the  Senators  knew 
better  ihan  any  others  what  was  best  for  the  party  and 
the  administration  in  that  state.  I  remarked  that 
Cabinet  officers  were  responsible  for  the  proper  admin- 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWAKD. 

istration  of  their  respective  departments  ;  that  subor- 
dinates should  have  their  confidence,  and  if  changes 
were  to  be  made  of  the  incumbents,  the  new  selections 
should  be  by  them  or  with  their  concurrence;  that  to 
fill  the  offices  under  them  with  untried  men  w^hom 
they  did  not  know,  and  without  their  knowledge,  ap- 
peared to  me  improper  and  would  be  likely  to  cause 
difficulties. .  Mr.  Seward  dissented,  and  claimed  that 
he  knew  what  was  best  for  the  Administration  in  Isew 
York  ;  that  there  were  personal  and  party  matters  to 
be  considered,  which  neither  Mr.  Chase  nor  Mr.  Bates 
could  understand  so  well  as  himself.  I  disclaimed  any 
intention  to  meddle  with  'New  York  parties  or  New 
York  controversies ;  but  besides  courtesies  which  it 
would  be  well  always  to  observe,  I  insisted  as  a  sound 
principle  and  correct  rule  of  action  that  the  heads  of 
departments  should,  if  they  did  not  select,  at  least  be 
consulted  in  regard  to  the  appointments  of  their  sub- 
ordinates. The  President  said  I  was  right ;  that  to 
fill  the  New  York  appointments  as  Mr.  Seward  wished, 
without  consulting  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and 
others  directly  interested,  would,  he  was  convinced, 
not  be  satisfactory.  He  was  willing  to  hear  any  re- 
marks or  suggestions  relative  to  candidates,  to  take 
their  recommendations;  but  it  must  be  distinctly  un- 
derstood that  there  would  be  nothing  conclusive  until 
he  advised  with  the  heads  of  the  departments  interest- 
ed. Witli  this,  the  meeting  soon  and  somewhat  ab- 
ruptly terminated. 

Mr.  Thurlow  Weed  has  related  and  published  more 
than  once  what  he  deems  a   creditable  proceeding, 
which    exemplifies   the   Albany   practice   of  making 
4 


74  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

appointments,  and  the  method  of  discharging  the 
executive  functions  with  which  he  was  familiar.  He 
was  going,  he  says,  on  a  brief  errand  to  Washington 
early  in  the  administration,  when  he  was  requested  by 
some  of  his  party  intimates  to  get  a  snug  place  for  a 
naturalized  Englishman  who  had  for  years  been  a 
willing  runner,  or  whipper-in,  for  the  Whigs  of  New 
York  city,  a  sort  of  "  Tim  Linkenwater"  Weed  says, 
but  who  now  wished  to  go  home  and  spend  his  last 
days  in  a  comfortable  place  in  England.  The  request 
was  cheerfully  assented  to,  and  Mr.  Weed  on  the 
morning  of  his  arrival,  while  at  breakfast  with  the 
Secretary  of  State,  communicated  the  wishes  of  their 
party  friends,  and  was  assured  the  solicited  appoint- 
ment should  be  made.  Immediately,  without  inquiry 
or  investigation,  and  while  they  were  at  breakfast,  the 
Secretary,  with  his  accustomed  promptness,  ordered 
the  removal  of  the  consul  at  Falmouth  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  party  instrument  "  Tim  Linkenwater" 
in  his  place.  When  Weed  called  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment for  the  commission,  Mr.  Hunter,  the  old  chief 
clerk,  on  d^-ivering  the  document  expressed  his  regret 
at  the  change.  The  consul  whom  you  remove,  said 
Mr.  Hunter,  is  one  of  the  most  correct  and  efficient 
officers  in  the  consular  service,  as  was  his  father  before 
him.  That  father  was  the  open,  steadfast,  and  true 
friend  of  our  country  in  the  war  of  independence. 
General  Washington  when  President,  in  grateful 
remembrance  of  the  sympathy  and  friendship  of  this 
English  gentleman, appointed  him  consul  at  Falmouth; 
and  on  his  death.  General  Jackson  appointed  the  son, 
whom  you  now  remove  without  fault  or  complaint 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWARD.  75 

after  years  of  faithful  service.  It  makes  me  sad,  said 
the  old  clerk.  Weed  acknowledged  he  was  ashamed. 
His  sensibilities  were  touched  for  fehe  man ;  there  had 
been  no  thought  for  the  faithful  incumbent  or  the 
welfare  of  the  government.  He  declined  to  take  the 
commission,  and  the  removed  consul  was  by  Mr.  Weed, 
not  by  Mr.  Seward,  reinstated  without  ever  knowing 
he  had  been  displaced.  Ko  Secretary  of  State  had 
ever  before  permitted  a  partisan  editor  to  enter  the 
State  Department  and  take  such  freedom  with  impor- 
tant appointments.  Mr.  Weed  assumes  and  is  entitled 
to  the  credit  of  not  finally  consummating  a  wrong  after 
he  learned  the  facts,  though  he  did  not  inquire  into 
the  case,  nor  did  the  State  Department  before  ordering 
the  removal. 


The  "Memorial  Address"  declares  that  "no  ex- 
periment so  rash  has  ever  been  made  as  that  of  elevat- 
ing to  the  head  of  affairs  a  man  with  so  little  previous 
preparation  for  his  task  as  Mr.  Lincoln.  If  this  be 
true  of  him  in  regard  to  the  course  of  domestic  admin- 
istration, with  which  he  might  be  supposed  partially 
familiar,  it  is  eminently  so  in  respect  to  the  foreign 
relations  of  which  he  knew  absolutely  nothing." 

No  greater  mistake  or  misrepresentation  could  be 
made.  Men  vastly  inferior  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  less  quali- 
fied and  less  able,  have  been  elected  President ;  and 
his  general  knowledge  of  our  "  foreign  relations,"  if 
not  as  minute  in  routine  and  current  details  as  that  of 
members  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Helations,  was 
more  enlarged  and  comprehensive  than  that  of  many  in 


76  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

those  positions.  Some  of  our  countrymen,  who  live 
and  die  in  retirement  without  ever  holding  office,  give 
attention  to  those  subjects,  and  are  more  capable  of 
discharging  the  duties,  and  would  represent  the  gov- 
ernment abroad  witli  more  ability  than  the  persons 
selected.  Without  specifying  particulars  on  these  mat- 
ters, I  may  mention  that  this  man,  who  is  represented 
as  so  totally  ignorant  and  unfit,  and  so  destitute  of  ex- 
perience, and  who  it  is  said  "  absolutely  knew  noth- 
ing " — concerning  them,  showed  intelligence,  sound 
judgment,  and  correct  views  at  the  very  commence- 
ment of  the  administration,  on  a  most  interesting  occa- 
sion, above  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  was,  by  the 
standard  of  Mr.  Adams,  greatly  his  superior.  In  an 
important  dispatch  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr. 
Adams,  who  was  then  our  Minister  at  London,  Mr. 
Lincoln  took  the  document,  which  he  considered  in 
some  respects  exceptional,  criticised,  modified;  and  with 
his  own  hand  expurgated,  corrected,  and  improved  it, 
and  changed  its  character.  This  paper  related  to  the 
recognition  of  belligerent  rights,  was  addressed  to  Mr. 
Adams,  and  is  probably  now  on  the  files  of  the  State 
Department  in  its  original  form,  with  the  corrections 
and  improvements  of  the  President.  Mr.  Adams  was 
doubtless  unaware  that  the  President,  who,  he  says, 
*'  absolutely  knew  nothing  "  of  our  foreign  relations, 
was  substantially  the  author  of  the  instructions  to  him- 
self, and  laid  down  the  chart  by  which  he  was  to  be 
guided  in  a  most  important  matter  of  national  concern- 
ment. The  President  overruled  and  set  aside  soma 
of  the  elaborate  and  important,  but  in  his  view,  objec- 
tionable  portions   of   the    dispatch   of    Mr.   Seward. 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  77 

These  facts  are  known  beyond  the  Cabinet  circle,  and 
are  consequently  no  secret.  There  were  other  marked 
cases  of  intelligent  supervision  of  our  foreign  aifairs 
and  their  management  by  the  President  in  the  final 
summing  up  on  important  questions,  which  overthrow 
the  statements  of  Mr.  Adams,  who  has  an  utterly  false 
conception  of  the  relative  position,  ability,  and  charac- 
ter of  the  two  men  of  whom  he  speaks.  To  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  whose  special  duty  it  was  to  investigate 
and  report  upon  international  subjects,  and  prepare 
instructions  to  the  respresentatives  of  the  government 
abroad,  the  President  gave  the  same,  perhaps  closer 
attention  than  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  who 
issued  instructions  and  orders  to  the  commanders  of 
squadrons  and  officers  on  special  duty.  In  no  respect 
was  the  Secretary  of  State  on  a  different  footing  in 
administering  the  government  from  other  heads  of 
departments  nor  did  he  infuse  more  vigor  or  character 
in  the  administration.  He  was  more  constant  and 
unwearied  than  others  in  his  attention  to  and  atten- 
dance upon  the  President,  made  it  a  point  to  alw^ays 
accompany  him  in  his  visits  to  the  army  or  wherever 
he  appeared  in  public,  and  was  personally  very  devoted 
to  him,  but  never  exercised  higher  executive  authority 
or  had  "  the  more  solid  power  to  direct  affairs  for  the 
benefit  of  the  nation  "  than  his  associates.  There  were 
in  the  foreigu  policy  of  the  government  during  Mr. 
Lincoln's  administration  fewer  and  less  perplexing 
questions,  less  serious  complications  than  under  several 
of  our  previous  Presidents.  But  the  domestic  admin- 
istration from  the  commencement  to  its  close  was  one 
of  unprecedented  labor  and   responsibility   requiring 


78  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

energy,  vigilance,  executive  and  administrative  ability, 
such  as  had  never  before  devolved  on  the  Cliief  Maoris- 
trate  or  the  government.  The  action  and  responsibil- 
\  itj  of  others  were  far  greater  than  those  devolved  on 
the  Secretary  of  State. 


It  is  admitted  by  Mr.  Adams  that,  while  wanting 
in  the  qualities  of  President,  and  while  "  no  experi- 
ment so  rash  has  ever  been  made  as  that  of  elevating 
to  the  head  of  affairs  a  man  with  so  little  previous 
preparation  for  his  task  as  Mr.  Lincoln,"  "he  after- 
wards proved  himself  before  tbe  world,  a  pure,  brave, 
honest  man,  faithful  to  his  arduous  work."  ^Nothing 
more.  It  is  still  left  to  be  inferred  that  though  he 
meant  well,  he  was  incompetent  and  without  ability  to 
discharge  the  duties  of  his  position,  except  under  the 
direction  of  one  of  his  subordinates  who  had  really 
less  to  do  than  others  in  the  domestic  administration 
of  the  government.  It  does  not  occur  to  Mr.  Adams 
that  he  undeV  estimated  the  ability  of  the  President  of 
whom  he  personally  knew  little,  and  that  the  people 
formed  a  more  correct  estimate  of  their  Chief  Majes- 
trate's  capacity  than  himself.  He  gives  no  credit  to 
President  Lincoln  for  far-seeing  sagacit}^,  in  which  he 
excelled  most  men  of  his  time ;  for  knowledge  of  the 
structure  of  the  government  and  information  on 
public  affairs,  which  he  had  studied  with  diligence 
and  passionate  fondness;  for  arduous  and  successful 
labors,  though  holding  no  office,  endowed  with  no 
wealth,  and  aided  by  no  metropolitan  funds,  in  his 
great  struggle  for  constitutional  freedom ;  for  execu- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  79 

tive  and  administrative  ability,  for  sound  judgment, 
intellectual  capacity,  mental  power,  and  practical 
knowledge,  which  enabled  him  to  stand  at  the  helm 
and  guide  the  government  through  storms  and  dan- 
gers such  as  no  country  ever  experienced.  In  all 
these  qualities  the  impression  is  conveyed  that  this 
remarkable  man  was  deficient,  but  that  they  were 
possessed  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  was  "  not 
blind  to  the  deficiencies  of  his  chief."  Indeed,  the 
whole  language,  tone,  tenor,  sentiment,  and  intent  of 
the  address  are  to  elevate  Mr.  Seward  and  depreciate 
Mr.  Lincoln  ;  to  award  to  the  Secretary  honors  that 
clearly  belong  to  the  President ;  to  make  it  appear 
that  the  subordinate  controlled  and  directed  the  prin- 
cipal ;  that  the  Secretar}^  of  State  was  de  facto  Presi- 
dent, and  the  President  himself  a  mere  locum  tenens^ 
incompetent  for  the  place  from  the  want  of  "  experi- 
ence" and  ''previous  preparation."  Mr.  Seward  had 
influence  in  the  administration,  but  not  control.  His 
mental  activity,  the  "  marvellous  fertility  of  his  pen," 
his  proneness  to  exercise  authority  and  to  make  him- 
self conspicuous  on  every  important  subject  and  occa- 
sion, imposed  on  admiring  and  willing  friends,  who, 
like  Mr.  Adams,  persuaded  themselves  that  one  so 
active  and  prominent  must  be  the  moving  and  direct- 
ing spirit  of  the  administration.  It  would  be  diffi- 
cult, however,  for  his  most  partial  friends  to  specify 
any  financial,  military,  naval,  territorial  or  general 
measure  of  administration,  which  had  its  origin  with 
or  was  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  while  the 
President  suggested  some  and  directed  all.  Mr. 
Seward  could  adapt  himself  to,  or  adopt  and  appropri- 


80  MR.    LINCOLN   AND    ME.    SEWARD. 

ate  the  views  of,  others  with  wonderful  facility  and 
address  could  second  their  propositions,  and  support 
them  with  a  zeal  and  earnestness  which  made  them 
seem  his  own. 


Me.  Adams  says  he  knows  that  in  order  to  cut  up 
by  the  roots  the  possibility  of  misunderstanding  or 
rivalry  between  the  President  and  Secretary  of  State, 
"  Mr.  Seward  deliberately  came  to  the  conclusion  to 
stifle  every  sensation  left  him  of  aspiration  in  the  future, 
by  establishing  a  distinct  understanding  with  the  Presi- 
dent on  that  subject."  "  Thus  it  happened  that  Mr. 
Seward  voluntarily  dismissed  forever  the  noblest 
dreams  of  an  ambition  he  had  the  clearest  right  to  in- 
dulge, in  exchange  for  a  more  solid  power  to  direct 
affairs  for  the  benefit  of  the  nation  through  the  name 
of  another,  who  should  yet  appear  in  all  later  time  to 
reap  the  honors  due  chiefly  to  his  labors." 

That  Mr.  Seward  signified  to  the  President  he 
should  not  be  a  competitor  with  him  for  the  office  of 
Chief  Magistrate  in  1864  is  not  improbable,  and  but 
for  the  disparagement  so  ungenerously  as  well  as  unjust- 
ly thrown  upon  the  President,  who  according  to  the 
"  Memorial  Address"  was  "  in  all  later  times  to  reap 
the  honors  due  chiefly  to  Mr.  Seward's  labors,"  the  lat- 
ter should  have  the  unrestricted  credit  of  patriotic 
self-abnegation.  But  the  truth  must  not  be  suppressed 
or  perverted,  and  there  are,  aside  from  the  act  of  dec- 
lination but  connected  with  it,  certain  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances which  are  essential  to  a  right  understand- 


MK.    LINCOLN   AND    MR.    SEWAED.  /^81    ) 

ing  of  the  case,  and  which,  if  the  subject  be  albided 
to,  truth  requires  should  not  be  omitted. 

In  December  1862,  the  dissatisfaction  which  ex- 
isted in  Congress  and  the  country  against  the  imputed 
meddlesome  interference  and  alleo^ed  mismanas^ement 
of  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  his  supposed  influence 
over  the  Executive,  was  such  that  a  very  general  desire 
was  expressed  that  he  should  leave  the  Cabinet  and  \, 
retire  from  the  Administration.  To  some  extent  he 
had  unwittingly  and  unintentionally  contributed  to  the 
prevailing  discontent  by  persistent  and  ostentatious 
exhibition  of  himself  in  public  with  the  President 
when  he  visited  the  army,  and  indeed  on  every  possible 
occasion,  outside  of  the  State  Department.  His 
claqueurs  and  supporters  busied  themselves  in  repre- 
senting that  Mr.  Seward  was  de facto  President,  and  the 
*'  Memorial  Address"  falls  into  the  same  error  by  de- 
claring he  was  directing  affairs.  Mr.  Seward  gave  en- 
couragement to  these  representations.  They  gratified 
his  vanity  and  that  of  his  supporters,  but  did  not 
strengthen  and  fortify  him  in  Congress  or  with  the 
public,  as  he  and  his  friends  anticipated  would  be  the 
case,  but  really  weakened  him,  and  for  a  time  were 
harmful  to  the  President,  towards  whom  the  country 
was  otherwise  well  inclined.  Military  reverses  alw^ays 
weaken  an  administration.  The  people,  however,  are 
tolerant  of  the  mistakes  of  their  Chief  Magistrate,  and 
forbearing  towards  his  honest  errors,  but  are  exacting 
and  often  intolerant  towards  subordinate  or  reputed 
favorites.  Under  national  reverses  they  were  lenient 
towards  the  President,  and  whatever  was  wrong  they 
charged,  sometimes  improperly,  on  the  secretaries, 
4^ 


82  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MK.    SEWAED. 

particularly  the  one  who  assumed  the  "more  solid 
power  to  direct  affairs,"  and  whom  they  held  account- 
able, not  entirely  without  reason,  for  certain  executive 
indiscretions  and  for  national  misfortunes. 

When  Congress  convened  in  December,  the  senti- 
ment or  prejudice  against  Mr.  Seward  was  deep  and 
severe,  but  he  seemed  not  cognizant  of  it,  nor  was  the 
President  himself  aware  of  its  full  extent.  He  could 
not  have  been  wholly  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  there 
was  a  growing  dislike  of  Mr.  Seward  and  that  he  was 
opposed  by  many  friends  of  the  administration  as  well 
as  opponents ;  but  he  knew  that  others  of  the  Cabinet 
were  improperly  censured  and  abused,  and  that  he  as 
well  as  they  were  in  some  cases  unjustly  assailed.  IN'o 
one,  however,  had  warned  either  of  the  extreme  dis- 
favor with  which  almost  the  whole  community  in  those 
days  viewed  Mr.  Seward — their  want  of  confidence  in 
his  sincerity  and  judgment,  and  their  belief  that  his 
intimacy  and  influence  with  the  President  were  per- 
nicious. This  erroneous,  or,  more  properly  speaking, 
exaggerated  impression  of  the  influence  and  power  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  which  the  partisans  of  Mr.  Sew- 
ard had  inculcated,  in  the  mistaken  belief  that  it  would 
increase  his  strength  to  the  same  extent  that  it  injur- 
ed the  President — a  mistake  into  which  Mr.  Adams 
appears  to  have  fallen — carried  with  it  the  idea  that 
the  President  permitted  himself  to  be  persuaded  and 
misled  by  his  subordinate  to  do  acts  against  his  own 
better  judgment.  The  assiduous  attentions  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  could  scarcely  fail  to  have  some 
effect  on  the  President,  especially  in  minor  matters,  to 
which  he  could  not  always,  in  the  overwhelming  mul- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  83 

tiplicitj  of  affairs,  give  that  minute  attention  which  he 
wished.  Intimacy,  companionship  would  unavoidably 
carry  with  it  more  or  less  influence,  and  in  that  view 
the  Secretary  had  influence  which  he  was  forward  to 
exhibit  and  not  reluctant  to  exercise,  sometimes  un- 
fortunately for  the  President  and  the  country.  It 
was  notorious  that  the  partisan  friends  of  Mr.  Seward 
were  anxious  to  have  it  believed  he  was  the  power  be- 
hind the  President  w^ho  controlled  the  action  of  the 
government,  and  some  of  his  own  oracular  sayings 
and  doings  tended  to  that  belief. 

A  brief  interchange  of  views  among  the  members 
after  Congress  assembled  led  to  the  disclosure  of  great 
unanimity  of  opinion  adverse  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
which  resulted  in  a  meeting  of  the  Republican  Sena- 
tors oa  the  17th  of  December,  at  which,  resolutions  in 
opposition  to  him  and  requesting  that  he  should  be  dis- 
missed, were  adopted  with  but  one  dissenting  voice. 
A  committee  of  nine  Senators,  embracing  some  of  the 
ablest  and  most  eminent  men  of  that  body,  at  the  head 
of  which  was  the  venerable  Judge  Collamer  of  Ver- 
mont, chairman  of  the  Judiciary  Committee,  was  ap- 
pointed, and  instructed  to  wait  upon  the  President  and 
communicate  to  him  the  general  conviction  that  the 
continuance  of  Mr.  Seward  in  ofiice  would  be  injurious 
to  the  administration  and  the  country,  and  to  make 
known  to  him  a  request  on  the  part  of  the  Senators 
assembled  that  the  services  of  Mr.  Seward  should  be 
dispensed  with. 

These  extraordinary  proceedings  were  immediately 
communicated  to  Secretary  Seward,  before  the  com- 
mittee had  waited  upon  the  President,  by  Senator 


84:  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

King  of  Isew  York,  the  only  gentleman  who  had 
opposed  them.  Mr.  Seward  promptly  and  properly 
tendered  his  resignation.  It  is  not  essential  to  enter 
into  the  details  of  that  movement  farther  than  to  say 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  defeated  it,  and  in  doing  so,  demon- 
strated to  Senators  and  Cabinet  executive  ability,  tact, 
and  power  such  as  Mr.  Adams  never  knew  he  possessed, 
and  consequently  fails  to  appreciate.  Although  sur- 
prised and  grieved  by  what  was  done  and  what  he 
learned,  the  President  did  not  submit  to  Senatorial 
dictation,  nor  permit  the  Executive  Department  of  the 
government  to  be  overborne  or  invaded.  Mr.  Seward 
was  not  dismissed,  nor  was  his  resignation  accepted, 
nor  did  he  wish  it  to  be  accepted.  The  attempt  to 
drive  him  from  the  State  Department  really  strength- 
ened him  in  the  position,  but  there  is  no  doubt  the 
movement  had  in  some  respects  a  beneficial  effect  in 
restraining  his  officiousness  and  in  arousing  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's attention  to  it.  The  scheming  party  manage- 
ment, which  had  been  defeated  first  at  Chicago  and 
subsequently  in  the  formation  of  the  Cabinet,^  but 
which  had  adroitly  undertaken  to  control  and  regulate 
the  Administration,  was  by  these  Senatorial  proceed- 
ings rebuked  and  again  defeated.  Some  of  the  active 
Congressional  friends  who  had  favored  the  nomination 
of  Mr.  Seward  at  Chicago  had  become  dissatisfied  with 
him  and  his  demonstrations,  and  were  most  forward 
in  asking  that  he  should  not  be  permitted  to  longer 
discharge  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  State. 

It  was  at  this  juncture,  when  he  became  conscious 
that  he  had  no  longer  a  party  to  sustain  him — when 
he  saw  all  the  Senate,  and  it  may  be  added,  about  the 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  85 

whole  of  the  representative  body  opposed  to  him — 
when  there  was  not  a  single  state,  nor  any  party*  in 
any  state,  in  his  favor — that  ''  Mr.  Seward  deliberately 
came  to  the  conclusion  to  stifle  every  sensation  left  in 
him  of  aspiration  in  the  future,"  and  '•  dismiss  forever 
the  noblest  dreams  of  ambition,"  not  that  he  might  be 
or  was  thereby  able  to  "direct  affairs,"  nur  yet  with 
the  conviction  that  Abraham  Lincohi  "should  reap  the 
honors  due  chiefly  to  his  labors,"  but  because  any  idea 
of  political  preferment  was  to  him  utterly  hopeless. 
It  is  an  incontrovertible  trnth  that  he  had  the  confi- 
dence and  support  of  no  party,  and  was  consequently 
wanting  in  that  power  which  derives  its  strength  from 
public  opinion. 


Perhaps  no  one  occurrence  better  illustrates  the 
executive  and  administrative  course  of  Mr.  Seward, 
than  certain  proceedings  in  relation  to  mails  taken  on 
captured  vessels.  Very  little  publicity  was  given  to 
the  subject  at  the  time,  though  it  was  the  cause  of 
frequent  and  earnest  discussion,  and  of  a  somewhat 
extensive  and  elaborate  correspondence. 

I  received  on  the  last  day  of  October,  1862,  a  brief 
note  from  Mr.  Seward,  saying:  "It  is  thought  expe- 
dient that  instructions  be  given  to  the  blockading  and 
naval  officers,  that  in  case  of  capture  of  merchant  ves- 
sels suspected  or  proved  to  be  vessels  of  the  insurgents 
or  contraband,"  the  mails  should  "not  be  searched 
or  opened,  but  be  put  as  speedily  as  may  be  conve- 
nient on  the  way  to  their  designated  destinations.!* 
By  whom  it  was  "  thought  expedient"  that  such  ille- 


86  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

gal  "  instructions"  should  be  given,  and  an  essential 
national  right  renounced  in  the  raidst  of  war  when 
most  needed,  did  not  appear.  The  note,  though  char- 
acteristic, was  of  such  a  tenor  that  I  gave  it  no  atten- 
tion whatever,  except  to  say  to  Mr.  Seward  within  a 
day  or  two,  probably  at  our  next  meeting,  that  I  had 
received  it,  that  I  disliked  its  tone,  and  knew  not  its 
object,  or  whether  it  was  private  or  official,  but  it 
could  not  be  expected  I  would  carry  it  into  effi3ct. 
He  made  a  passing  reph^  that  he  had  great  difficulty 
in  keeping  the  peace  and  satisfying  foreign  demands, 
particularly  the  English,  who  were  very  exacting. 
There  the  matter  rested,  and  I  supposed  was  ended ; 
but  six  months  later  he  came  to  my  house,  Saturday 
evening,  the  11th  of  April,  with  a  letter  from  Lord 
Lyons  enclosing  an  extract  from  Mr.  Archibald,  the 
English  Consul  in  New  York,  who  liad  written  his 
lordship  that  the  mail-bag  of  the  Peterhoff,  a  captured 
vessel,  was  in  the  prize  commissioner's  office,  "  that 
the  court  had  directed  the  mail  parcels  should  be 
opened  in  order  to  see  what  letters  were  enclosed 
relating  to  the  cargo  on  board  the  ship,  and  requested 
that  I  would  open  the  package  and  select  such  letters 
as  appeared  to  me  to  relate  to  the  cargo  on  board  or 
to  the  consignee  mentioned  in  the  manifest,  and  to 
take  charge  of  the  residue,  with  a  view  of  forwarding 
them  to  their  destination."  With  this  request  the 
consul  refused  to  comply,  and  immediately  informed 
Lord  Lyons,  who  wrote  Mr.  Seward  that  "all  these 
proceedings  seem  to  me  to  be  so  contrary  to  the  spirit 
of  your  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  the  31st 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  87 

of  October,  that  I  cannot  help  hoping  you  will  send 
orders  by  telegraph  to  stop  them." 

I  asked  Mr.  Seward  if  he  had  telegraphed  or  writ- 
ten as  requested.  He  said  he  had  not ;  it  was  not 
strictly  within  the  province  of  the  State  .Department ; 
the  court  would  not  be  likely  to  be  governed  by  any- 
thing from  him  on  a  subject  of  naval  concern;  he 
therefore  wished  me  to  send  word  to  the  court  to  give 
up  the  mail.  I  assured  him  I  was  not  prepared  to  send 
any  such  order ;  that  I  could  not  do  it  without  a  vio- 
lation of  law,  and  that  the  judge  knew  his  duty  too 
well  to  regard  such  an  order  from  him  or  me  ;  that  the 
mails  were  legally  in  the  custody  of  the  court,  and 
ought  not  to  be  given  up  without  examination,  for,  in 
all  probability,  the  best,  and  perhaps  the  only  evidence 
that  the  Peterhoff  was  a  good  prize,  was  to  be  found  in 
the  mail  bag.  It  would  be  wrong  toward  the  govern- 
ment and  unjust  to  the  captors  to  part  with  this  evi- 
dence. 

He  was  greatly  disturbed ;  said  he  was  committed 
by  his  letter  to  me  of  the  thirty-iirst  of  October, 
which  had  directed  and  virtually  pledged  the  gov- 
ernment that  the  mails  should  be  given  up  without 
search.  I  replied  that  he  was  not  authorized  to  give 
any  such  direction  or  pledge ;  that  it  was  contrary 
not  only  to  usage  but  to  international  and  statute  law  ; 
that  I  had  paid  no  attention  to  his  note,  which  was 
irregular  and  improper,  as  well  as  illegal,  subversive 
of  usage,  and  an  unauthorized  abandonment  of  a  na- 
tional right,  which  would  be  most  injurious  to  the 
navy  and  the  country ;  that  as  regarded  any  personal 
humiliation  in  recalling  or  disavowing  it,  no  one  but 


88  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

myself  was  aware  he  had  ever  written  such  a  note,  and 
it  had  entirely  passed  from  my  mind.  He  answered 
that  he  had  given  a  copy  of  it,  and  it  had  been  read 
and  received  as  authority  in  Parliament.  Our  gov- 
ernment would  be  holden  to  the  promise  he  had  made. 
But,  said  I,  3^ou  could  make  no  promise  to  override 
the  law,  or  against  law  ;  the  letter  was  not  an  execu- 
tive order,  an  act  of  Congress,  or  a  treaty  stipulation. 
I  regretted  that  it  had  been  written,  still  more  that  it 
was  published,  for  it  was  supercilious  and  improper  on 
his  part  to  undertake  to  instruct  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  as  he  would  a  subordinate ;  that  it  was  unfortu- 
nate such  a  note,  unofficial  and  of  no  authority  what- 
ever, should  have  been  made  public.  It  was  discour- 
teous for  him  to  address  such  a  letter  to  me ;  disre- 
spectful and  wrong  to  have  communicated  such  an  un- 
authorized missive  to  the  English  Minister;  that  they 
were  not  aware  he  was  not  empowered  to  instruct  me 
or  any  of  his  colleagues  ;  that  this  subject  had  never 
been  a  matter  of  CabinsLxDnsultation,  and  was  in  no 
sense  an  administration  measure.  He  left  me  at  a  late 
hour,  and  after  a  pretty  earnest  conversation,  to  see 
Lord  L3'ons.  The  Minister  was  unyielding,  and  the 
question  was  carried  to  the  President,  who  frankly 
stated  that  the  subject  was  new  to  him  ;  that  he  was 
not  familiar  with  maritime  law  or  the  law  of  prize.  I 
turned  his  attention  to  our  statutes,  which  were  clear 
and  explicit.  The  law  of  1789,  our  earliest  statute, 
says :  "  All  papers,  charter-parties,  bills  of  ladin  x, 
passports,  and  other  writings  whatsoever  found  on 
board  any  ship  or  ships  which  shall  be  taken,  shall  be 
carefully  preserved,  and  the  originals  sent  to  the  courts 


ME.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  89 

of  justice  for  maritime  affairs,"  confirmed   by  the  law 
of  1800,  and  subsequent  enactments. 

Eminent  counsel  were  consulted,  and  authorities 
hunted  up,  but  the  whole  array  was  against  the  unau- 
thorized, illegal,  and  ill-considered  note  of  the  thirty- 
first  of  October.  For  days  and  weeks  the  subject  was 
under  consideration,  and  the  more  clear  and  unques- 
tionable the  case  appeared,  and  the  greater  the  embar- 
rassment of  Mr.  Seward,  the  deeper  were  the  Presi- 
-dent's  sympathies  for  him  and  the  stronger  his  wish  to 
extricate  the  Secretary  from  a  dilemma  into  which  he 
had  been  apparently  unwittingly  seduced.  The  trans- 
action was  studiously  withheld  from  Cabinet  consulta- 
tions.  Mr.  Seward  had,  it  seemed,  in  a  weak  and  un- 
guarded moment,  attempted  to  show  to  Mr.  Stuart,  of 
the  British  legation,  his  authority  and  power  as  Secre- 
tary of  State ;  that  he  was  virtually  the  premier  and  the 
controlling  mind  of  the  Government ;  that  he  could 
issue  orders  to  his  associates  in  the  Cabinet  as  he  would 
to  subordinates,  and  regulate  international  questions 
by  a  mere  dash  of  his  pen,  without  regard  to  the 
President  and  Cabinet,  the  Senate  or  Congress.  But 
when  the  question  came  to  a  practical  issue,  and  he 
was  required  to  show  his  authority  to  make  regulations 
for  the  navy,  to  set  aside  the  laws  of  the  country,  to 
disregard  international  law  and  usage,  his  ill-timed 
letter  and  assumption  of  power  came  home  with  terri- 
ble effect.  Law  and  usage  and  the  practice  oftiations 
could  not  be  overturned  hy  a  flippant  note  from  the 
head  of  a  department.  Only  an  Act  of  Congress  or  a 
treaty  duly  ratified  could  do  what  the  Secretary  of 
State,  with  all  the  experience  and  superior  intelligence 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

awarded  him  by  Mr.  Adams,  attempted  to  do,  in  order 
to  gratify  a  subordinate  in  the  British  legation,  who 
had  an  object  in  view,  and  gained  his  point  by  sedu- 
cing the  Secretary,  whose  vanity  was  susceptible. 
When  I  asked  if  this  renunciation  of  a  right,  which 
would  impair  the  efficiency  of  the  navy  and  operate 
injuriously  to  our  national  interest,  was  reciprocal, 
whether  the  British  Government  had  consented,  in 
case  of  war,  to  also  abandon  the  right,  M.  Seward  ad- 
mitted they  had  come  under  no  obligation  to  that  ef- 
fect, but  he  had  no  doubt  they  would.  His  principal 
justification,  however,  was  the  unfriendly  feeling  of 
Great  Britain,  which  he  declared  was  very  hostile,  and 
that  it  was  his  constant  labor  and  duty  to  pacify  and 
appease  that  government.  This  necessity,  he  said, 
had  driven  him  to  extraordinary  concessions,  and  in 
promising  the  surrender  of  the  mails  without  examina- 
tion he  had  acted  in  the  interest  of  peace.  In  other 
words,  he  had  disregarded  law,  renounced  an  essential 
at  a  critical  period  of  the  war  without  reciprocity, 
without  an  equivalent,  without  Cabinet  consultation,/ 
and  submitted  and  yielded  to  the  illegal  exactions  of( 
the  English  legation. 

Senator  Sumner,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  in  whose  superior  intelligence  and 
information  on  questions  of  international  law  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  had  great  confidence,  and  whom  he  often 
consulted  on  conflicting  and  troublesome  subjects  with 
foreign  powers,  became  greatly  interested  in  this  ques- 
tion. He  assured  the  President  that  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  was  right,  and  the  State  Department  wrong. 
But  Mr.  Seward  insisted  that  the  British  Government 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEW  ADD.  91 

was  sensitive,  and  if  we  opened  and  examined  the 
mails  they  would  avail  themselves  of  the  occasion  to 
make  war.  This  the  President  dreaded.  I  claimed 
that  the  best  way  to  avert  war  was  a  fearless  mainte- 
nance of  our  rights ;  that  to  abandon  or  renounce  our 
rights  from  fear  or  threat  would  be  humiliation  and 
weakness.  The  point  was  one  on  which  the  Presi- 
dent assumed  the  Secretary  of  State  must  be  correctly 
informed,  and,  horrified  with  the  idea  of  irritating 
Great  Britain,  which  Mr.  Seward  insisted  would  be  in- 
evitable, and  all  his  sympathies  being  with  the  Secre- 
tary, he  thought  it  expedient  to  accede  to  Lord  Lyons' 
demand,  and  surrender  the  Peterhoff  mails. 

Mr.  Seward  did  not  call  and  inform  me  after  the 
interview  on  the  evening  of  Saturday,  the  11th  of 
April,  of  i±ie  result  of  his  visit  to  Lord  Lyons,  but  I 
received  on  Monday  the  13th,  a  note  from  him  enclos- 
ing a  letter  from  the  Minister,  written  on  the  9th,  with 
extracts  from  a  correspondence  between  Kear-Admiral 
Bailey  and  the  British  Yice-Consul  at  Key  West  in 
which  Lord  Lyons  said  :  "  It  would  seem  from  these 
that  the  mail  found  on  board  the  captured  steamer  Pe- 
terhoff has  been  dealt  with  both  at  Key  West,  and  at 
New  York  in  a  manner  which  is  not  in  accordance 
with  the  views  of  the  government  of  the  United  States 
as  stated  in  your  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
of  the  31st  of  October  last."  Mr.  Seward's  letter,  en- 
closing this  correspondence  was  written  on  Saturday 
the  11th,  before  his  evening  interview  with  me  at  my 
house  and  previous  to  his  reception  of  the  second  letter 
from  Lord  Lyons,  which  he  brought  to  me,  with  notice 
from  Mr.  Archibald  stating  the  mail  was  in  the  hands  of 


92  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

the  prize-commissioners.  This  letter  of  the  11th  reach- 
ed me  on  Monday  morning,  and  having  in  view  onr  con- 
versation on  Saturday  evening,  I  embraced  the  oppor- 
tunity of  sending  him  at  once  the  following  reply  : 

"Navy  Department. 

April  13,  1863. 
"Sir:— 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  communication  of  the  11th  inst.  enclosing  a  note 
of  Lord  Lyons'  and  correspondence  relative  to  the  mail 
of  the  PeterhofF. 

"His  lordship  complains  that  the  Peterhoflfs  mails 
were  dealt  with  *  both  at  Key  West  and  at  New  York  in 
a  manner  which  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  views  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  as  stated  in  your 
letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  of  the  31st  Octo- 
ber last.' 

"  Acting  Rear-Adrairal  Bailey,  an  extract  from  whose 
letter  is  enclosed  in  the  correspondence  transmitted 
on  the  14th  ult.,  gave  Her  Majesty's  Consul  at  Key  West 
an  authenticated  copy  of  the  law  of  the  United  States, 
and  of  the  instructions  based  thereon,  on  the  subject  of 
papers  which  strictly  belong  to  captured  vessels  and 
the  mails.  By  special  direction' of  the  President,  unu- 
sual courtesy  and  concession  were  made  to  neutrals  in 
the  instructions  of  the  18th  August  last  to  Naval  offi- 
cers, who  themselves  were  restricted  and  prohibited 
from  examining  or  breakings  the  seals  of  the  mail-bairs, 
parcels,  etc.,  which  they  might  find  on  board  of  captur- 
ed vessels,  under  any  pretext,  but  were  authorized  at 
their  discretion  to  deliver  them  to  the  consul,  command- 
ing naval  officer,  or  the  legation  of  the  foreign  govern- 
ment to  be  opened,  upon  the  understanding  that  what- 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  93 

ever  is  contraband,  or  important  as  evidence  concerning 
the  character  of  a  captured  vessel,  will  be  remitted  to 
the  prize-court. 

"On  the  31st  of  October  last,  I  had  the  honor  to 
receive  from  you  a  note  suggesting  the  expediency  of 
instructing  naval  officers  that,  in  case  of  capture  of 
merchant  vessels  suspected  or  found  to  be,  vessels 
of  insurgents  or  contraband,  the  public  mails  of  every 
friendly  or  neutral  power,  duly  certified  or  authenticated 
as  such,  shall  not  be  searched  or  opened,  but  be  put  as 
speedily  as  may  be  convenient  on  the  way  to  their 
designated  destination.  As  I  did  not  concur  in  the 
propriety  or  'expediency'  of  issuing  instructions  so 
manifestly  in  conflict  with  all  usage  ^nd  practice,  and 
the  law  itself,  and  so  detrimental  to  the  legal  rights  of 
ca  )tors,  who  would  thereby  be  frequently  deprived  of 
the  best,  if  not  the  only  evidence  that  would  insure 
condemnation  of  the  captured  vessel,  no  action  was 
taken  on  the  suggestions  of  the  letter  of  the  31st 
October,  as  Lord  Lyons  seems  erroneously  to  have 
supposed. 

"  In  the  only  brief  conversation  that  I  ever  remember 
to  have  had  with  you,  I  expressed  my  opinion  that  we 
had  in  the  instructions  of  the  18th  of  August,  gone  to 
the  utmost  justifiable  limit  on  this  subject.  The  idea 
that  our  naval  officers  should  be  compelled  to  forward 
the  mails  found  on  board  the  vessels  of  the  insurgents — 
that  foreisrn  officials  would  have  the  sanction  of  this 
government  in  confiding  their  mails  to  blockade-runners 
and  vessels  contraband,  and  that  without  judicial  or 
other  investigation,  the  officers  of  our  service  should 
hasten  such  mails,  without  examination  to  their  desti- 
nation, was  so  repugnant  to  my  own  convictions,  that 
I  came  to  the  conclusion  it  was  only   a   passing  sug- 


94  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

gestion,  and  the  subject  was  therefore  dropped.     Until 

the  receipt  of  your  note  of  Saturday,  I  was  not  aware 

that  Lord  Lyons  was  cognizant  such  a  note  had  been 

written.     Acting  Rear-Admiral  Bailey  has  acted  strictly 

in  accordance  with  the  law  and  his  instructions  in  the 

matter  of  the  PeterhofTs  mail.     The  dispatch  of  Lord 

Lyons  is  herewith  returned. 

"  I  am  respectfully, 

"  Your  obed't  servant, 

"  Gideon  Welles, 

"  Sec'Vy  of  Navy.'' 
"Hon.  Wm.  H.  Seward, 

"  SecH'y  of  State:' 
This  letter  exhibiting  our  difierent  views  and  opin- 
ions, would  I  supposed,  cause  the  subject  to  be  brought 
before  the  President  and  Cabinet ;  but  instead  of  this, 
Mr.  Seward  wrote  me  on  the  15th,  that  he  had  sub- 
mitted the  subject  to  the  President  who  approved  his 
course,  that  the  PeterholTs  mail  was  to  be  given  up, 
and  that  it  was  an  inauspicious  time  to  *  raise  new 
questions  or  pretensions  under  the  belligerent  right  of 
search.'  This  hasty  committal  of  the  President  was  a 
sort  of  snap  judgment  so  unlike  him,  and  so  inconsis- 
tent with  his  character  and  general  course,  that  it  was 
evident  to  my  mind  that  confiding  in  the  Secretary  of 
State,  he  had  given  his  sanction  to  the  proceeding  witli- 
out  a  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  or  of  the  irregular 
and  illegal  act  which  renounced  our  unquestioned 
right,  and,  if  made  a  precedent,  would  work  serious 
injury  to  the  country.  I  was  not  willing  therefore, 
that  the  question  should  be  thus  summarily  disposed 
of  nor  to  remain  quiet  under  the  admonition  respect- 
ing   *new  questions    or    pretensions.*     The    warning 


ME.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  95 

that  Great  Britain  would  take  offence — an  argument 
often  used  to  affect  the  President  on  doubtful  or  dis- 
puted points  bj  the  State  Department,  I  knew  how  to 
appreciate,  and  therefore  w^rote  the  following ; 

"  Navy  Department. 

April  18,  1863. 
"  Sir  :— 

"  I  have  had  the  honor  to  receive  your  note  of  the 
15th  inst.  in  reference  to  the  mails  of  the  Peterhoff 
which  are  in  possession  of  the  prize-court  in  New  York. 
I  am  not  aware  that  this  Department  has  raised  any 
*  new  questions  or  pretensions  under  the  belligerent 
right  of  search,'  in  the  case  of  tlie  mails  of  the  Peter- 
hoff. Had  there  been  ground  for  such  an  imputation, 
it  could  hardly,  on  an  occasion  to  which  so  much  impor- 
tance has  been  given,  have  escaped  the  observation  of 
Lord  Lyons.  He  however,  advances  no  such  charge, 
directly  or  by  implication,  and  founds  the  demand  made 
by  him  exclusively  on  the  concession  which  he,  apparently 
through  some  knowledge  of  the  details  of  your  letter  to 
me  of  the  31st  October,  had  been  erroneously  led  to 
believe  was  made  by  this  government,  in  instructions 
given  to  the  commanders  of  its  vessels  of  war. 

"  The  true  question  in  the  present  case  is,  whether  the 
administration  of  the  law  shall  be  suffered  to  take  its 
ordinary  course,  or  whether  the  court  established  to  ad- 
minister the  law,  and  which  has  certainly  been  in  exis- 
tence long  enough  to  know  its  powers  and  duties,  shall 
be  arrested  in  the  discharge  of  its  functions  by  an  order 
of  the  Executive,  issued  on  the  demand  of  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment, which  exhibits  no  evidenc3,  and  in  fact  makes 
no  charge  that  law  or  usage  has  been  violated  on  our 
part. 


96  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

"  If  the  Peterhoff  was  captured  and  sent  to  the  prize- 
court  without  any  reasonable  grounds  for  such  a  pro- 
ceeding, then  undoubtedly  the  opening  of  the  mails,  if  it 
takes  place,  may  have  been  an  illegal  act — but  in  my 
judgment,  not  otherwise.  If  it  is  to  be  assumed  that 
the  capture  was  wrongful,  not  only  the  mails,  but  the 
vessel  and  cargo  should  at  once  be  surrendered. 

"  It  may  be  an  *  unfavorable  time  to  raise  new  ques- 
tions or  pretensions,'  but  it  is  certainly  no  time  to  re- 
nounce any  right  or  to  unsettle  any  long  and  well-estab- 
lished principles  and  usage.  Such  a  surrender  would  be 
a  confession  of  weakness  which,  even  if  it  existed,  it 
would  be  inexpedient  and  injurious  to  make  known  to 
our  enemies.  If  the  case  be  one  of  doubt,  it  will  be  time 
enough  to  yield  when  the  doubt  is  dispelled,  and  we  are 
found  to  have  been  in  the  wrong.  We  may  then  yield 
and  make  amends. 

*^  I  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  discuss  the  question 
of  genuine  or  spurious  and  simulated  mails  ;  but  will 
merely  suggest  that  if  what  pretends  to  be  a  mail  is  to 
be  considered,  in  all  cases,  jjrima  facie  sacred,  and  ex- 
empt from  examination,  it  will  hereafter  be  found  ex- 
ceedingly difficult,  in  practice,  to  distinguish  the  spuri- 
ous from  the  genuine  ;  nor  indeed  would  there  be  any 
necessity  for  the  fabrication  of  a  spurious  mail. 

"  In  the  meantime  I  cannot  but  hold  that  the  prize- 
court  is  lawfully  in  possession  of  the  mail-bag  in  ques- 
tion, and  that  the  court  itself  is  the  proper  authority  to 
adjudge  and  determine  what  disposition  shall  be  made 
of  it.  I  propose  to  avoid  all  new  questions  by  leaving 
the  whole  matter  to  this  ancient  method  of  adjustment, 
established  by  the  consent  of  nations,  and  it  was  in 
order  to  avoid  innovations,  as  well  as  to  maintain  our 
national  rights  and  the  legal  rights  of  the  captors,  that 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  97 

the  suggestions  contained  in  your  note  of  the  31st  of 
October  were  not  adopted  by  this  Department. 
"  I  am,  respectfully, 

"  Your  obed't  serv't, 

"  Gideon  Welles, 

''  Sec'fy  of  N'avy:' 

"  Hon.  Wm.  H.  Seward, 

"  Sec'Vy  of  State.'' 

Before  sending  this  letter  I  read  it  to  the  President 
who  was  evidently  surprised  and  somewhat  disturbed 
by  it.  He  said  that  the  subject  was  one  with  which 
he  was  not  familiar — that  he  had  no  time  to  investi- 
gate it  and  must  depend  on  those  of  us  who  under- 
stood it,  that  his  great  object  was  to  keep  the  peace 
which  was  much  endangered,  he  thought  it  unneces- 
sary to  bring  the  matter  before  a  full  Cabinet — Seward 
he  said  was  sensitive,  he  wished  me  to  send  Seward  the 
letter,  and  if  he  did  not  bring  it  to  his  notice,  which  I 
doubted  from  what  had  already  occurred,  said  he 
would  call  it  up  for  further  action.' 

At  the  Cabinet  meeting  on  the  21st  he  requested 
Mr.  Seward  and  myself  to  remain  after  the  adjourn- 
ment, and  when  we  were  alone,  made  known  that  his 
object  was  to  get  at  the  right  of  the  question  in  rela- 
tion to  the  seizure  of  foreign  mails.  A  long  and  ani- 
mated discussion  took  place  in  which  Mr.  Seward 
dwelt  at  length  on  the  great  changes  which  had  taken 
place  in  regard  to  mails  during  the  last  fifty  years, 
and  that  nations  must  move  forward  with  the  improve- 
ments of  the  age ;  spoke  of  the  Trent  affair  and  the 
concessions  that  were  then  made,  of  the  necessity  of 
keeping  at  this  time  on  good  terms  with  England  and 
5 


98  MR.    LIN'COLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

said,  that  tlie  measures  lie  bad  taken  had  been  with 
the  President's  approval. 

I  thought  it  unnecessary  to  discuss  the  changes  that 
bad  taken  place  in  regard  to  the  mails  which  constitu- 
ted the  principal  part  of  his  remarks,  for  whatever 
they  were,  law  and  usage  and  the  practice  of  nations 
could  not  be  set  aside,  except  by  legislation  or  treaty, 
denied  that  the  Trent  was  a  parallel  case,  and  main- 
tained that  the  legitimacy  of  the  capture  and  the  dis- 
position of  the  mails  belonged  by  law  to  the  courts 
and  not  to  the  executive. 

The  President  said  he  had  no  distinct  recollection 
that  the  subject  of  captured  mails  had  been  brought 
to  his  notice,  but  Mr.  Seward  was  doubtless  right  for 
it  was  his  work.  The  Trent  case  he  did  not  consider 
analagous,  but  he  thought  the  executive  had  perhaps 
some  rights  in  the  matter  though  he  was  not  certain 
what  they  were,  nor  what  had  been  the  practice.  The 
discussion  closed  by  his  saying  he  wished  to  be  thor- 
oughly informed  on  the  subject,  and  in  order  to  be  in- 
formed and  to  hold  us  each  responsible  for  our  posi- 
tions he  would  address  to  us  certain  interrogatories 
which  we  could  respectively  answer.  Mr.  Seward  re- 
marked that  there  was  no  time,  that  Lord  Lyons  was 
pressing  him,  claiming  that  we  had  conceded  the  point. 
I  replied  that  Great  Britian  had  no  claim  whatever 
except  under  his  note  of  the  31st  of  October  which  I 
regarded  as  unofficial  and  of  no  authority  until  our 
statutes  were  repealed. 

On  the  next  day  I  received  from  the  President  the 
interrogatories  addressed  mutually  to  the  Secretary  of 
State  and  myself  which  1  insert  with  my  answer. 


MB.    LINCOLN   AND    MR.    SEWARD.  99 

"Executive  Mansion,  April  21,  1863. 
"  Hon.  Secretaries  of  State  and  Navy. 

"  Gentlemen, 

"It  is 
now  a  practical  question  for  this  government  whether 
a  government  mail  of  a  neutral  power,  found  on 
board  a  vessel  captured  by  a  belligerent  power,  on 
charge  of  breach  of  blockade,  shall  be  forwarded  to  its 
designated  destination,  without  opening  ;  or  shall  be 
placed  in  custody  of  the  prize-court  to  be  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court,  opened  and  searched  for  evidence 
to  be  used  on  the  trial  of  the  prize  case.  I  will  thank 
each  of  you  to  furnish  me  : 

"  First,  a  list  of  all  cases  wherein  such  question  has 
been  passed  upon,  either  by  a  diplomatic  or  a  judicial 
decision, 

"  Secondly,  all  cases  wherein  mails  under  such  cir- 
cumstances have  been  without  special  discussion  either 
forwarded  unopened,  or  detained  and  opened  in  search 
of  evidence.  I  wish  these  lists  to  embrace  as  well  the 
reported  cases  in  the  books  generally,  as  the  cases  per- 
taining to  the  present  war  in  the  United  States, 

"  Thirdly,  a  statement  and  brief  argument  of  what 
would  be  the  dangers  and  evils  of  forwarding  such  mails 
unopened, 

"  Fourthly,  a  statement  and  brief  argument  of  what 
would  be  the  dangers  and  evils  of  detaining  and  open- 
ing such  mails,  and  using  the  contents,  if  pertinent,  as 
evidence, 

"  And  lastly,  any  general  remarks  that  may  occur  to 
you  or  either  of  you. 

"  Your  Obed't  Serv't, 

"  A.  Lincoln." 


100  mr.  lincoln  and  mr.  seward. 

**Nayy  Department, 

April  25,  1863. 
"Sir  :— 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  communication  of  the  21st  inst.  in  which  you  di- 
rect me  to  furnish  certain  information,  which  is  called  for 
by  you  in  consequence  of  the  application  made  by  the 
British  Minister,  Lord  Lyons,  for  the  delivery  without 
examination  by  the  prize-court,  of  the  government  mail 
found  on  board  the  Peterhoff  ;  a  British  vessel  recently 
captured  and  brought  into  the  port  of  New  York. 

"  This  application  had  previously  been  made  known  to 
this  Department,  and  was  urged  upon  it  not  as  a  request, 
but,  as  I  understood,  a  demand  founded  on  a  communi- 
cation by  which  a  right  is  assumed  to  have  been  yielded 
by  this  government. 

"  It  is,  I  believe,  nowhere  claimed  by  Lord  Lyons  or 
the  parties  in  interest,  that  by  any  law  or  usage  of  this 
or  any  other  country,  or  by  any  principle  or  practice 
amonac  nations  that  this  examination  should  not  be  made, 
but  it  is  urged,  or  demanded  that  the  mail  shall  be  giv- 
en up  and  the  evidence  essential  to  condemnation  sur- 
rendered, by  reason  of  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of 
State,  under  date  of  October  31st,  1862,  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  suggesting  instructions  to  our 
naval  officers.  The  proposed  instructions  would  in  my 
judgment  have  been  such  a  renunciation  of  the  rights 
of  the  nations  and  of  the  captors  that  the  suggestions 
were  never  carried  into  effect. 

"  The  pretension  that  mail-bags  found  on  board  ves- 
sels captured  at  sea,  should  be  exempt  from  examination 
by  a  prize-court  appears  to  the  Department  not  only 
novel  and  startling,  but,  if  admitted,  pregnant  with  the 
most  serious  consequences.     A  recognition  of  it  would 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWAKD.  101 

seem  to   be  nothing    less   than  a  surrender  of   all  the 
rights  of  the  captor  government  in  such  courts. 

"  The  Department,  after  inquiry,  can  find  no  pre- 
cedent for  such  a  pretension — no  case  in  which  it  has 
been  either  asserted  diplomatically  or  affirmed  judicially. 
The  right  of  examining  all  papers,  of  whatsoever 
nature,  found  on  board  a  captured  vessel  appears  to  have 
been  always  exercised. 

"Our  own  earliest  statute  on  the  subject,  the  Act  of 
March  2,  1789,  for  the  Government  of  the  Navy  directs 
that  : 

"  *  All  papers,  charter-parties  bills  of  lading,  pass- 
ports, and  other  writings  lohatsoever,  found  on  board  any 
ship  or  ships  which  shall  be  taken,  shall  be  carefully  pre- 
served, and  the  originals  sent  to  the  courts  of  justice  for 
maritime  aifairs.' 

So  too  the  Act  of  April  23,  1800  : 

"  '  The  commanding  officers  of  every  ship  or  vessel  in 
the  navy,  who  shall  capture  or  seize  upon  any  vessel  as 
a  prize,  shall  carefully  preserve  all  the  papers  and  writ- 
ings found  on  board,  and  transmit  the  whole  of  the  orig- 
inals unmutilated  to  the  judge  of  the  district  to  which 
such  prize  is  ordered  to  proceed.' 

"Our  law  on  this  subjectis  borrowed  from  the  British 
law  and  practice.  The  instructions  of  the  King  to 
commanders  of  letters-of-marque,  issued  September  29, 
1798,  direct  them  to  bring  and  deliver  to  the  admiralty 
judge: 

"  *  All  such  papers,  passes,  sea-briefs,  charter-parties, 
bills  of  lading,  cockets,  letters  and  other  documents  and 
writings  as  shall  be  delivered  up  'or  found  on  board 
any  ship.'  (2  Rob.  Appendix  No.  VIII.) 

"  It  has  never  been  pretended  that  these  instructions, 
which  except  no  letters  or  papers  whatsoever,  whether 


102  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

contained  in  mail-bags  or  not,  are  in  violation  of  inter- 
national law.  And  yet  for  what  purpose  are  all  the 
letters  and  writings  found  on  hoard,  without  exception, 
to  be  delivered  to  the  admiralty  judge  if  not  to  be  used 
as  evidence  in  the  case  ? 

"  The  *  standing  interrogatories'  administered  to  all 
witnesses  in  every  prize,  British,  or  American,  direct 
them  to  state  under  oath, — 16th  Interrogate — 'What 
papers,  bills  of  lading,  letters  or  other  loritings  were  on 
board  the  ship  at  the  time  she  took  her  departure  from 
the  last  clearing  port,  before  her  being  taken  as  a  prize  ? 
Were  any  of  them  burnt,  torn,  thrown  overboard,  de- 
stroyed or  cancelled,  or  attempted  to  be  concealed,  and 
when,  and  by  whom,  and  who  was  then  present? ' 

"  What  necessity  could  exist  for  destroying  or  attempt- 
ing to  conceal  *  letters  or  other  writings'  if,  by  simply 
enclosing  them  in  a  mail-bag,  they  were  exempted  from 
examination  ?  The  very  reason  for  destroying  or 
attempting  to  conceal  them  is,  that  the  mail-bag  is  oiot 
exempt  from  examination  by  the  court.  And  the  very 
reason  for  making  it  all  important  to  seek  and  find  the 
information  concealed  in  letters  is,  that  without  such 
information,  there  would  hardly  in  any  case  be  sufficient 
proof  to  condemn  a  vessel.  So  far  as  it  respects  the 
ordinary  ship's  papers — clearance,  manifests,  etc,,  every 
vessel  would  appear  innocent. 

"  No  rule  can  be  better  known,'  says  Sir  Wra.  Scott, 
*  than  that  neutral  masters  are  not  at  liberty  to  destroy 
papers  ;  or  if  they  do,  that  they  will  not  be  permitted 
to  explain  away  such  a  suppression  by  saying  they  were 
only  private  letters.'     (The  Two  Brothers,  1  Rob.  134.) 

"  This  rule,  so  well  known,  must  have  originated  from 
the  practice  of  destroying  papers,  and  such  practice 
necessarily  implies  the  practice  of  searching  for,  seizing 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  103 

and  sending  in  for  judicial  examination  all  papers, 
including  'private  letters.' 

"  The  British  practice  of  seizing  such  private  letters 
and  using  them  in  evidence  in  the  prize-court  will 
.appear  from  the  case  of  the  Romea  (6  Rob).  The  report 
of  the  case  shows  that  the  commander  of  a  British  gun- 
brig,  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  search,  had  stopped 
an  American  vessel,'  *  had  examined  her  papers  and 
finding  a  letter  which  purported  to  disclose  the  real 
state  of  a  transaction  which  had  been  fraudulently 
concealed,  had  sent  the  paper  in  question  to  the  King's 
proctor,  officially,  but  without  detaining  the  ship  in 
which  it  was  found.'  The  letter  was  a  private  letter 
having  no  relation  to  the  vessel  in  which  it  was  found, 
or  the  cargo  of  that  vessel,  but,  relating  to  another  vessel. 

"In  the  case  of  the  Atlanta  (6  Rob.),  Sir  Wm.  Scott 
refers  to  the  case  of  the  Lisette  *  which  had  carried  a 
Dutch  packet  in  the  Danish  mail-hag.''  How  could  this 
have  been  known  but  by  examining  the  Danish  mail-bag  ? 

"  In  the  case  of  the  Caroline  (6  Rob.)  dispatches  from 
the  Minister  and  Consul  of  France  in  the  United  States 
to  the  government  of  France  were  found  on  board  an 
American  vessel.  As  it  had  never  been  decided  and  was 
not  in  this  case  decided,  that  carrying  such  dispatches 
was  ground  for  condemnation,  it  is  presumed  that  these 
dispatches  were  not  concealed  on  board  the  Caroline  but 
found  in  the  ship's  letter-bag. 

"  The  practice  of  our  courts,  so  far  as  is  known,  has 
been  in  conformity  with  that  of  the  British.  Our 
statute  peremptorily  directs  that  all  '  papers  and 
writings  found  on  board '  a  captured  vessel  shall  be  sent 
to  the  district  judge.  The  Department  is  not  aware  of 
any  exception  taken  to  this  law  until  very  recently ; 
though  in  the  numerous  captures  which  have  been  made 


104:  ME.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

during  the  present  war,  mail-bags  containing  important 
correspondence  must  have  been  frequently  transmitted 
to  the  prize-court.  If  there  had  been  any  violation  of 
international  law  or  usage  in  this  course  it  is  not  to  be 
doubted  that  we  should  have  been  very  promptly 
reminded  of  it,  and  in  earnest  terms.  Yet  it  is  not 
until  near  the  close  of  the  second  year  of  the  war,  that 
anything  in  the  nature  of  a  remonstrance  appears,  and 
then  the  remonstrance  is,  not  against  a  departure  from 
international  law  or  usage,  but  against  the  tenure  of  a 
surrender  of  an  independent  and  established  right  made 
and  communicated  to  the  British  Minister  without 
alleged  authority  from  the  President,  and  as  is  believed 
by  this  Department,  in  direct  contravention  of  the 
ancient  policy  of  this  and  other  governments,  and  of  the 
rights  and  duties  of  captors  as  defined  by  statute. 

"  That  there  may  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  prize- 
court  some  exception  to  an  indiscriminate  examination 
of  all  letters  and  writings  found  on  board  of  a  captured 
ship,  may  be  admitted  in  cases  when  such  exception 
does  not  interfere  with  the  proper  evidence  ;  and  no 
doubt  such  exceptions  have  been  made  in  practice  in 
favor  of  official  dispatches.  They  have  been  regulated, 
however,  not  by  strict  international  law,  but  rather  as  a 
matter  of  comity  between  nations. 

"  If  a  mail-bag  on  board  a  captured  vessel  is  to  be 
held  sacred  and  free  from  judicial  examination,  what 
security  will  there  be  that  it  does  not  conceal  and 
protect  the  proof  which  the  captor  requires  to  condemn 
his  prize,  and  which  would  be  sufficient  to  condemn  it  ? 
No  government  could  give  such  assurance  without  a 
previous  examination  of  all  the  private  letters  admitted 
into  the  bag.  Few  private  individuals  would  be  content 
to  have  their  letters  examined  by   government  officials, 


MK.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWAKD.  105 

before  being  admitted  into  the  mail,  although  they 
might  be  willing  to  run  the  risk  of  their  being  examined 
by  belligerents  during  the  war. 

"  And  if  individuals  are  willing  to  run  this  risk,  why 
should  their  government  insist  on  protecting  them 
against  it  ?  Why  indeed,  should  the  most  exacting 
government  insist  on  anything  more  than  that  its  own 
dispatches,  certified  as  such,  or  claimed  as  such  by  re- 
sponsible officers,  should,  when  known  to  be  such,  be  free 
from  scrutiny.  There  would  be  little  difficulty  in 
framing  an  arrangement  to  this  effect. 

"  No  such  arrangement  is  now  in  existence,  except,  as 
before  stated,  informally,  perhaps  by  custom,  and  in  con- 
formity with  the  comity  due  to  friendly  or  neutral  govern 
ments  in  reference  to  their  admitted  official  dispatches. 

"  The  instructions  which  were  issued  by  this  Depart- 
ment on  the  18th  August  last,  to  commanders  of  vessels 
of  the  Navy,  authorizing  them  to  use  their  discretion  in 
delivering  up  government  mails  or  dispatches  found  on 
board  captured  vessels,  to  be  opened  and  examined  in 
their  presence,  merely  empowered  them  to  exercise  a 
comity  towards  neutral  or  friendly  governments,  the 
exercise  of  which  might  be  safely  entrusted  to  those 
who  were  on  the  spot,  had  the  means  of  judging,  and 
being  interested  in  the  capture,  were  not  likely  to  show 
undue  indulgence.  The  only  doubt  entertained  by  me 
as  to  those  instructions  was,  whether  they  were  in  strict 
conformity  with  our  statute  and  with  the  rights  of  the 
captors.  But  in  deference  to  the  State  Department 
communicating  with  foreign  powers,  it  seemed  possible 
to  presume  that  the  Executive  government  here  might 
have  so  much  discretionary  power  in  such  cases. 

*'  These  instructions,  however,  I  considered  a  stretch 
of  power  on  the  part  of  this  Department,  and  even  of 
5* 


106  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

the  Executive,  and  when  it  was  proposed  shortly  after 
wards  that  they  should  be  put  in  the  form  of  a  positive 
injunction  to  forward  immediately  to  their  destination 
all  government  mails  found  on  captured  vessels,  a  very 
little  reflection  sufficed  to  convince  me  that  no  such 
order  ought  to  be  issued. 

"  But  unfortunately,  it  has  been  taken  for  granted  that 
a  mere  suggestion  made  without  alleged  authority  by 
the  President,  and  by  this  Department  at  once  objected  to, 
was  carried  into  immediate  execution  ;  and  what  is  more 
unfortunate,  at  least  one  foreign  government  has  been  led 
apparently  to  adopt  the  very  same  erroneous  conclusion. 

"  Such  presumption  is  wholly  unathorized  and  is  incom- 
patible with  the  nature  and  organization  of  our  govern- 
ment. Under  our  constitution  and  laws  the  Chief  Ma- 
gistrate gives,  or  is  supposed  to  give,  directly  to  the  head 
of  each  of  the  principal  departments  his  orders  in  rela- 
tion to  the  business  of  the  departments  respectively,  and 
this  most  especially  in  all  matters  oi7iatio7ial  importance. 

"  And  in  all  matters — especially  important  matters — 
affecting  the  international  relations  of  the  government, 
or  its  rights  as  a  belligerent,  even  the  Chief  Magistrate 
might  hesitate  to  adjust  questions  by  an  executive  order, 
but  would  prefer  to  make  them  the  subject  of  reciprocal 
treaty  stipulations,  duly  considered  and  clearly  expressed 
to  be  submitted  to  the  scrutiny  of  the  body  whose  con- 
currence is  necessary. 

"  There  is  nothing  to  justify  the  presumption  that  this 
government  would  at  a  time  like  the  present,  surrender 
any  of  its  belligerent  rights  by  an  executive  order,  in  pur- 
suance of  a  mere  suggestion,  not  even  reciprocal  in  its  na- 
ture, and  especially  when  such  concession  would  effect- 
ually deprive  it  of  all  the  advantages  of  the  right  of  search. 

"It  is  remarkable  that  in  our  traditional  anxiety  to 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  107 

protect  in  treaty  stipulations  at  every  point  all  the  rights 
of  neutrals,  we  have  never  attempted  to  reserve  mails, 
or  mail-bags,  or  mail-matter  from  the  scrutiny  of  a  prize- 
court.  On  the  contrary  we  have  always  recognized 
that  by  the  law  of  prize,  mail-matter  may  be  contra- 
band— for  enemy's  dispatches  are  mail  matter  and  no 
prize-court  in  the  United  States,  or  in  any  other  country, 
has  ever  doubted  that  they  were  contraband.  In  our 
treaty  with  New  Granada  we  stipulate  for  the  inviola- 
bility of  correspondence  on  its  land  transit  across  the 
isthmus  from  ocean  to  ocean,  but  we  abstain  from  at- 
tempting to  make  it  inviolable  on  the  sea.  In  our  treaty 
with  the  Argentine  Republic  we  stipulate,  reciprocally  the 
free  access  of  mail-packets  to  the  ports  of  the  contracting 
parties,  but  there  is  no  record  in  the  treaty,  excepting 
them  or  their  mail-bags  out  of  the  belligerent  right  and 
law  of  search  and  j  udicial  examination.  On  the  contrary, 
Hautefeuille — perhaps  the  most  eminent  living  publicist 
of  France,  and  known  as  preeminently  the  champion  of 
the  rights  of  neutrals — in  his  very  last  publication, 
elicited  by  the  affiiir  of  the  Trent,  does  not  hesitate  ex- 
pressly to  affirm,  that  no  mail  steam-packet  can,  in  its 
quality  of  a  regular  and  recognized  government  mail- 
carrier,  claim  immunity  from  search,  and  much  less  of 
course  from  judicial  examination.  In  the  war  with 
Mexico  we,  as  a  mere  favor,  permitted  the  ingress  of 
British  mail-steamers  into  Mexican  blockaded  ports.  The 
mail-steamer  Teviot  abused  the  indulgence  by  carrying 
in  the  Mexican  General  Parades.  We  thereupon  asserted 
diplomatically,  our  right  both  to  condemn  the  Teviot 
and  to  withdraw  the  privilege  from  all  the  mail-packets. 
The  British  government  made  no  denial  of  our  position 
and  settled  the  matter  satisfactorily.  [Mr.  Bancroft  to 
Lord  Palmerston,  Oct.  8,  1847.] 


108  MR.    LINCOLN   AND    ME.    SEWARD.  ' 

"On  these  grounds  of  judicial  authority,  of  ancient 
practice,  of  statute  law,  and  of  public  policy  embodied 
in  treaty  stipulations,  it  is  considered  to  be  clear  and 
unquestionable,  that,  in  every  case  of  capture  of  a  ship 
upon  probable  cause,  every  manuscript,  or  printed  paper 
found  on  board  of  her  is  liable  in. law  to  the  inspection 
of  a  prize-court.  Indeed  a  part  of  the  complaint  of  the 
British  government  in  the  case  of  the  Trent  was,  that  the 
vessel  was  not  brought  in  for  adjudication  in  order  to 
enable  the  court  to  determine  whether  or  not  she  be  a 
good  prize.  It  cannot  be  otherwise — for  being  so 
captured,  the  ship  is  presumed  to  be  in  delicto — to  be  pro 
hoc  vicey  adhering  to  the  enemy — by  some  form  of  vio- 
lation of  the  belligerent  right  of  the  captor  government ; 
and  this  predicament  of  the  ship  necessarily  opens  to  the 
tribunal  all  the  proofs  of  guilt  which  the  ship  contains. 

"  But  all  this,  though  conclusive,  is  not  the  most  im- 
portant point  involved  in  this  inquiry.  That  point  is 
not  the  immunity  of  a  government  mail-bag  from  inspec- 
tion by  a  prize-court,  but  it  is  the  far  higher  and  graver 
point  of  the  immunity  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  prize- 
court  itself  from  executive  interference.  This  trans- 
cendent  question  has  been  fully  settled  by  the  unanimous 
and  unquestioned  assent  of  all  the  departments  of  this 
government.  By  the  constitution  and  by  the  law,  our 
prize-courts,  unlike  those  of  England  and  other  Euro- 
pean powers  are  not  a  portion,  or  an  appendage,  or  a 
dependent  of  the  political  administration,  but  are  a  part 
of  the  permanent  organization  of  the  judicial  power,  and 
invested  with  its  independence  in  the  determination  and 
application  of  the  law  to  all  the  cases  of  which  they  take 

nizance. 

"  In  a  whole  series  of  treaties,  beginning  with  the  Con- 
vention with  France  in  1830,  and  continuing  down  to 


ME.    LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWAED.  109 

our  latest  treaties  with  Spanish  America,  we  solemnly 
stipulate  that  the  prize-courts  of  the  contracting  parties 
shall  have  exclusive  cognizance  and  adjudication  of  all 
questions  of  prize,  and  in  case  of  condemnation,  shall 
render,  and  on  demand  certify,  to  claimants  the  grounds 
of  such  condemnation. 

"  In  our  proclamation  opening  New  Orleans  and  other 
ports  to  vessels  from  foreign  ports,  licensed  by  our  con- 
suls under  authority  of  the  President,  we  insert  as  a  con- 
dition of  the  license  that  the  vessel  shall  carry  no  infor- 
mation useful  to  the  enemy,  and  the  condition  of  her 
clearance  by  our  own  collector  for  her  return  voyage  is, 
that  he  shall  be  satisfied  and  certify  that  in  entering  the 
port,  she  has  complied  with  the  requirements  of  her 
license.  Must  not  the  collector  then  have  authority  to 
inspect  the  mail  she  brings  ?  And  if  our  collector  in 
execution  of  our  municipal  law  has  such  authority,  can 
we  doubt  that  the  prize-court  has  it  under  the  broader 
belligerent  right  of  search  and  the  law  of  war  ?  In  our 
recent  treaty  with  Great  Britain  respecting  the  slave 
trade,  negotiated  by  the  present  Secretary  of  State,  the 
reciprocal  right  of  search,  established  by  that  treaty  con- 
tains no  exemption  of  mails,  or  mail-matter  from  such 
search.  Suppose  the  PeterhofF  had  been  brought  in  on 
suspicion  under  that  treaty,  is  there  a  doubt  that  every 
paper  on  board  of  her  could,  in  the  discretion  of  the 
court,  be  looked  into  in  order  to  settle  the  question  of 
her  guilt?  We  must  remember  that  this  question  of  the 
mail  on  board  of  a  captured  ship  is  a  question  of  evi- 
dence against  her.  If  the  District  Attorney  may  law- 
fully threaten  the  court,  that  he  will  abandon  the  case 
if  the  court  looks  into  such  evidence  by  reason  of  its  be- 
ing under  an  official  seal,  or"  lock,  why  may  he  not  also 
in  his  discretion  make  the  same  threat  to  the  court  on 


110  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

the  question  of  its  inspecting  any  other  official  paper — 
the  register,  or  clearance  for  example — which  the  ship 
contains  ?  But  by  the  whole  law  all  this  is  settled  other- 
wise. It  is  for  the  court  under  the  law,  and  not  for  the 
Executive,  to  determine  what  papers  found  on  board  the 
prize-ship  shall  be  inspected  as  evidence. 

"  No  muniment  by  a  foreign  government  can  shield 
any  writing  whatever  found  on  board  a  captured  ship 
from  such  inspection,  when  deemed  necessary  by  the 
court  in  the  due  administration  of  justice. 

"  In  repeated  cases,  and  without  doubt  or  denial,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  with  the  full  sanc- 
tion of  the  Executive,  has  sat  in  judgment  on  the  ques- 
tion, not  of  inspecting  for  evidence  the  government  mail- 
bag,  but  as  condemning  as  good  prize  a  regularly  docu- 
mented vessel,  or  commissioned  armed  vessel,  composing 
part  of  the  navy  of  a  foreign  friendly  power.  Three  of 
these  cases — that  of  the  Cassius  in  the  2d  of  Dallas,  and 
that  of  the  Exchange  in  the  7th  of  Cranch  and  that 
of  La  Jeune  Eugenie,  are  reviewed  by  Mr.  Attorney- 
General  Wirt  in  an  official  opinion  given  by  him  in  the 
year  1821.  In  these  cases  not  only  the  foreign  Minister 
claimed,  hut  the  President  was  fully  satisfied,  that  the 
court  could  not  condemn  without  infraction  of  the  sov- 
ereign right  of  a  friendly  power  by  reason  of  the  public 
character  and  commission  of  the  ship.  What  happened  ? 
Did  the  President  direct  the  court  to  release  the  ship, 
or  not  proceed  to  adjudication  ?  Did  the  District  At- 
torney threaten  to  abandon  the  case  if  the  court  should 
proceed  ?  Quite  the  contrary.  The  President,  through 
the  Attorney- General,  came  into  court,  and  made  sug- 
gestion for  the  consideration  of  the  court,  as  a  part  of 
the  fact  in  the  case,  that  the  Executive  was  satisfied  the 
ship  was  a  public  ship — such  suggestion,  no  way  manda- 


ME.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWAKD.  Ill 

tory  in  its  character,  but  leaving  open  to  the  unswayed 
determination  of  the  court  all  the  evidence  and  the 
whole  question  of  prize  or  no  prize,  was  the  uttermost 
limit  to  which  the  Executive  deemed  it  right  to  proceed. 
The  very  careful  language  of  Attorney-General  Wirt  on 
this  point  merits  your  special  attention.  It  may  be  found 
in  vol.  I  of  '  Opinions  of  Attorneys-General,'  page  505. 

"  In  the  late  case  of  the  Amisted,  15  Pet.  Rep.,  page 
587,  the  claim  of  Spain  made  in  virtue  of  its  sovereign 
right,  even  when  supported  by  the  admission  of  our  Ex- 
ecutive, was  to  the  great  satisfaction  of  the  country 
overruled  by  the  prize-court,  and  the  Executive  did  not 
contest  the  validity  of  its  decree.  [See  for  citation, 
with  approval  of  these  cases,  Wheaton's  Elements,  sec- 
ond edition  by  Lawrence,  page  969,  et  seq.] 

"These  cases  are  as  strong  as  any  which  can  possibly 
be  imagined,  to  show  the  absolute  independence  of  our 
prize-courts  in  the  adjudication  of  the  most  transcendent 
claims  of  foreign  sovereignties,  when  presented  in  cases 
of  prize ;  and  the  acknowledged  immunity  of  these  tri- 
bunals from  any  species  of  dictation  or  interference  by 
the  executive  government. 

"In  the  presence  of  such  precedents,  is  it  not  clear 
that  the  prize-court  has  full  right  to  examine  the  mail- 
bag  found  on  board  of  a  captured  vessel,  which  doubt- 
less contains  conclusive  evidence  of  her  liability  to  con- 
demnation ? 

"  I  observe  that  the  terms  of  your  letter  refer  only  to 
vessels  captured  for  alleged  violation  of  the  blockade. 
I  suppose  this  restriction  to  be  accidental,  and  that  you 
intend  the  inquiry  to  extend  to  mails  found  on  board  of 
vessels  captured  for  any  cause  as  prize  of  war.  The  case 
of  the  Peterhoff,  as  I  understand  it,  is  not  one  of  viola- 
ted blockade,  but  a  case  of  contraband. 


112  MR.    LINCOLN    AKD    MR.    SEWARD. 

"  I  observe  also  that  your  letter  makes  no  reference  to 
the  question  as  to  which  department  of  the  government 
is  the  proj^er  organ  to  convey  any  suggestion  from  the 
President  to  the  prize-court  ;  nor  does  it  refer  to  the 
question  which  of  the  heads  of  department  is  the  statu- 
tory organ  of  the  President  to  convey  instructions  to 
the  District  Attorneys  of  the  United  States.  It  is  in  my 
opinion  important  to  the  interest  of  the  pul51ic  service 
and  to  the  good  order  of  executive  business,  that  there 
should  be  no  conflict  or  misapprehension  as  to  the  char- 
acter of  the  instructions  to  such  officers,  and  T  therefore 
beg  leave  to  refer  you  to  the  recent  Act  of  Congress  of 
August  2,  1861,  which  in  the  pressure  of  your  cares  may 
have  escaped  your  attention.  It  places  the  District  At- 
torneys, in  the  conduct  of  all  their  official  business,  under 
the  exclusive  superintendence  and  direction  of  the  At- 
torney-General, as  the  organ  of  the  President. 

"  The  court  had  it  appears  no  hesitation  as  to  its  rights 
and  duty  to  examine  the  mails  of  the  PeterhofF,  nor  had 
the  District  Attorney.  The  court  was  proceeding  to 
exercise  its  duty  in  conformity  to  law  and  usage  when  it 
was  estopped  by  an  order  to  the  District  Attorney — not 
emanating  from,  or  conveyed  through  that  department 
of  the  government  to  which  he  is  by  law  attached — di- 
recting him  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  mail  and 
with  it  of  course  the  evidence  therein  contained. 

"  Now  if  the  mails  or  captured  vessels  are  to  be  for- 
warded to  their  designated  destination,  without  inspec- 
tion, and  the  evidence  which  they  contain  thereby  denied 
to  the  captors,  should  not  the  chief  law  officer  of  the 
government  be  aware  of  tlie  authority  for  so  extraordi- 
nary a  proceeding,  whereby  important  national  rights 
have  been  renounced  and  the  rights  of  captors  surren- 
dered ?     It  appears  to  me  that  if  the  suggestions  of  the 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  113 

31st  of  October,  which  effect  so  great,  and  in  my  judg- 
ment so  calamitous  a  revolution  in  the  law  of  search, 
capture  and  adjudication,  are  to  govern  our  national 
forces,  that  not  only  the  officers  of  the  navy,  but  the 
District  Attorneys,  the  judges,  and  all  authorities  of  our 
own  and  other  countries  should  be  promptly  informed  of 
this  great  change  of  policy,  by  an  immediate  and  formal 
publication  to  that  effect. 

'  In  conclusion,  I  have  no  doubt  that,  even  under 
the  British  rule  as  laid  down  in  Earl  Russell's  recent 
communication  to  Mr.  Spence,  the  Peterhoff,  was  right- 
fully captured  and  is  liable  to  condemnation  for  carry- 
ing contraband,  ostensibly  to  Matamoras,  but  with  con- 
tingent destination  to  Brownsville.  I  still  hope  that 
sufficient  evidence  yet  remains  in  the  reach  of  the  court 
to  condemn  this  vessel  and  cargo,  but  I  greatly  fear 
that  such  evidence,  even  in  this  case  may  have  been  ir- 
reparably lost  by  the  unfortunate  surrender  of  the  mail. 
However  this  may  be  in  the  present  instance,  I  cannot 
doubt  that  if  this  case  becomes  a  precedent,  in  future  all 
documentary  evidence  to  condemn  any  such  ship  will  be 
concealed  in  her  mail-bag,  and  no  papers  but  innocent 
ones  will  be  found  outside  of  it.  If  so,  condemnation 
of  the  guiltiest  ship  will  become  almost  an  impossibility 
while  her  capture  may  saddle  her  captors — who  will 
only  have  done  their  duty — with  heavy  costs  and  dama- 
ges, and  proba.bly  the  government  with  heavy  claims 
for  indemnification  to  the  guilty  party,  whom  its  ill-or- 
dered surrender  of  a  clear  right  shall  have  enabled  to 
conceal  his  guilt  from  the  judicial  eye. 

"  I  most  respectfully  and  earnestly  invoke  your  se- 
rious and  careful  consideration  of  the  evil  consequences 
that  must  follow  from  this  calamitous  state  of  things. 
Already    Mr.   Spence,  the  Confederate   Agent,  has    an- 


114  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

nounced  that  the  Peterhoff  which  had  previously  once 
run  the  blockade  is  but  one  of  a  line  of  four  steam- 
ers, owned  by  him  and  destined  to  carry'  goods  un- 
questionably contraband  to  Matamoras.  The  Peterhoff 
precedent,  as  it  now  stands,  arms  him  with  power  to  set 
at  defiance  all  our  efforts  to  stop  such  trade  though  its 
ultimate  destination  be  undoubtedly  to  Brownsville  ; 
for  under  this  precedent,  he  will  assuredly  hereafcer  put 
the  proof  of  the  guilt  of  his  vessels  into  the  mail-bag  and 
so  beyond  our  reach.  Thus,  by  our  ow^n  act,  done  as  I 
think  ill  derogation  of  the  unquestionable  right  of  our 
prize-court,  we  shall  furnish  to  our  enemies  an  abun- 
dant supply  of  the  munitions  of  war  through  the  port  of 
Matamoras.  In  this  view  I  perceive  with  satisfaction 
that  the  prize-court  has  placed  its  surrender  of  the 
mail-bag  exclusively,  and  only  upon  the  request  of  the 
government,  made  known  through  the  District  Attor- 
ney. After  careful  consideration,  I  think  that  the  court 
erred  in  yielding  to  this  request,  so  expressed.  I  trust, 
howeA''er,  that  it  is  not  yet  too  late  for  the  government  to 
retrieve  its  mistake,  at  least  in  part,  by  taking  action  and 
making  such  declarations  as  wdll  prevent  the  case  of  the 
Peterhoff  from  becoming  a  precedent  for  the  future  sur- 
render by  the  court  of  lawful  and  necessary  evidence. 

"  If  we  go  on  as  we  have  begun  in  the  Peterhoff 
case,  we  shall  find  ourselves  inconsiderately  relinquish- 
ing an  undoubted  national  right,  not  by  consent  of  the 
people  or  with  the  approval  of  the  government — not  by 
treaty  with  reciprocal  advantages,  but  by  voluntary  re- 
nunciation of  an  indispensable  right  in  all  naval  cap-' 
tures  in  cases  of  contraband  or  breach  of  blockade. 

"  Besides  national  abnegation,  a  cruel  wrong  is  done 
the  gallant  men  of  our  navy,  who  will  be  liable  to 
censure   if  they   do   not  capture,  and   who   are  to  be 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  115 

deprived  by  their  own  government  of  the  evidence  that 
would  sustain  them. 

"  I  am  Sir,  with  great  respect, 
"  Your  ob'd't  serv't, 

*'  Gideon  Welles, 

"  Sec'Vy  of  Navy:'* 
"  The  President." 

Mr.  Seward's  answer  to  the  the  interrogatories  I 
never  saw,  though  I  tliink  the  President  promised  me 
the  perusal,  or  a  copy,  but  the  subject  passed  away, 
and  I  do  not  remember  that  it  was  ever  again  alluded  to. 
Sometime  after — about  the  close  of  the  w^ar,  I  met  in 
the  published  deplomatic  correspondence  the  following : 

"Department  of  State, 
Washington,  April  21,  1863." 
«  Sir  :— 

"  The  Peterhoff  will  be  left  to  the  care  of  the  courts. 
Her  mail  will  be  forwarded  to  its  destination  unopened. 
I  shall,  however,  improve  the  occasion  to  submit  some 
views  upon  the  general  question  of  the  immunities  to 
public  mails  found  on  board  of  vessels  visited  under  the 
belligerent  right  of  search.  The  subject  is  one  attended 
by  many  embarrassments,  while  it  is  of  great  impor- 
tance. The  President  believes  that  it  is  not  less  desira- 
ble to  Great  Britain  than  it  is  to  the  United  States  and 
other  maritime  powers,  to  arrive  at  some  regulation  that 
will  at  once  save  the  mails  of  neutrals  from  unnecessary 
interruption  and  exposure,  and  at  the  same  time  prevent 
them  from  being  made  use  of  as  auxiliaries  to  unlawful 
designs  of  irresponsible  persons  seeking  to  embroil 
friendl)^  states  in  the  calamities  of  war. 

"  I  am  Sir,  your  ob'd't  serv't, 

"  William  H.  Seward." 
"Charles  Francis  Adams,  Esq.'* 


116  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   ME.    SEWARD. 

I  need  not  comment  on  this  letter,  written  months 
after  the  Secretary  of  State  in  iiis  letter  of  the  31st  of 
October  had  assumed  without  consultation  or  advise- 
ment to  overturn  and  dispose  of  a  long-settled  question 
which  involved  the  efficcient  and  proper  administration 
of  another  department  of  the  government  and  the  gov- 
ernment itself — an  assumption  in  derogation  of  usage 
and  a  violation  of  law,  on  the  ground  that  he  deemed 
it  expedient.  In  the  workings  and  disposition  of  this 
subject  the  orator  who  delivered  the  "  Memorial  Ad- 
dress" has  an  exposition  of  that  "solid  power  to  direct 
affairs  for  the  benefit  of  the  nation  through  the  name 
of  another"  which  he  asserts  was  exercised  by  Mr. 
Seward,  a  "  superior  in  native  intellectual  power"  to 
Mr.  Lincoln.  The  latter  anxious  to  extricate  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  the  country  from  its  dilemma 
on  becoming  acquainted  with  the  facts,  the  law  and 
usage,  thought  it  desirable  that  Great  Britain  and  the 
other  maritime  powers  should  "  arrive  at  some  regula- 
tion" in  regard  to  captured  mails.  He  was  not  aware 
and  Mr.  Seward  persisted  in  denying,  that  the  question 
belonged  to  the  courts,  yet  in  the  characteristic  letter 
to  Mr.  Adams  he  admits  "  the  subject  is  one  attended 
by  many  embarrassments  while  it  is  of  great  impor- 
tance." This  important  subject  and  its  "  many  em- 
barrassments" all  of  which  by  usage  and  international 
and  statute  law  belonged  to  the  courts,  he,  without 
consultation  with  the  Cabinet,  without  the  assent  of 
the  Senate,  without  the  action  of  Congress,  undertook 
to  dispose  of  in  a  flippant  letter  to  a  subordinate  of 
the  English  legation,  by  giving  up  without  condition 
or  equivalent  our  undisputed  right.     Worse  than  the 


ME.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  117 

original  mistake,  for  it  was  doubtless  a  mistake  of  his 
authority,  he  refused  to  retract,  and  when  he  became 
informed,  persisted  in  error  to  the  detriment  of  the 
naval  service  and  the  injury  of  the  country.  What 
farther  views,  if  any,  he  ever  presented  I  am  not 
informed.  Nor,  after  our  frequent  passages  on  the 
subject,  did  he  submit  to  me  the  letter  addressed  by 
order  of'  the  President,  to  Mr.  Adams.  The  English 
government  less  willing  to  renounce  a  right  than  our 
Secretary  of  State,  received  w^ith  complacency  our 
obsequious  surrender  in  the  case  of  the  Peterhoff,  but 
entered  into  no  arrangement  for  renunciation  on  their 
part  nor  am  I  aware  that  the  abandonment  of  our 
right  was  farther  insisted  upon  after  the  subject  was 
canvassed. 

English  enterprise,  if  not  English  diplomacy  from 
the  commencement  to  the  close  of  our  domestic  diffi- 
culties was  vigilant  and  unceasing  in  schemes  to  evade 
the  blockade  and  establish  intercourse  with  the  rebels, 
of  which  the  non-examination  of  the  mails  seemed  a 
part.  The  western  borders  of  Texas,  where  there  w^as 
no  military  force  to  guard  the  frontiers,  opened  the 
way  for  illicit  traffic  which  was  hastily  improved. 
The  attention  of  the  Secretary  of  State  was  repeatedly 
called  to  this  subject  with  suggestion  that  we  could 
not  have  a  thorough  blockade  in  the  southwest  under 
the  existing  state  of  things  ;  but  that  an  arrangement 
might  be  made  with  Mexico  in  relation  to  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Rio  Grande  which  was  the  boundary  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  and  that  being  a  mutual 
highway,  we  could  not  close,  nor  could  we  but  by  con- 
sent of  Mexico,  interdict  or  regulate  trade  upon  that 


118  ME.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

river.  An  immense  commerce  sprang  up  with  the 
neutral  port  of  Matamoras  which  became  for  a  period 
a  great  commercial  mart,  but  it  was  notoriously  illicit 
trade  with  the  rebels  through  Brownsville.  This 
fraudulent  and  evasive  traffic  was  stimulated  and  en- 
couraged by  the  assurance  which  the  Secretary  of 
State  had  given  to  England,  of  immunity  to  the  mails. 
Information  of  this  renunciation  of  our  right  of  search 
was  promptly  communicated  to  the  British  public,  by 
an  announcement  of  the  fact  on  the  floor  of  Parlia- 
ment. A  line  of  British  mail-packets  to  Matamoras, 
of  which  the  Peterhoff,  an  old  blockade-runner  was 
one,  was  speedily  established  in  the  couiident  belief 
that  a  vessel  with  a  mail  and  clearance  to  a  neutral 
port,  though  carrying  letters  and  freight  fraudulently 
for  Brownsville  and  the  insurgent  region,  would  escape' 
capture,  for  the  mails  which  could  not  be  examined 
would  cover  the  evidence  of  guilt.  My  suggestions 
that  a  treaty  or  arrangement  might  be  made  with  the 
Mexican  republic,  by  which  we  might  blockade  the 
Rio  Grande  were  unheeded,  lest  we  should  give  of- 
fence to  Louis  Napoleon  who  was  sustaining  the  em- 
pire of  Maximilian.  The  case  of  the  PeterhoflP  and  her 
mails  demonstrated  that  a  great  diplomatic  error  had 
been  committed.  The  Secretary  of  State  had  of  his 
own  motion,  against  law  and  without  Cabinet  consulta- 
tion abandoned  a  national  and  indispensable  belliger- 
ent right  without  an  equivalent,  without  mutual  ar- 
rangement or  reciprocity.  England  would  enter  into 
no  arrangement  that  required  the  surrender  of  the 
rio:ht  which  the  Secretary  of  State  had  inconsideratelv 
and  without  authoritv  renounced.     The  act  was  our 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  119 

own.  It  was  declared  in  Parliament  that  *'  Earl  Rus- 
sell considered  that  this  was  not  an  arrangement  be- 
tween her  Majesty's  government  and  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  but  simply  an  arrangement  made 
by  the  government  of  the  United  States  for  the  direc- 
tion of  their  own  cruisers.'' 

Mr.  E.  Delalield  Smith,  District  Attorney  for  the 
United  States,  who  under  direction  of  Mr.  Seward 
withdrew  the  mail  from  the  court  and  delivered  it  to 
the  British  consul  also  said  in  his  argument  before  the 
United  States  court :  y 

"  The  withdrawal  from  the  registry  of  the  court  of 
the  public  mail  of  Great  Britain  and  its  delivery 
through  us  to  the  Consul  of  that  country  to  be  by  him 
forwarded  to  its  professed  destination,  will  be  cited  by 
the  respective  counsel  for  the  captors  and  the  claim- 
ants. Each  will  insist  that  the  mail  might  have  pro- 
duced witnesses  in  favor  of  his  clients.  As  it  was  thus 
disposed  of  at  my  instance  (under  Mr.  Seward),  I  shall 
argue  nothing  from  its  absence,  and  shall  seek  to  infer 
notliing  from  the  silence  of  the  claimants  when  I  ap- 
plied for  its  release.  They  unquestionably  in  that 
silence  acted  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  their 
government,  as  I,  in  my  application,  co7nplied  icith  the 
policy  of  my  own'' 

A  few  days  after  the  renunciation  of  our  national 
right  to  placate  England,  Senator  Sumner  met  Lord 
Lyons  at  the  house  of  Tassara,  the  Spanish  Minister, 
and  expressed  to  him  his  regret  that,  taking  advantage 
of  the  peculiar  condition  of  our  affairs,  he  should  have 
made  a  demand  on  our  government  which  could  not 
be  yielded  without  national  dishonor ;  and  remarked 


\, 


120  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

that  the  subject  of  examining  all  letters  and  papers  on 
prizes  was  well  settled  by  the  law  of  nations,  and  that 
questions  relating  to  mails  on  captured  vessels  were 
judicial  rather  than  diplomatic.  Lord  Lyons  dis- 
Hvowed  ever  having  made  a  demand^  said  he  was 
careful  and  guarded  in  all  his  transactions  with  Mr. 
Seward,  and  made  it  a  point  to  reduce  every  question 
with  him  to  writing.  He  authorized  Mr.  Sumner  to 
examine  his  whole  correspondence  with  the  State 
Department ;  said  he  had  of  course  been  gratified  with 
the  voluntary  renunciation  by  Mr.  Seward  of  the  right 
to  search  the  mails ;  and  when,  contrary  to  the  promise 
tendered  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  mails  were 
carried  into  court,  he  had  called  Mr.  Seward's  atten- 
tion to  his  own  letter  of  the  31st  of  October  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  ^avy,  abandoning  the  right ;  but  he 
had  exacted  nothing,  made  no  demand,  and  merely 
asked  him  to  do  as  he  had  promised. 

AVhen  Mr.  Sumner  on  the  following  day  reported 
this  interview  with  the  British  Minister,  the  President 
^     was  filled  with  astonishment,  and  said,  in  his  emphatic 
\  manner,  "  I  shall  have  to  cut  this  knot." 

Of  what  advantage  to  the  Executive  or  the  country 
was  the  greater  experience  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
in  this  instance  ?  He  had  been  twelve  years  in  the 
Senate,  and  by  a  dash  of  the  pen,  in  a  note  of  six  lines, 
he,  ao^ainst  usao^e — ao^ainst  both  national  and  inter- 
national  law — without  the  action  of  Congress — without 
consulting  President  or  Cabinet — without  the  consent 
of  the  people  or  the  approval  of  the  government — 
without  a  treaty  with  reciprocal  advantages — without 
authority  of  any  kind,  assumed  the  power  to  relinquish 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  121 

and  renounce  an  indispensable  national  right  in  naval 
captures.  If  the  President,  from  friendship  or 
sympathy,  was  influenced  to  shield  or  sustain  the 
Secretary  of  State  in  his  distressing  embarrassment, 
it  was  under  circumstances  which  will  be  rightly 
appreciated.  It  is  one  of  many  cases  which  exhibit 
the  workings  of  the  Administration —  the  "  positive 
qualities"  and  real  merits  and  course  of  action  of  the 
President  and  Secretary,  of  State — the  confiding  nature 
of  the  former  and  the  influence  exercised  by  the  latter ; 
and  from  facts  like  these,  a  judgment  may  be  formed 
how  far  the  country  and  posterity  are  likely  to  "  award 
honors  to  Mr.  Lincoln  that  clearly  belong  to  Mr. 
Seward."  Let  neither  be  robbed  of  the  honors  he 
earned,  or  of  the  just  merits  to  which  he  is  entitled. 

The  Peter h off  was  an  advance  steamer  of  a  pro- 
posed line  of  packets  which  were  to  convey  mails  and 
supplies,  ostensibly  to  Matamoras,  but  with  contin- 
gent destination  for  Texas.  The  whole  scheme  was 
deliberately  planned  to  evade  the  blockade,  and  open 
for  the  rebels  free  communication  abroad  through 
British  mails,  via  the  Hio  Grande ;  and  the  Secretary 
of  State  flattered  and  seduced,  I  need  not  say  intimi- 
dated by  the  British  legation,  had  without  authority 
by  law  or  by  treaty,  abandoned  a  principle  and  given 
the  parties  immunity  by  his  ill-advised  letter  renoun- 
cing the  national  right  to  search  the  mails.  After  the 
mails  of  the  Peterhoff  were  given  up,  that  vessel 
or  her  appraised  value  was  restored  to  her  owners 
for  the  want  of  sufficient  evidence  to  condemn 
her,  a  heavy  loss  to  the  captors  and  to  the  govern- 
ment ;  but  the  parties  in  the  Matamoras  line  became 
6 


122  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

involved  in  a  leo:al  controversy  in  the -Enorlish  courts 
after  the  war  was  over,  when  it  was  made  evident  that 
the  vessel  was  actually  good  prize,  and  it  is  understood 
the  evidence  which  would  have  insured  her  condemna- 
tion was  in  the  mails  that  were  surrendered. 


Differences  existed  in  the  Cabinet  and  the  coun- 
try in  1861  on  some  of  the  measures  and  the  course  of 
policy  which  the  government  should  pursue  toward  the 
secessionists.  The  questions  presented  were  in  some 
respects  novel  and  without  precedent,  as  was  the  insur- 
rection itself.  Hostilities  were  precipitated  within 
forty  days  of  the  inauguration,  before  the  administra- 
tion was  fully  established  in  place,  or  had  time  to  de- 
velop its  policy.  The  assault  on  the  flag  at  Charles- 
ton compelled  immediate  action.  The  proclamation 
promptly  issued  for  seventy-live  thousand  volunteers, 
also  declared  a  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports.  There 
was  entire  unanimity  in  the  Cabinet  on  all  points  in 
the  proclamation  except  that  of  a  blockade,  which  was 
questioned  as  a  doubtful  and  irregular  proceeding  ;  for 
the  conflict,  whether  an  insurrection  or  rebellion,  was 
purely  domestic — a  civil  war,  and  not  a  foreign  war ; 
and  it  was  thought  the  internal  dissensions  in  our  own 
territory  should  be  confined  within  our  own  borders. 
A  majority  of  the  ^binet,  therefore,  preferred  an 
embargo  or  suspension  of  intercourse  with  that  part 
of  the  country,  to  a  blockade,  and  maintained  it  to  be 
the  true  policy  of  the  government  to  close  the  ports 
and  interdict  commerce  with  the  insurgents  until  the 
rebellion  was  suppressed.   It  was  claimed  that  a  block- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWARD.  123 

ade  was  not  a  domestic  but  an  international  question 
— legitimate  and  proper  as  between  two  distinct  na- 
tions, but  that  we  could  not  properly  blockade  our  own 
ports,  though  we  might  shut  them  up,  prohibit  traffic 
from  abroad  by  law,  and  make  its  violation  a  criminal 
offence  ;  that  the  very  fact  of  a  blockade  of  the  whole 
rebel  territory  would  raise  the  insurgents  to  the  level 
of  belligerents — a  concession  to  the  Confederate  organ- 
ization virtually  admitting  it  to  be  a  quasi  government 
— giving  that  organization  a  position  among  nations 
that  we  would  not  and  could  not  recognize  or  sanction, 
and  which  would  inevitably  lead  to  embarrassments. 
But  the  subject  was  in  some  of  its  aspects  novel,  and 
the  Secretary  of  State,  though  sometimes  rash,  had  not 
the  bold  and  vigorous  mind  to  assert  and  maintain  a 
right  principle,  if  fraught  with  doubt  and  difficulty, 
provided  there  was  an  easier  path.     The  blockade,  he 
thought,  opened  up  a  way.    The  questions  of  blockade 
were  well  settled  and   clearly  defined,  the  authority 
and  precedents  explicit ;  and  he  therefore  preferred  to 
adopt  that  course,  shelter  himself  under  those  prece- ; 
dents,  and  apply  international  law  to  a  strictly  national 
and  domestic  controversy,  rather  than  assert  a  measure 
and  vindicate  an  important  principle  afi*ecting  nation- 
al rights.    Less  was  said,  in  the  confusion  and  proceed- 
ings which  came  like  an  avalanche  at  that  critical  mo- 
ment upon  the  Administration,  than  at  a  later  period. 
Two  members  of  the  Cabinet,  Messrs.  Cameron  and 
Caleb  Smith  said  they  had  bestowed  very  slight  exam- 
ination upon   the  subject,  and  as  it  related  to  foreign 
intercourse  they  deferred  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
who  had  given  it  special  attention,  and  also  cited  au- 


124  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

thorities  justifying  an  exclusion  of  commerce  from 
national  ports  in  the  equitable  form  of  blockade.  Pres- 
ident Lincoln  inclined  to  that  view,  and  when  Mr. 
Seward  asserted  that  one  great  object  of  the  blockade 
instead  of  a  closure  of  the  ports  was  to  avoid  complica- 
tions which  w.ould  be  likely  to  involve  us  in  a  foreign 
war,  the  question  was  decided.  The  President  said 
we  could  not  afford  to  have  two  wars  on  our  hands  at 
once,  and  a  blockade  of  our  own  ports  and  collection 
districts  was  ordered.  The  authoritv  and  the  rit^ht 
of  the  national  government  to  close  ports  within  its 
jurisdiction  was  controverted  by  no  one,  though  a 
blockade  was.  Mr.  Seward  himself,  in  his  dispatch 
of  the  8th  of  June  1861,  to  Mr.  Adams,  said  :  ''We 
claim  to  have  a  right  to  close  the  ports  which  have 
been  seized  by  insurrectionists  for  the  purpose  of  sup- 
pressing the  attempted  revolution,  and  no  one  could 
justly  complain  if  we  had  done  so  decisively  and  per- 
emptorily." But  the  English  Government,  as  soon  as 
information  crossed  the  Atlantic  of  differences  in  the 
American  Cabinet,  made  haste  to  force  us  to  adhere 
to  the  blockade,  which  would  be  an  acknowledgment 
of  belligerent  rights  to  the  rebels,  by  indirectly  ad- 
monishing us  of  its  views  and  intentions  in  a  debate 
promptly  got  up  in  Parliament  for  the  purpose  on  the 
27th  of  Jane,  immediately  on  the  receipt  of  Mr.  Sew- 
ard's dispatch.  Lord  John  Russell  in  that  debate  an- 
nounced the  interpolation  of  a  new  doctrine  by  the 
British  Government  into  international  law,  by  declar- 
ing to  the  feeble  government  of  New  Granada,  **  It 
is  not  competent  for  its  government  to  close  its  ports 
that  are  de  facto  in  possession  of  the  insurgents." 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND    MR.    SEWARD.  125 

The  debate,  ostensibly  on  the  affaire  of  l^ew 
Granada,  was  evidently  and  unmistakably  intended  as 
an  admonition  and  menace  to  the  United  States,  theil 
engaged  in  suppressing  insurrection.  In  a  dispatch 
of  the  28th  of  June  from  our  Minister  in  London,  just 
twenty  days  after  Mr.  Seward ^s  dispatch  of  the  8th 
of  June  claiming  our  right  to  close  the  ports,  Mr. 
Adams  wrote  the  Secretary  of  State  that  in  an  inter- 
,  view  with  Lord  John  Kussell,  **  His  lordship  then 
said  something  about  difficulties  in  New  Granada,  and 
the  intelligence  that  the  insurgents  had  undertaken  to 
close  several  of  their  ports.  But  the  law  officers  here 
told  him  that  this  could  not  be  done  as  against  foreign 
nations,  excepting  by  the  regular  form  of  blockade. 
He  did  not  know  what  we  thought  about  it,  but  he 
had  observed  that  some  such  plan  was  likely  to  be 
adopted  at  the  coming  session  of  Congress  in  regard 
to  the  ports  of  those  whom  we  considered  as  insur- 
gents." His  lordship  also  on  the  27th  of  June  an-^ 
nounced  in  Parliament  that  "  the  opinion  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government  after  taking  legal  advice  is, 
that  it  is  perfectly  competent  for  the  government  of  a 
country  in  a  state  of  tranquillity  to  say  which  ports 
shall  be  open  to  trade  and  which  shall  be  closed  ;  but 
in  the  event  of  insurrection  or  civil  war  in  that  coun- 
try, it  is  not  competent  for  its  government  to  close  its 
ports  that  are  de  facto  in  the  hands  of  the  insurgents, 
as  that  would  be  an  invasion  of  international  law  with 
regard  to  blockade." 

Congress  when  it  convened  in  special  session  in 
July,  a  few  days  after  this  English  menace,  totally 
unmindful  of  "  the  opinion  of  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 


12G  MR.   LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

ment  after  taking  legal  advice,"  but  under  the  counsel 
and  deliberate  conclusion  of  our  wisest  and  ablest 
legislators  and  statesmen,  and  in  total  disregard  of 
the  policy  of  our  own  Secretary  of  State  as  well  as  of 
Her  Majesty's  Government,  declined  to  commit  itself 
to  the  blockade,  and  in  explicit  and  emphatic  language 
authorized  by  the  Act  of  the  13tli  of  July,  a  closure  of 
the  ports.  Mr.  Seward  was  constrained,  under  these 
circumstances  and  under  the  direction  of  President 
Lincoln,  on  the  21st  of  July,  to  tell  Mr.  Adams  that 
I  "  Since  your  conversation  with  Lord  John  Russell,  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  has  by  law  asserted  the 
right  of'  this  government  to  close  the  ports  of  this 
country  which  have  been  seized  by  the  insurgents. 
The  connecting  by  Lord  John  Russell  of  that  measure 
when  it  was  in  prospect  with  what  had  taken  place  in 
regard  to  a  law  of  New  Granada,  gives  to  the  remarks 
which  he  made  to  you  a  signiUcance  that  requires  no 
especial  illustration.  The  President  fully  agrees  with 
Congress  in  the  principle  of  the  law  Avhich  authorizes 
him  to  close  the  ports  which  have  been  seized  by  the 
insurgents,  and  he  will  put  into  execution  and  main- 
tain it  with  all  the  means  at  his  command,  at  the 
hazard  of  whatever  consequences,  whenever  it  shall 
appear  that  the  safety  of  the  nation  requires  it." 

It  is  not  expedient,  perhaps,  to  follow  up  in  its 
details  a  subject  not  particularly  creditable  to  our 
diplomacy  and  to  the  maintenance  of  our  national 
rights,  further  than  to  allude  briefly  to  the  historic 
facts.  The  brave  words  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
uttered  on  the  21st  of  July,  were  not  enforced.  Mr. 
Adams,  in  a  dispatch  of  the  16th  of  August,  says  he 


MR.    LINCQLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  127 

took  occasion  to  intimate  to  Lord  Jolm  llussell  tliat 
**  he  must  not  infer  from  my  not  having  entered  into 
discussion  of  the  merits  of  the  question,  that  I  gave 
any  assent  to  the  position  taken  by  him  about  the 
right  of  a  government  to  close  its  own  ports,  when 
held  by  forcible  possession  of  persons  resisting  its 
authority.  On  the  contrarj^  I  desired  to  reserve  for 
my  government  the  treatment  of  it  as  an  open  ques- 
tion whenever  it  should  take  any  practical  shape.  In 
the  mean  time  I  had  every  reason  to  believe  that  it 
w^as  the  design  of  the  President  to  persevere  in  the 
blockade,"  etc,.  His  lordship  declared  in  Parliament, 
however,  that  he  considered  the  law  of  Congress  '^  as 
merely  giving  a  discretionary  power.  But  if  carried 
into  practice,  he  construed  it  as  putting  an  end  to  the 
blockade."  Under  these  threats  our  government 
tamely  submitted.  The  law  of  Congress  was  not 
carried  into  effect,  our  diplomacy  was  meek  and  yield- 
ing, and  under  British  menace  the  blockade  of  our 
own  ports,  by  our  own  ships,  was  continued. 

On  the  2d  of  September  the  Secretary  of  State, 
with  some  trepidation,  informed  the  Minister  that  "  no 
change  of  policy  in  regard  to  the  blockade  has  been 
adopted'' — a  timid  intimation  of  acquiescence  in  an 
insult  and  injury,  to  appease  British  arrogance ;  her 
ministry  believing  and  asserting  that  an  effective 
blockade  of  our  extensive  coast  was  impossible,  but 
that  in  no  other  way  than  by  blockade  could  com- 
merce be  interdicted.  Our  government  did  not  order 
the  ports  to  be  closed  but  under  the  hint  given  by  the 
English  dictum  to  New  Granada,  it  abstained  from  ex- 
ercising the  national  authority  within  that  part  of  the 


128  MK.   LINCOLN   AND   MK.    SEWARD. 

territory  of  the  United  States  that  was  in  insurrec- 
tion, and  was  passive  and  submissive.  In  all  this  time, 
while  treating  the  Confederates  as  belligerents,  and 
their  organizg,tion  as  a  quasi  government,  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  with  strange  inconsistency,  denounced 
their  cruisers  as  pirates. 

Not  until  the  11th  of  April,  1865,  after  Kichmond 
had  fallen,  and  only  three  days  before  the  assassination 
of  President  Lincoln,  was  a  proclamation  issued,  in 
pursuance  of  the  Act  of  Congress  of  the  13th  of  July, 
1861,  to  close  the  ports  of  the  Southern  States.  Until 
the  war  had  virtually  ceased,  the  law  of  Congress  was 
not  enforced.  The  British  mandate  to  New  Granada 
was  submissively  acquiesced  in  and  obsequiously  ob- 
served by  the  United  States.  Our  ports  were  not 
closed,  but  blockaded,  which  eventuated,  as  was  in- 
tended, in  establishing  throughout  the  war  the  English 
ports  of  Nassau,  Bermuda,  and  Halifax  as  entrepots 
for  illicit  traffic  with  the  rebels  and  resorts  for  rebel 
cruisers,  to  harass  and  destroy  our  commerce.  It 
opened  the  English  ports  throughout  the  world  to  the 
Alabama,  and  rovers  of  her  class,  which  swept  our 
merchant  ships  from  the  ocean  for  the  benefit  of 
England. 

On  the  subject  of  a  blockade  of  our  own  ports  by 
our  own  vessels,  Mr.  Seward  had  undoubtedly,  for 
good  or  for  evil,  influence  with  the  President,  which 
outweighed  a  majority  of  the  Cabinet  and  Congress. 
The  subject  was  new  to  him  when~Tiis  decision  was 
given,  and  the  blockade  being  made  effective  by  the 
navy,  he  did  not  care  to  re-open  a  disturbing  question, 
though  his  views  became  modified,  and  ultimately  the 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  129 

ports  were  closed,  notwithstanding  the  English  dictum 
to  New  Granada. 

The  management  of  our  foreign  affairs,  and  the 
maintenance  of  our  rights  against  the  pretensions  and 
menaces  of  the  arrogant  ministry  of  England,  thus 
commenced,  was  continued,  until  intelligent  English- 
men themselves  were  surprised  if  not  disgusted  with 
our  subserviency.  After  the  shameful  renunciation 
of  our  right  to  send  into  the  courts,  mails  from  captur- 
ed vessels — a  right  recognized  and  established  by  the 
usage  of  nations,  and  made  a  duty  by  our  own  stat- 
utes— an  eminent  English  publicist,  Sir  Yernon  Har- 
court  amazed  at  our  submissive  and  pusillanimous  di- 
plomacy, warned  his  government  against  proceeding 
too  far  in  its  demands,  "  for,"  said  he ;  ''  what  we  have 
most  to  fear  is  not  that  Americans  will  yield  too  little 
hut  that  we  shall  accept  too  tnuchr  A  humiliating 
commentary  on  our  diplomacy,  by  an  English  writer 
of  no  mean  ability. 


The  efforts  of  the  secessionists  to  bring  about  a 
dissolution  of  the  Union  on  the  pretext  that  slavery  in 
the  states  was  in  danger,  in  consequence  of  the  suc- 
cess of  the  Kepublicans  in  1860,  and  that  new  guarantees 
were  required  to  protect  the  institution,  had  the  effect 
of  increasing  the  anti-slavery  feeling  in  the  free  states. 
Until  the  attempts  to  secede  from  the  Union  and  throw 
the  country  into  dissevered  sections,  the  fundamental 
law  was  strictly  observed  and  adhered  to  throughout  the 
whole  [Rorth,  and  the  right  of  each  state  to  regulate  its 
own  affairs,  its  industrial  pursuits,  its  domestic  institu- 
6* 


1^0  MR.   LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

tions,  the  condition  of  its  people  in  tlie  matter  of 
servitude,  of  debtor  and  creditor,  including  imprison- 
ment for  debt,  and  punishment  for  criminal  offences 
was  respected.  The  serious  agitation  of  the  slavery 
question  had  its  origin  in  fact  with  the  nullifiers.  After 
their  defeat,  as  a  party  on  the  tariff  issue  and  the  futile 
claim  of  intolerable  burdens  by  reason  of  high  duties 
on  imposts,  which  they  had  striven  to  make  a  political 
party  test,  the  South  Carolina  politicians  changed  their 
tactics  and  professed  to  be  greatly  alarmed  by  the 
petitions  of  the  Quakers  and  a  few  fanatics  as  extreme 
as  the  nullifiers  themselves,  and  vastly  inferior  in  num- 
bers and  talents,  who — regardless  of  constitutional  ob- 
ligations and  limitations,  asked  for  the  abolition  of 
slavery  by  the  general  government. 

So  pronounced  and  universal  was  the  sentiment  of 
the  North  against  this  feeble  sect,  that  politicians  and 
public  men  denounced  their  doctrines  and  were  careful 
to  be  in  no  way  committed  to,  or  connected  with  them. 
Abolition  was  as  unpopular  with  both  the  great  parties 
of  the  North  as  the  South,  but  it  pleased  the  Nullifiers 
to  make  indiscriminate  war  upon  the  free  states  and  to 
classify  the  whole  North  as  abolitionists  inimical  to  the 
South  and  southern  institutions.  Disclaimers  and  disa- 
vowals were  of  no  avail  with  the  men  who  had  a  party 
purpose  to  accomplish  by  these  deliberate  misrepresen- 
tations. On  the  abstract  question  of  slavery  there  was 
but  one  sentiment  throughout  the  free  states  ;  but  this 
sentiment,  for  it  was  a  sentiment — could  not  overcome 
the  deep  and  sacred  regard  for  constitutional  obligations. 
On  no  political  subject  was  there  more  unity,  than  that 
the  rights  of  the  states  should  be  respected  and  observed 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWARD.  131 

on  the  question  of  slavery.  But  the  Kullifiers  started 
to  be  aggressive,  and  with  a  determination  to  be  the 
ascendant  party  in  the  government  or  to  subvert  it. 
The  means  resorted  to  for  uniting  the  South  irrespec- 
tive of  parties  on  this, local  question  were,  by  creating 
alarm  in  the  slave  states — stating  the  free  states  were 
aggressive — warning  the  slave  owners  that  their  prop- 
erty was  in  jeopardy — demanding  new  guarantees  for 
its  security — promoting  sectional  animosity  and  some 
of  them  requiring  a  dual  executiv^e. 

Mr.  Seward  who,  according  to  Mr.  Adams,  had  in 
1824  made  "■  a  deliberate  claim  of  a  right  in  the  federal 
government  to  emancipate  slaves  by  legislation," 
abandoned  in  the  winter  of  1861,  this  original  position 
and  proposed  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  guar- 
anteeing the  perpetuation  of  slavery  so  far  as  the  gen- 
eral government  was  concerned  by  prohibiting  Congress 
through  all  time  and  under  all  circumstances  from  ex- 
ercising "  any  power  to  abolish  or  interfere  in  any  state 
with  the  domestic  institutions  thereof,  including  that 
of  persons  lield  to  service  or  labor  by  the  laws  of  said 
state.''  Politicians  of  the  Jefferson  school,  less  prac- 
tical, in  the  judgment  of  Mr.  Adams,  than  Mr.  Seward 
(for  Jefferson  never  admitted  *'  a  right  in  the  federal 
government  to  emancipate  slaves,''),  were  averse  to  this 
extraordinary  proposition  which  was  presented  as  a 
peace-offering  and  a  compromise  by  one  who,  accord- 
ing to  the  "  Memorial  Address"  ought  to  have  been 
made  President  instead  of  Mr.  Lincoln. 

When  at  length,  after  more  than  twenty  years  of 
declamation,  agitation,  persistent  aggression  and  delib- 
erate misrepresentation,  the  country  became  involved 


132  ME.    LINCOLN   AND   ME.    SEWARD, 

in  civil  war  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing that  many  who  had  until  this  time  adhered  to  and 
maintained  the  constitutional  safeguards,  deprecated 
the  cause  of  dissension  and  disunion  and  wished  it 
removed.  The  rebellion  rapidly  increased  the  anti- 
slavery  sentiment  everywhere,  and  politicians  shaped 
their  course  accordingly.  On  the  wave  of  this  anti- 
slavery  excitement  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the 
British  Minister  in  the  spring  of  1862  negotiated  a 
treaty  for  the  suppression  of  the  African  slave-trade, 
a  revival  of  which  had  been  threatened  by  the  seces- 
sionists in  the  cotton-growing  states.  If  other  and 
ulterior  purposes  were  designed,  it  was  an  adroit 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  English  diplomat  who 
availed  himself  of  the  popular  feeling  which  in  free 
governments  influences  public  men.  The  Secretary 
of  State  very  naturally  fell  in  with  a  movement  which 
was  in  harmony  with  public  sentiment  and  the  current 
of  affairs.  The  treaty  was  quietly  negotiated.  I 
knew  nothing  of  it  until  after  its  ratification,  for  it 
was  not  submitted  for  Cabinet  consultation  in  any 
stage  of  its  progress.  When  promulgated  in  the 
second  year  of  the  war,  it  did  hot  create  the  sensation 
which  might  have  been  expected.  Other  and  more 
exciting  matters  absorbed  the  public  mind.  There 
began  to  be  a  conviction  that  not  only  the  slave-traffic 
but  slavery  itself  was  doomed.  I  do  not  remember 
to  have  seen  or  read  the  treaty  until  after  it  had  been 
ratified  and  duly  exchanged  by  both  governments.  A 
certified  copy  was  sent  me  by  the  Secretary  of  State 
about  the  first  of  September,  and  also  a  copy  of  a 
singular  arrangement,  con  tract,  or  treaty  negotiated  or 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  133 

entered  into  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  under 
advisement  of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Charge 
d'affaire's  of  Denmark  relative  to  the  colonization  in 
the  West  Indies  of  negroes  captured  under  the  treaty. 
On  the  17th  of  September  I  received  the  following 
letter  from  the  Secretary  of  State  with  a  list  of  some 
twenty  or  thirty  naval  vessels  in  Her  Majesty's  service, 
and  a  copy  of  the  instructions  of  the  British  govern- 
ment to  the  respective  commanders. 

**  Department  op  State, 

17  Sept.  1862." 
"Sir:— 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  invite  your  attention  to  the 
enclosed  copy  of  a  communication  of  the  13th  inst.  from 
the  British  Charge  d'affaires  here,  embracing  the 
instructions  which  it  is  intended  to  furnish  to  the  com- 
manders of  Her  Brittannic  Majesty's  cruisers  who  may 
be  employed  in  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  recent 
slave-trade  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  as  well  as  lists  of  Her  Majesty's  several  ships 
employed  on  the  African,  North  American  and  West 
India  stations,  whose  commanders  will  be  authorized  to 
act  under  the  treaty  and  asking  for  a  similar  list  of 
United  States  cruisers. 

"  I  am  sir,  your  ob'd't  serv't, 

"Wm.  H.  Seward." 
"Hon.  Gideon  Welles, 

"  8eGH''y  of  the  JSFavy:' 

This  communication  and  the  accompanying  pa- 
pers led  to  a  critical  examination  of  the  treaty,  which 
contained  some  extraordinary  provisions  that,  if  carried 


134:  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

into  effect,  were  likely  to  impair  the  efficiency  of  our 
own   navy  during  the  war.     Whilst  examining  and 
considering  the  treaty,  then  wholly  new  to  me,  and 
concerning  which  I  had  not  been  consulted,  although 
the  navy  was  to  be  employed  in  carrying  out  its  pro- 
visions ;  and  in  its  operation  our  cruisers  would  be  se- 
riously affected  by  the  instrument,  I  received  a  second 
or  duplicate  of  the  foregoing  letter,  hastening  early 
compliance,  and  asking  for  a  list  of  United  States  ves- 
sels with  my  instructions  to  officers  commanding  such 
as  were  authorized  by  the  treaty  to  capture  slaves.     I 
replied  on  the  29th,  informing  Mr.  Seward  the  treaty 
was  wholly  incompatible  with  the  existing  condition 
of  affairs — that  it  would  be  impossible  during  the  war 
to  detail  any  vessel  with  specific  instructions  to  act 
under  the  treaty,  for  it  would,  for  belligerent  purposes, 
destroy  the  efficiency  of  any  vessel  so  instructed — that 
it  would  be  virtually  locking  up  a  portion  of  the  navy 
tying  the  hands  of  the  government  at  a  time  when 
every  vessel  was  wanted  for  blockade  and  independent 
cruising,  and  it  appeared  to  me  the  full  force  and  scope 
of  the  treaty  could  not  have  been  well  considered  when 
negotiated.     My  letter  was  probably  more  pungent 
than  was  necessary  or  expedient.     It  aroused  Mr.  Sew- 
ard's attention  to  certain  conditions  and  stipulations, 
the  operation  of  which  had  not  attracted  his  attention 
while  framing  and  assenting  to  the  instrument.     He 
evidently  felt  that  he  had  been  precipitate,  and  that 
there  were  unfortunate  or  unguarded  stipulations  in 
his   arrangement   with   which  we  could  not  comply. 
He  therefore  wrote  me  an  unofficial  note  on  the  30th 
of  September,  enclosing  the  form  of  letter  which  he 


MR.    LmCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  135 

wished  me  to  substitute  for  mine  of  the  preceding 
day.  His  reason  for  this,  as  stated  by  himself  was  that 
he  might  wish  to  give  Lord  Lyons  a  copy  of  my  objec- 
tions which  he  saw  were  insuperable.  Bat  this  pro- 
posed substitute  prepared  by  him  was  gentle  and  too 
pointless  in  its  expressions,  and  on  the  whole,  of  such 
a  tenor  that  I  was  not  inclined  to  adopt  and  make  it 
my  own,  though  desirous  to  oblige  him  in  the  emer- 
gency. I  however  modified  my  communication  of 
the  29th  and  sent  to  him  the  following  : 

**Navy  Department, 

"Oct  9,  1862. 
"Sir:— 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
communications  of  the  17th  and  26th  ulto.,  enclosing  a 
copy  of  a  letter  from  the  British  Charge  d'affaires,  com- 
municating the  instructions  which  it  is  intended  to  fur- 
nish the  commanders  of  Her  Brittanic  Majesty's  crui- 
sers who  may  be  employed  in  carrying  out  the  provisions 
of  the  recent  slave-trade  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  as  well  as  lists  of  Her  Majes- 
ty's several  ships  employed  in  the  African,  North  Amer- 
ican and  West  India  stations,  whose  commanders  will  be 
authorized  to  act  under  the  treaty,  and  asking  for  a  sim- 
ilar list  of  United  States  cruisers. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  all  our  crui- 
sers are  at  present  exercising  the  belligerent  right  of 
search,  and  it  would  be  highly  detrimental  to  the  ser- 
vice and  unjust  to  the  country  to  detach  any  of  them  at 
the  present  moment  from  the  duties  on  which  they  are 
engaged  and  restrict  their  operations  by  instructions  un- 
der the  treaty  for  the  present,  or  during  the  existence 


136  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWARD. 

of  hostilities,  under  the  unquestioned  belligerent  right 
of  search,  each  and  all  of  our  national  vessels  will  exer- 
cise the  rights  which  appertain  to  them  as  belligerents 
— will  visit  and  search  suspected  vessels  not  only  within 
the  latitude  prescribed  by  the  treaty,  but  elsewhere  ; 
and  in  the  exercise  of  this  belligerent  right,  they  will 
not  hesitate  to  seize  slavers  or  other  piratical  craft  that 
are  abusing  our  flag. 

"  To  give  our  cruisers,  now  performing  such  general 
duties,  instructions  under  the  treaty,  would  be  to  limit 
their  operations  to  a  specific  object,  while  the  exigencies 
of  the  country  require  them  to  perform  other  necessary, 
legal  and  legitimate  duties.  So  far  as  it  is  practicable 
on  our  part  to  use  the  belligerent  right  of  search  inci- 
dentally, in  aid  of  the  purposes  of  the  treaty,  we  shall 
so  use  it. 

"  The  important  privilege  of  visit  and  search,  and  in 
some  cases  of  detention  and  capture,  is  conceded  by  each 
of  the  two  governments  in  this  treaty,  and  offence  can- 
not be  taken  at  our  waiving  for  a  season  the  exercise  of 
the  privilege  conceded.  This  waiver  will  not  prevent 
British  cruisers  from  searching  and  seizing  suspected 
vessels  claiming  to  be  American,  while  those  claiming 
to  be  English  will  also  be  searched  by  them.  Besides 
this,  our  cruisers  searching  all  vessels  under  the  belli- 
gerent right,  will  of  course  capture  all  slavers  which  use 
or  abuse  the  American  Flag  or  adopt  that  of  the  rebels. 

"  I  do  not  propose  during  the  existence  of  hostilities 
to  impair  the  efficiency  or  usefulness  of  our  cruisers  as 
war  vessels  by  giving  their  commanders  instructions  un- 
der the  treaty,  for  the  reason  that  any  naval  officer  act- 
ing under  such  instructions  would  be  restrained  from  the 
general  belligerent  right  of  search — the  instrument  it- 
self compels  him  to  declare,  on  boarding  a  vessel,  that 


MR.   LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWARD.  137 

*  the  only  object  of  the  search^  is  to  ascertain  whether 
the  vessel  is  employed  in  the  African  slave-trade,  or  is 
fitted  up  for  that  trade ' — whereas,  instead  of  confin- 
ing our  officers  to  that  only  object  in  this  time  of  war, 
we  have  not  a  cruiser  afloat  whose  commander  is  not 
under  imperative  orders  to  search  all  merchant  vessels 
for  contraband  of  war.  We  can  not  consent  to  abandon 
the  belligerent  right  of  search  and  seizure^  in  the  West 
Indies,  where  neutral  obligations  are  disregarded  and  neu- 
tral flags  are  prostituted  to  aid  the  insurgents — conse- 
quently, I  must  for  the  present  omit  to  issue  any  instruc- 
tions under  the  treaty  which  permits  no  commander 
having  instructions  under  the  treaty  to  search  a  vessel  in 
certain  localities  for  any  other  purpose  than  that  of 
detecting  slaves. 

"  Whenever  the  condition  of  affairs  will  permit  us  to  set 
apart  cruisers  for  the  special  service  required,  it  will  give 
me  pleasure  to  furnish  a  list  of  them  as  requested  and  to 
perform  the  duties  which  devolve  upon  the  department 
for  a  strict  execution  of  the  treaty. 

"I  am,  respectfully, 
«  Your  Obed't  Serv't, 
"Gideon  Welles, 
''  Sec't'y  of  the  Navy?'' 

"Hon.  W.  H.  Seward, 
'^Secretary  of  State?"* 

I  on  the  same  day  addressed  the  subjoined  com- 
munication, adverting  to  the  unfortunate  complications 
and  difficulties  in  which  we  were  likely  to  become  in- 
volved by  this  confused  mixture  of  executive,  legisla- 
tive and  diplomatic  proceedings,  under  the  treaty,  un- 
der the  law  of  Congress  which  he  had  procured  to  be 


138  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   ME.    SEWARD. 

enacted,  and  under  the  Danish  treaty  which  had  never 
been  ratified. 

"  Navy  Department, 

Oct.  P.  1862. 
«  Sir  :— 

"  Since  the  receipt  of  your  unofficial  note  of  the  30th 
ultimo,  with  the  proposed  form  of  a  draft  as  a  substitute 
for  my  letter  of  the  29th  ultimo,  1  have  given  the  subject 
much  thought  and  examination.  That  a  copy  of  my  let- 
ter would  have  to  be  communicated  to  the  British  Gov- 
ernment had  not  occurred  to  me.  That  fact,  and  some 
defects  of  full  explanation  in  my  letter  of  the  29th  ultimo 
to  you,  render  it  proper  that  I  should  revise  and  modify 
my  communication. 

"  I  have  therefore  prepared  the  enclosed  with  some 
care,  as  better  adapted,  I  think,  to  the  case  than  the 
form  you  were  so  kind  as  to  send  me.  This  whole  sub- 
ject has  become  strangely  complicated  ;  there  is,  in  the 
first  place,  the  conceded  privilege  of  reciprocal  search  by 
the  treaty,  and  there  is  the  unquestioned  belligerent 
right  of  search  which  cannot  be  surrendered.  Yet  the 
two  are  in  conflict.  Then  we  come  in  contact  with  that 
strange  anomaly,  a  treaty  with  Demmark,  which  has 
never  been  ratified  by  the  Senate — concluded  and  isigned 
by  the  Danish  Charge  d'afiaires  on  behalf  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  Demmark,  and  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior 
on  behalf  of  the  government  of  the  United  States — not 
negotiated  in  conformity  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Constitution,  nor  through  the  department  that  is  charged 
with  the  special  duty  of  making  treaties,  but  by  an 
entirely  different  department  and  under  an  Act  of  Con- 
gress which  assumes  to  authorize  the  treaty  or  agreement 
regardless  of  the  Constitution. 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 


139 


*'  The  treaty  with  Great  Britain  provides  that  instruc- 
tions shall  be  given  to  our  cruisers.  The  form  of  letter 
which  you  send  me  promises  that  orders  will  be  given 
for  captured  slavers  to  be  sent  into  port  for  adjudication 
according  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  this  without 
instructions. 

"The  mixed  commission  under  the' treaty  cannot 
adjudicate  the  questions,  if  instructions  are  not  given, 
and  are  precluded  from  action. 

"  In  addition  to  this,  by  the  Danish  treaty  or  agree- 
ment, it  is  stipulated  to  the  effect  that  all  negroes,  mulat- 
toes,  or  persons  of  color  on  board  of  vessels  seized  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  slave-trade  shall  be  sent  to  West  Mid, 
in  the  Island  of  St^  Croix,  and  our  commanders,  exercis- 
ing the  belligerent  right  of  search,  are  to  be  instructed 
accordingly. 

"  It  is  true  that  this  strange,  unconfirmed  and  singular 
instrument  makes  no  provision  for  adjudication  and  con- 
demnation of  any  captured  slaver.  Ordering  the  negroes 
to  be  sent  to  St.  Croix,  therefore,  may  not  be  inconsist- 
ent with  a  condemnation  under  the  treaty,  but  how  can 
the  slaves  and  slaver  be  brought  before  the  mixed  com- 
mission  established  by  the  treaty,  when  they  are  not 
captured  by  officers  instructed  under  that  instrument- 
such  instructions  being  made  a  condition-precedent  under 
that  instrument,  of  all  proceedings  by  the  mixed  com- 
mission ? 

"  I  find  myself,  I  confess,  embarrassed  in  several 
respects  by  the  stipulations  and  complications  involved 
in  this  subject  of  captured  slavers,  and  see  no  other 
course  to  pursue,  than  to  wholly  abstain  from  any  action 
whatever  \mder  the  treaty,  so  long  as  the  war  con- 
tinues. 

"  The  privilege  of  reciprocal  search  for  slavers  being 


I 


140  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

conceded  by  the  treaty,  I  do  not  see  that  the  English 
government  can  complain  if  we  do  not  avail  ourselves 
of  it,  but  permit  them  to  enjoy  it. 

"Incidentally  our  own  cruisers  will,  with  greater 
energy  and  effect,  aid  in  enforcing  the  object  of  the 
treaty  under  the  more  comprehensive  belligerent  right 
of  search. 

"  It  appears  to  me  that  this  whole  subject  of  slaves 
and  slavers  has  become  so  involved  and  complicated  by 
treaties  and  agreements  and  statutory  enactments — the 
reciprocal  right  of  search,  and  belligerent  right  of 
search — the  process  of  adjudication  under  the  mixed 
commission,  under  the  stipulations  to  adjudicate  by  the 
British  treaty,  and  the  arrangements  to  send  the  negroes 
to  St.  Croix  under  the  Danish  agreements,  that  some 
measures  should  be  adopted  to  disembarrass  the  ques- 
tion. 

"I  am,  respectfully, 
«  Your  Obed't  Serv't, 
"  Gideon  Welles, 
"  SecH'y,  of  the  Navy^ 
"  Hon.  Wm.  H.  Seward, 
'' SecHY  of  Stated 

"Whether  a  copy  of  my  letter  was  ever  sent  to 
Lord  Lyons  is  problematical,  but  he  was  made  aware 
that  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  disinclined  and 
believed  it  impracticable  to  carry  out  the  stipulations 
of  the  treaty  during  the  existence  of  hostilities.  It 
was  unquestionably  an  unpleasant  topic  to  one  of  the 
temperament  and  mind  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to 
dwell  upon,  nor  was  it  pleasant  for  him  to  admit  that 
in  a  treaty  on  which  he  prided  himself,  he  had  com- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  141 

mitted  an  error  or  been  overreaclied.  I  supposed  at 
the  time  that  the  exceptional  provision  was  an  inad- 
vertence on  the  part  of  both  the  negotiators,  and  have 
no  doubt  it  was  as  regards  the  Secretary  of  State,  but 
subsequent  developments  in  regard  to  the  treatment 
of  mails  captured  and  the  simultaneous  establishment 
of  a  line  of  British  mail-packets  to  the  Rio  Grande, 
which  was  within  the  prescribed  latitudes,  where  naval 
vessels  under  treaty  instructions  could  only  search  for 
slaves,  rendered  it  doubtful  whether  the  English 
legation  had  not  shrewdly  availed  itself  of  the  zeal  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  against  slave  traffic  to  adopt  a 
measure  which  would  promote  English  commercial 
enterprise  by  securing  immunity  to  their  vessels  and 
thus  opening  a  way  for  intercourse  with  the  blockaded 
rebels. 

Mr.  Seward  did  not  submit  to  me  his  letter  to  the 
English  legation  stating  the  obstacles  which  inter- 
vened to  prevent  the  consummation  of  the  treaty  or 
action  under  it  in  the  existing  state  of  things,  nor  do 
I  think  the  President  was  fully  apprised  of  it.  I  only 
know  that  the  treaty  was  necessarily  suspended.  The 
tenor  of  his  communication  to  Lord  Lyons,  I  learned 
some  eighteen  months  later  from  the  following  letter, 
written  several  weeks  after  my  communication  of  the 
9th  of  October,  stating  the  objections  to  issue  instruc- 
tions which  would  circumscribe  and  impair  the  rights 
and  efficiency  of  our  cruisers. 

"Washington,  November  27,  1862. 
"Sir:— 

"  Mr.  Stuart  did  not  fail  to  communicate  to  her  Ma- 
jesty's  government  the  note  which  you  did  him   the 


112  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

honor  to  address  to  him  on  the  14th  of  last  month,  and 
in  which  you  stated  certain  reasons  which  induced  the 
government  of  the  United  States  to  decline,  for  the 
moment  to  issue  to  commanders  of  United  States  vessels 
the  instructions  contemplated  by  the  treaty  of  the  '7th 
of  April  last  for  their  guidance  in  carrying  out  the 
stipulations  of  that  treaty  for  the  suppression  of  the 
slave  trade.  The  principal  reason  for  omitting  to  issue 
the  instructions  appears  to  be  an  apprehension  that 
they  would  restrict  the  more  extended  right  of  search, 
which  the  commanders  of  United  States  vessels  now 
exercise  as  belligerents. 

"And  it  seems  to  be  believed  that  the  object  of  the 
treaty  may  be  in  great  measure  attained  by  the  exercise 
of  this  belligerent  right  of  search  in  lieu  of  the  special 
right  of  search  provided  for  by  the  treaty.  I  am  how- 
ever instructed  by  Her  Majesty's  principal  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  take  an  opportunity  of 
representing  to  you,  that  although  United  States  cruisers 
may  search  by  virtue  of  their  belligerent  rights,  yet 
they  cannot  by  virtue  of  these  rights,  detain  or  send  in 
for  adjudication  any  neutral  vessel  not  breaking  block- 
ade ;  in  short,  that  they  cannot  give  effect  to  the  stipu- 
lations of  the  treaty  unless  they  have  such  warrants  and 
instructions  as  are  prescribed  by  it. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  the  highest  respect, 
sir,  your  most  obedient  humble  servant, 

"Lyons." 
"Hon.  William  H.  Seward, 

"  Secretary  of  State" 

In  this  letter  Her  Majesty's  principal  Secretary  of 
State  did  not  controvert  or  modify  the  point  presented, 
but  denied  that  any  neutral  vessel,  not  breaking  the 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  143 

blockade,  could  be  detained  or  sent  in  for  adjudication 
bj  the  naval  commander  under  the  belligerent  right — 
in  other  words,  no  slaver  captured  by  our  war-vessels 
without  specific  instructions,  could  be  adjudicated  bj 
the  courts  established  by  the  treaty,  and  if  they  had 
specific  instructions,  they  could  not  capture  blockade- 
runners  or  anything  else.  This  ultimatum  failed  to 
influence  our  government,  and  from  the  necessity  of 
the  case,  action  under  the  treaty  remained  suspended. 
Mr.  Seward  was,  properly  perhaps,  opposed  to  any 
direct  ofiicial  communication  between  the  representa- 
tives of  foreign  governments  and  the  head  of  any 
department  except  through  the  Secretary  of  State. 
In  this  condition  of  afi[airs  and  while  matters  were  in 
abeyance,  Lord  Lyons,  a  cool,  adroit  and  sagacious 
diplomatist,  but  able  and  far-seeing,  and  I  think, 
friendly  to  our  government  when  it  did  not  clash  with 
British  interests,  felt  it  important  that  he  should 
rightly  understand  the  case  and  the  difficulties  to  be 
overcome.  As  he  could  not,  under  the  rule  or  practice, 
communicate  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  directly, 
he,  on  the  14th  of  December  invited  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Fox,  to  dine  with  him. 
Mr.  Fox  informed  me  of  the  invitation  and  that  he 
had  an  intimation  that  Lord  Lyons  was  anxious  to 
know  the  difiicultics  in  the  way  of  carrying  the  treaty 
into  effect.  I  authorized  him  to  say  frankly  to  Lord 
Lyons  or  any  one  else,  that  in  declining  to  give  special 
instructions  which  would  tie  up  the  hands  of  our  naval 
commanders,  my  only  object  was  not  to  impair  their 
efficiency  or  circumscribe  their  undoubted  belligerent 
right  by  specific  instructions,  that   were  inconsistent 


144  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

with  the  broader  general  belh'gerent  right.  Mr.  Fox 
so  informed  the  Minister,  and  in  due  time  the  treaty 
requirements  were  so  far  relaxed  as  to  authorize  a 
special  warrant  to  our  naval  officers,  to  the  effect  that 
the  rights  and  privileges  under  the  treaty  would  not 
in  any  way  derogate  from  or  conflict  with  belligerent 
rights — that  the  power  conferred  by  the  treaty  was 
added  to  belligerent  rights,  not  substituted  for  them, 
and  that  the  mixed  courts  of  justice  established  by  the 
treaty  would  exercise  their  functions  in  cases  of 
captures  under  the  belligerent  right  as  well  as  the 
special  right,  which  might  be  sent  to  them  for  adjudi- 
cation. But,  in  point  of  fact,  I  believe  not  a  single 
capture  was  made,  the  African  slave-trade  had  ceased, 
and  the  cumbrous  and  expensive  machinery  of  mixed 
courts  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  Sierra  Leone  and  > 
"New  York  were  never  put  in  operation.  The  offi- 
cers of  these  tribunals  never  had  anything  to  do 
but  draw  their  salaries.  After  the  war  was  over,  the 
treaty,  the  Danish  arrangement  and  all  the  accom- 
paniments went  out  of  existence.  I^o  great  eclat 
attached  to  the  negotiators  of  this  slave-trade  treaty  in 
the  United  States,  nor  did  Great  Britain  derive  any 
commercial  benefit  from  the  attempt  to  limit  the  right 
of  search  below  the  latitude  of  32°  ;  but  failing  in  this, 
of  which  the  English  legation  was  notified  on  the  14th 
of  October,  they  succeeded  on  the  31st  of  that  month 
in  securing  from  the  Secretary  of  State,  without  law, 
assurance  of  immunity  to  the  mails.  Lines  of  packets 
to  Matamoras  were  immediately  established,  which 
opened  intercourse  to  the  rebel  states  through  Texas 
and  the  blockade  was  thereby  evaded. 


MR,    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  ,         145 

That  Mr.  Seward  himself  came  into  the  State  De- 
partment with  no  acquaintance  with  the  forms  of  bu- 
siness other  than  that  obtained  incidentally  through 
his  services  in  the  Senate,  is  undoubtedly  correct  and 
is  well  exemplified  in  the  whole  arrangement  attend- 
ing this  slave-trade  treaty  and  its  incidents,  a  treaty 
wherein  the  negotiator,  represented  as  "  a  superior  in 
native  intellectual  power"  to  the  President  and  who 
exercised  the  more  solid  power  to  direct  affairs  **  through 
the  President's  name,"  a  treaty  negotiated  in  the  midst 
of  war  but  which  by  its  provisions  would  cripple  the 
war  power  of  the  government,  a  treaty  negotiated  by 
the  Secretary  of  State  without  consulting  his  colleagues 
in  the  administration,  a  treaty  fortified  or  attempted 
to  be  fortified  by  an  anomalous  quasi-treaty  entered 
into  by  another  and  a  domestic  department  with  the 
representative  of  a  foreign  government,  which  quasi- 
treaty  or  arrangement  was  never  ratified  by  the  Sen- 
ate, as  the  constitution  requires,  but  which  anomaly 
and  the  law  under  which  it  was  justified  were  the  off- 
spring of  the  negotiator  of  the  slave-trade  treaty  and 
a  part  of  that  arrangement.  This  strange  complica- 
tion, the  treaty,  the  quasi-treaty  and  the  law,  with 
the  legal  tribunals  and  the  extensive  and  attending 
paraphernalia  resulted  in  nothing  but  a  large  expen- 
diture from  the  national  treasury. 


The  subject  of  enlisting  private  enterprise  in  aid 
of  the  government  upon  the  ocean  as  well  as  the  land, 
early  engaged  attention.     Yague  and  wonderfully  ex- 
aggerated rumors  that  our  commerce  and  shipping  in- 
7 


146  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

terests  were  endangered  from  swarms  of  privateers  that 
were,  or  soon  would  be  abroad,  alarmed  the  mercantile 
communities,  and  stirred  up  the  fishermen  and  mari- 
ners on  our  coast  who  were  anxious  that  there  should 
be  counteracting  movements  against  these  threatened 
depredators.  Schemes  for  a  volunteer  navj,  proposi- 
tions for  a  militia  of  the  seas,  tenders  of  jacht-squad- 
rons  and  plans  for  naval  brigades  were  pressed  upon 
the  government  bj  men  of  position  and  character  as 
well  as  by  adventurous  spirits.  It  was  remembered 
that  in  the  war  of  1812  important  service  was  render- 
ed by  the  privateers.  Without  considering  the  difier- 
ence  between  a  foreign  war  with  the  wealthiest  com- 
mercial nation  and  a  civil  conflict  with  insurgents  who 
had  neither  commerce  to  be  injured,  nor  booty  to  re- 
ward private  enterprise,  it  was  urged  that  the  govern- 
ment might  be  benefitted  now  as  then  by  reprisals. 
y  The  Secretary  of  State  falling  in  with  the  current 
"^  popular  feeling  favored  these  crude  schemes ;  while  the 
Secretary  of  the  Kavy  who  had  more  especially  in 
charge,  the  police  of  the  seas,  questioned  whether  let- 
ters-of-marque  could  be  made  efifective  in  this  conflict 
with  the  rebels,  and  was  apprehensive  they  might 
jeopard  peaceful  relations  with  other  powers.  At  the 
commencement  of  difliculties  the  rebel  government  au- 
thorized the  licensing  of  privateers  which  produced  a 
great  sensation  and  aggravated  the  existing  hostile 
feelino^.  In  the  universal  desire  to  strike  the  most 
effective  blows  against  the  rebels,  the  demand  for 
using  every  available  means  became  almost  irresisti- 
ble. Indications  of  a  willingness  by  foreign  govern- 
ments, particularly  by  Great  Britain,  to  give  encour- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWAED.  '      147 

agement  to  the  rebels  by  their  treatment  of  questions 
of  international  maritime  law  had  probably  an  influ- 
ence on  the  Secretary  of  State  and  more  deeply  enlist- 
ed his  sympathies  with  those  who  were  zealous  foi 
carrying  on  upon  the  high  seas,  private  as  well  as  pub- 
lic war  against  the  insurgents.  No  encouragement  was 
given  by  the  administration,  for  privateers,  but  the 
pressure  from  without,  naturally  led  to  occasional  dis- 
cussions in  the  Cabinet,  which  developed  the  different 
views  entertained  by  the  heads  of  the  two  departments 
most  interested.  But  no  decisive  steps  were  taken, 
and  this  was  in  itself  the  naval  policy.  At  the  extra 
session  of  Congress  in  July,  the  subject  was  entertain- 
ed by  the  members  and  among  the  acts  passed  confer- 
ring authority  on  the  Executive,  was  one  empowering 
the  President  to  "  authorize  the  commanders  of  armed 
vessels  sailing  under  the  authority  of  any  letters-of- 
marque  and  reprisal  granted  by  Congress — to  subdue, 
seize,  take,  and  if  on  the  high  seas  to  send  into  port.'' 
But  Congress  omitted  to  authorize  the  issuing  of 
letters-of-marque  and  prescribe  conditions  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  privateers  ;  the  enactment  however  served 
to  relieve  the  administration  in  a  measure  from  many 
of  the  schemes  that  had  been  urged.  Shortly  after 
Congress  adjourned  several  highly  respectable  mer- 
chants of  Boston  engaged  in  the  China  trade,  apprehen- 
sive that  "  rebel  cruisers  might  get  into  those  seas" 
addressed  a  communication  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  suggesting  the  "  expediency  of  letters-of-marque 
or  other  commission,"  under  the  provision  of  the  re- 
cent enactment.  Application  was  also  made  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  by  some  of  the  same  parties  for  let- 


148  MB.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

ters-of-marque  to  the  steamer  Pembroke  which  was 
about  sailing  from  Boston  to  China.  Mr.  Seward  in 
view  of  the  differences  between  the  State  and  Navy 
Departments  instead  of  answering  this  letter  direct, 
referred  it  with  an  inquiry  to  me.  My  reply  to  him 
which  the  President  approved,  and  which  I  here  in- 
sert, corresponded  with  my  answer  to  the  merchants, 
and  Mr.  Seward  disposed  of  the  application  to  him- 
self, by  sending  out  and  publishing  my  letter  to  him. 
This  relieved  him  of  responsibility. 

"Navy  Department,  Oct.  1.  1861, 
"Sir:— 

"  In  relation  to  the  communication  of  R.  B.  Forbes, 
Esq.,  a  copy  of  which  was  sent  by  you  to  this  Depart- 
ment on  the  16th  ultimo,  inquiring  whether  letters-of- 
marque  cannot  be  furnished  for  the  propeller  Pembroke, 
which  is  about  to  be  despatched  to  China,  I  have  the 
honor  to  state  that  it  appears  to  me  there  are  objections 
to,  and  no  authority  for,  granting  letters-of-marque  in 
the  present  contest.  I  am  not  aware  that  Congress, 
which  has  exclusive  power  of  granting  letters-of-marque 
and  reprisal,  has  authorized  such  letters  to  be  issued 
against  the  insurgents ;  and  were  there  such  authoriza- 
tion, I  am  not  prepared  to  advise  its  exercise,  because 
it  would,  in  my  view,  be  a  recognition  of  the  assumption 
of  the  insurgents,  that  they  are  a  distinct  and  indepen- 
dent nationality. 

"Under  the  Act  of  August  5,  1861,  'Supplementary 
to  an  Act  entitled  An  Act  to  protect  the  commerce  of 
the  United  States  and  to  punish  the  crime  of  piracy,' 
the  President  is  authorized  to  instruct  the  commanders 
of  '  armed  vessels  sailing  under  the  authority  of  any 
letters-of-marque  and  reprisal  granted  by  the  Congress 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWARD.  149 

of  the  United  States,  or  the  commanders  of  any  other 
suitable  vessels,  to  subdue,  seize,  take,  and,  if  on  the 
high  seas  to  send  into  any  port  of  the  United  States  any 
vessel  or  boat  built,  purchased,  fitted  out,  or  held,'  etc. 
This  allusion  to  letters-of-marque  does  not  authorize 
such  letters  to  be  issued,  nor  do  I  find  any  otlier  act 
containing  such  authorization.  But  the  same  act,  in  the 
second  section,  as  above  quoted,  gives  the  President 
power  to  authorize  the  'commanders  of  any  suitable 
vessels  to  subdue,  seize,'  etc.  Under  this  clause,  letters 
permissive,  under  proper  restrictions  and  guards  against 
abuse,  might  be  granted  to  the  propeller  Pembroke,  so 
as  to  meet  the  views  expressed  by  Mr.  Forbes.  This 
would  seem  to  be  lawful,  and  perhaps  not  liable  to  the 
objection  of  granting  letters-of-marque  against  our  own 
citizens,  and  that  too,  without  law  or  authority  from  the 
only  constituted  power  that  can  grant  it. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  a  copy  of  a 
letter  from  Messrs.  J.  M.  Forbes  &  Co.  and  others,  ad- 
dressed to  this  Department,  on  the  same  subject. 
*'  I  am  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"Gideon  Welles." 
"  Wm.  H.  Seward. 

"  /Secretary  of  StateJ'^ 

The  letter  had  the  effect  apparently  of  satisfying 
for  a  time,  at  least,  those  who  had  taken  the  deepest 
interest  in  the  subject.  But  the  ravages  of  the  Sumter, 
which  vessel  was  hailed  with  friendly  welcome  and 
supplied  in  British  ports,  with  the  subsequent  depreda- 
tions of  the  Alabama  and  Florida — English  built,  and 
manned  chiefly  by  Englishmen,  aroused  the  indigna- 
tion  of  the   whole   country.     This   indignation   was 


150  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   ME.    SEWAKD. 

increased  and  aggravated  by  the  conduct  of  the  British 
government  in  excluding  all  United  States  cruisers 
from  the  English  ports  in  China,  though  the  seas  of 
that  empire  were  infested  by  pirates,  and  the  whole 
commercial  world  was  interested  in  their  suppression. 
While  our  national  ships  in  English  ports  received 
only  grudging  hospitality  it  was  notorious  that  the 
semi-piratical  vessels  with  no  recognized  nationality, 
though  substantially  English  vessels  sailing  under  the 
rebel  flag  were  capturing,  plundering  and  wantonly 
destroying  our  commerce,  and  that  the  injury  to  us 
was  to  the  benefit  of  England.  Under  these  wrongs 
and  outrages  our  whole  commercial  marine  became 
greatly  excited,  and  could  the  country  have  been 
united,  a  war  with  England,  more  calamitous  than  any 
she  had  ever  known,  would  have  made  havoc  with  her 
commerce.  But  our  condition  was  such  that  forbear- 
ance became  a  duty,  and  the  government  while 
engaged  in  prosecuting  a  war  with  the  rebels  was 
also  subjected  to  a  severe  trial,  in  restraining  the 
popular  demand  for  reprisals  which  would  likely  have 
begotten  a  war  with  Great  Britain ; — for  though  the 
crown  was  not  unfriendly  to  the  Union  it  was  known 
that  English  capital  was  largely  engaged  in  illicit 
traffic  with  the  insurgents  and  in  running  and  evading 
the  blockade.  At  the  same  time  the  unnatural  and 
unfriendly  conduct  of  her  ministry,  who  put  forth  no 
arm  to  prevent,  but  craftily  connived  at  schemes 
against  the  Union  was  felt,  and  will  be  remembered 
against  the  Administration  of  Palmerston  and  Russell. 
It  is  some  gratification  to  remember  now  when  those 
dark  days  are  over,  that  in  addition  to  the  award  of 


MR,    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  151 

fifteen  millions  for  tlie  criminal  wrong  we  sulfered 
from  England,  our  navy,  without  assistance  from 
privateers,  captured  more  tlian  thirty  millions  of 
property  engaged  in  illicit  traffic  and  running  the 
blockade,  no  inconsiderable  portion  of  which  was 
English  capital.  While  the  public  mind  was  inflamed 
by  the  wrongs  inflicted,  complaints  were  made  of  the 
want  of  efiiciency  on  the  part  of  the  navy  and  [N^avy 
Department.  Privateers,  letters-of -marque  were  called 
for,  regardless  of  the  necessities  of  the  case  and 
of  the  consequences  of  committing  to  greedy  and 
reckless  adventurers  the  highest  and  most  delicate 
responsibilities  of  government,  an  abuse  of  which 
would  endanger  our  peace  w^ith  other  nations.  To 
meet  and  dispose  of  these  demands  required  decision 
and  eflfort.  The  Secretary  of  State  instead  of  repress- 
ing, quietly  favored  the  privateer  policy  which  had  its 
advocates  in  certain  persons  and  circles  in  'New  York. 
Fortunately  the  President,  cautious  but  firm,  main- 
tained a  prudent  and  wise  reserve,  and  committed  him- 
self to  no  project  that  w^as  likely  to  endanger  the 
national  welfare.  There  were  also  judicious  and 
discreet  minds  in  Congress  that  deprecated  the  policy 
of  sending  out  letters-of-marque  in  this  war  with 
rebels  ;  but  the  subject  was  much  agitated,  and  in  July 
1862,  Mr.  Seward  wrote  to  Mr.  Adams,  that  he  might 
inform  Earl  Russell  "  Since  the  Oreto  and  other  gun- 
boats are  being  received  by  the  insurgents  from  Europe 
to  renew  demonstrations  on  our  national  commerce, 
Congress  is  about  to  authorize  the  issue  of  letters-of- 
marque  and  reprisal,  and  that  if  we  find  it  necessary 
to  suppress  this  piracy  we  shall  bring  privateers  into 


152  MR.    LINCOLN  AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

service  for  that  purpose  and  of  course  for  that  purpose 
onlj." 

This  was  a  qualified  and  harmless  admonition 
w^hich  was  duly  appreciated  bj  Earl  Knssell,  particu- 
larly when  he  learned  a  few  days  after,  that  Congress 
had  adjourned  without  taking  action  on  the  subject. 
In  the  meantime  the  depredations  of  the  Alabama  and 
Florida  increased  the  irritation  against  not  only  the 
rebels  but  mercenary  England. 

On  the  29th  of  September,  Mr.  Seward  warned  me 
that  there  were  extensive  combinations  to  break  the 
blockade  and  to  confirm  his  admonition,  brought  me  a 
dispatch  and  documents  from  Mr.  Dudley,  our  efficient 
consul  at  Liverpool.  The  dispatches  were  a  notification 
that  eight  or  ten  steamers  were  nearly  ready  to  run  the 
blockade ;  but  there  was  no  evidence  to  confirm  the 
apprehensions  of  the  Secretary  of  State.  JSTo  mention 
was  made  of  any  armed  vessels,  but  there  were  reports 
of  wonderful  activity  among  the  merchant  adventurers 
of  Great  Britain,  stimulated  by  the  tidings  of  our  dis- 
asters under  Gen.  Pope  at  Bull  Run,  which  they  had 
just  previously  received,  and  which  they  considered 
conclusive  that  the  Union  cause  could  not  be  sustain- 
ed. Mr.  Seward  had  mistaken  unarmed  Ensflish 
blockade  runners  for  armed  blockade  breakers.  Al- 
though relieved  by  my  remarks  he  persisted  still  that 
the  policy  of  letters-of-marque  was  advisable  and  pro- 
posed that  the  powerful  merchant-steamer  Baltic 
should  be  commissioned,  and  Comstock,  a  very  compe- 
tent merchant-captain,  somewhat  connected  with,  and 
used  by  the  New  York  Bing  should  be  placed  in  com- 
mand.    Such  a  proceeding  on  the  part  of  the  govern- 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  153 

ment  would  have  been  a  reflection  on  naval  officers  and 
could  not  be  entertained,  there  was  yet  no  authority 
to  grant  letters-of-marque,  and  if  the  Baltic  were  char- 
tered or  purchased  by  the  Navy,  she  must  I  assured 
him,  be  commanded  by  a  naval  officer. 

So  long  as  the  subject  remained  under  executive 
control  the  prudence  and  firmness  of  the  President  in- 
sured the  national  welfare  and  safety.  But  the  public 
mind  had  become  angry  and  highly  inflamed,  in  which 
Congress  participated,  and  on  the  3rd  of  March  1863, 
the  last  day  of  the  session,  an  Act  was  passed  declaring, 
"  that  in  all  domestic  and  foreign  wars  the  President 
*^  of  the  United  States  is  authorized  to  issue  to  private 
"  armed  vessels  of  the  United  States,  commissions  or 
"  letters-of-marque  and  general  reprisal  in  such  form 
**  as  he  shall  think  proper,  and  under  the  seal  of  the 
"  United  States,  and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regu- 
"  lations  for  the  government  thereof,  and  for  the  adju- 
"  dication  and  disposal  of  the  prizes  and  salvages  made 
"  by  each  vessel — provided  that  the  authority  confer- 
"  red  by  this  Act  shall  cease  and  terminate  at  the  end 
**of  three  years  from  the  passage  of  this  Act." 

This  action  of  Congress,  though  general  in  its  char- 
acter would,  it  was  anticipated,  have  a  favorable  eflect 
abroad.  England  would  be  admonished  that  there 
was  a  limit  to  American  forbearance.  Viewing  it  in 
this  light,  and  as  a  warning  to  Great  Britain  where  the 
spirit  of  unscrupulous  greed,  if  not  of  positive  enmity 
to  the  Union,  had  embarked  an  immense  capital  in 
schemes  of  illicit  traffic  in  violation  of  our  laws  and  of 
the  blockade,  the  brief  and  modified  enactment  was 
acquiesced  in.     It  was  moreover  felt,  notwithstanding 

7* 


154  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

the  favor  which  the  project  received  from  the  Secretary 
of  State,  that  the  country  would  be  secure  against  any 
rash  or  precipitate  measure  by  the  President  to  whom 
the  whole  subject  was  committed.  But,  unfortunately, 
the  effect  of  the  enactment,  and  the  feeling  which 
forced  its  passage,  proved  a  stimulant  which  brought 
strength,  and  added  unexpected  recruits  to  the  move- 
ment. Among  others,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
on  whom  the  more  cautious  and  prudent  had  relied, 
became  a  convert  to,  or  avowed  advocate  for,  privateers 
and  reprisals.  The  Secretary  of  State  was  much 
elated  by  the  enactment,  and  by  the  acquisition  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  his  policy.  He  also  rep- 
resented that  merchants  of  ]S"ew  York  were  ready  and 
anxious  to  lit  out  privateers  to  take  the  Alabama  and 
Florida,  and  proposed  at  once  to  take  measures  for 
carrying  the  law  into  effect.  But  the  President  still 
hesitated,  though  the  law,  considered  as  an  expression 
of  the  sentiment  of  the  legislative  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment, together  with  the  countenance  which  it  re- 
ceived from  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  who  was 
understood  to  be  the  special  representative  and  ex- 
ponent of  the  commercial  interest,  had  each  an  influence 
which  it  was  difficult  successfully  to  resist.  I  had  from 
the  first  maintained  that  commerce  being  sensitive,  in- 
telligent merchants  and  capitalists  would  not  engage  in 
such  enterprises — that  privateers  were  usually  excited 
by  the  expectation  of  large  returns  from  captured  mer- 
chantmen— that  the  Alabama  and  Florida,  plundering 
rovers  which  they  would,  under  present  circumstances 
be  commissioned  to  overtake,  would,  if  captured,  be 
found  destitute  of  cargo  or  merchandize,  and  that  ves- 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND    MK.    SEWARD.  155 

sels  of  suflScient  magnitude  and  power  to  cope  snccess- 
fnllj  witli  the  Alabama  would  require  a  large  invest- 
ment for  so  uncertain  a  venture.  Without  naming 
persons,  Mr,  Seward  insisted  there  were  responsible 
parties  ready  to  engage  in  the  work  so  soon  as  they 
could  be  licensed,  he  therefore  proceeded  at  once  to 
prepare  forms  and  make  "  needful  rules  and  regulations" 
for  the  government  of  privateers  in  conformity  with 
the  recent  Act.  These  regulations  covering  a  number 
of  pages,  he,  on  the  10th  of  March,  one  week  after  the 
enactment  submitted  to  me  for  review,  criticism  and 
suggestions.  As  I  was  wholly  opposed  to  the  proceed- 
ing, I  declined  the  labor,  admitted  they  conformed  to 
the  legal  enactments  of  1812;  but  in  a  free  Cabinet 
discussion  I  made  some  general  remarks,  excepting  to 
the  regulations  as  transcending  executive  authority. 
The  subject  lingered  for  two  or  three  .weeks  during  a 
portion  of  which  time  I  was  absent  from  Washington 
and  the  President  declined  to  come  to  a  decision  while 
I  was  away.  Soon  after  my  return,  Mr.  Seward 
brought  forward  the  subject  and  said  that  parties  inter- 
ested were  becoming  impatient.  He  proposed  that  I 
should  communicate  my  objections  to  his  rules  in  writ- 
ing, and  the  President  concurred  in  the  suggestion.  I 
therefore  in  a  day  or  two,  addressed  to  him  the  follow- 
ing letter : 

*'Navy  Department, 

March  3 1st,  1863. 
"Sir:— 

"  When   discussing  the  regulations  concerning  '  let- 
ters-of-marque,'  etc.,  a  few  days   since,  I  made   certain 


15d  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

suggestions,  and  you  invited  me  to  communicate  any 
views  I  might  entertain  in  writing. 

"I  have  felt  some  delicacy,  I  may  say  disinclination, 
to  take  any  active  part  in  this  matter,  because  I  have 
from  the  beginning  of  our  difficulties  discouraged  the 
policy  of  privateering  in  such  a  war  as  this  we  are  now 
waging.  The  rebels  have  no  commercial  marine  to 
entice  and  stimulate  private  enterprise  and  capital  in 
such  undertakings,  provided  the  policy  were  desirable. 
We,  however,  have  a  commerce  that  invites  the  cupid- 
ity, zeal  and  spirit  of  adventure,  which,  once  commenced, 
it  will  be  difficult  to  regulate  or  suppress.  A  few  priva- 
teers let  loose  among  our  shipping,  like  wolves  among 
sheep  would  make  sad  havoc,  as  the  Alabama  and 
the  Florida  bear  witness.  It  is  proposed  to  encourage 
private  enterprise  to  embark  in  an  undertaking  to  cap- 
ture the  two  wolves  or  privateers  that  are  abroad 
devastating  the  seas;  and  it  is  said,  in  addition  to 
the  wolves,  they  may  be  authorized  to  catch  blockade 
runners.  The  inducement,  I  apprehend  will  not  meet 
a  favorable  response.  There  may  be  vessels  fitted 
out  to  capture  unarmed  prizes,  but  not  of  sufficient 
force  to  meet  and  overcome  the  Alabama ;  if  not,  the 
great  end  and  purpose  of  the  scheme  will  fail  of  accom- 
plishment. 

"  To  clothe  private  armed  vessels  with  governmental 
power  and  authority,  including  the  belligerent  right  of 
search,  will  be  likely  to  beget  trouble,  and  the  tendency 
must  unavoidably  be  to  abuse.  Clothed  with  these 
powers,  reckless  men  will  be  likely  to  involve  the  gov- 
ernment in  difficulty,  and  it  was  in  apprehension  of  that 
fact,  and  to  avoid  it,  I  encountered  .much  obloquy  and 
reproach  at  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion,  and  labored 
to  institute  a  less  objectionable  policy. 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND    MR.    SEWARD.  157 

"Propositions  for  privateers,  for  yacht-squadrons, 
for  naval  brigades,  volunteer  navy,  etc.,  etc.,  were, 
with  the  best  intentions  in  most  instances,  pressed  upon 
the  department  regardless  of  the  consequences  that  might 
follow  from  these  rude  schemes  of  private  warfare.  It 
was  to  relieve  us  of  the  necessity  of  going  into  these 
schemes  of  private  adventure,  that  the  '  Act  to  provide 
for  the  temporary  increase  of  the  Navy,'  approved 
July  24,  1861,  was  so  framed  as  to  give  authority  to 
take  vessels  into  the  naval  service  and  to  appoint 
officers  for  them,  temporarily,  to  any  extent  which 
the  President  may  deem  expedient.  Under  other  laws, 
seamen  may  be  enlisted  and  their  wages  fixed  by  exec- 
utive authority  ;  and  the  officers  and  men  so  taken 
temporarily  into  the  naval  service  are  subject  to  the 
laws  for  the  government  of  the  navy.  An  '  Act  for 
the  better  government  of  the  navy,  approved  July  17, 
1862,  grants  prize-money  to  any  armed  vessel  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States,'  in  the  same  manner  as  to 
vessels  of  the  navy. 

"  These  laws,  therefore,  seem  and  were  intended  to 
provide  all  the  advantages  of  letters-of-marque,  and  yet 
prevent  in  a  great  measure,  the  abuses  liable  to  spring 
from  them.  Private  armed  vessels,  adopted  temporarily 
into  the  naval  service,  would  be  more  certainly  and 
immediately  under  the  control  of  the  government,  than 
if  acting  only  under  a  general  responsibility  to  law. 

"  It  will  be  necessary  to  establish  strict  rules  for  the 
government  of  private  armed  vessels,  as  to  some  extent 
they  will  be  likely  to  be  officered  and  manned  by  per- 
sons of  rude  notions  and  free  habits.  Congress  after 
authorizing  letters-of-marque  in  the  war  of  1812,  adopt- 
ed the  necessary  legislation  for  the  vessels  bearing 
them,  by  the  Act  of  June  26th  of  that  year.     This  Act 


158  MB., LINCOLN   AND   ME.    SEWAED. 

has  not  been  revived.  The  recent  Act  concerning  let- 
ters of-marque  etc.,  etc.,  authorized  the  President  to 
"  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  for  the  govern- 
ment and  conduct  of  private  armed  vessels,  furnished 
with  letters-of-marque.'  In  pursuance  of  this  authori- 
zation, the  *  Regulations'  have  been  prepared,  embrac- 
ing the  provisions  of  the  statute  enacted  during  the 
War  of  1312.  These  regulations  establish,  as  the  stat- 
ute did  a  penal  code.  They  impose  fines  and  assume 
to  authorize  punishments,  including  even  capital  punish- 
ment. 

"  As  suggested  in  our  interview,  I  question  the  va- 
lidity of  such  proceedings.  Can  Congress  delegate  this 
power  of  penal  legislation  to  the  President  ?  and  if  to 
the  President,  why  may  it  not  to  any  branch  of  the  ex- 
ecutive ? 

"  If  it  can  be  granted  for  this  special  purpose — the 
government  of  private  armed  vessels — why  not  for  any 
other  purpose  ?  And  if  it  can  delegate  the  power  of 
penal  legislation,  why  could  it  not  delegate  any  other 
power  or  powers,  to  the  President,  to  Commissioners,  or 
even  to  a  Committee  of  its  own  body,  to  sit  during  the 
recess?  Why  could  it  not  delegate  authority  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  legislate  respecting  im- 
ports, foreign  trade,  or  to  the  Postmaster-general  full 
power  of  legislation  respecting  postofiices  and  post 
routes?  The  power  of  imposing  penalties  and  inflict- 
ing punishments  is  the  essence  of  legislative  power,  for  it 
is  the  penalty  of  transgression  that  gives  force  to  law. 
These  regulations  also  establish  rewards  as  well  as  pen- 
alties. They  provide  that  a  large  bounty  shall  be  paid 
to  private  armed  vessels  in  certain  cases.  But  no  fund 
is  appropriated  for  the  purpose  by  the  Act,  nor  has  any 
provision  elsewhere  been  made  for  it.      Can  Congress 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MK.    SEWARD.  159 

delegate  to  the  President  the  power  to  appropriate  the 
public  moneys,  or  to  take  them  without  specific  ap- 
propriation, or  pledge  the  public  faith  at  his  discretion 
for  an  indefinite  amount  ? 

"  As  I  have  already  said  I  have  doubts  in  these  par- 
ticulars. They  are  expressed  with  some  reluctance,  be- 
cause in  the  uneasy  condition  of  the  public  mind,  grow- 
ing out  of  the  lawless  depredations  of  the  semi-piratical 
cruisers  that  are  abroad,  I  am  unwilling  to  interpose 
anything  which  may  be  construed  into  an  obstacle  to 
repress  public  indignation,  which  is  so  justly  excited.  I 
did  not  regret  that  Congress  enacted  a  law  authorizing 
letters-of-marque  ;  because  I  verily  believe  that,  with 
it,  England  can  be  made  to  prevent  her  mercenary  citi- 
zens from  making  war  on  our  commerce  under  a  flag 
that  has  no  recognized  nationality.  If  the  police  of  the 
sea  is  to  be  surrendered,  and  rovers  built  by  English 
capital  and  manned  by  Englishmen  are  to  be  let  loose 
to  plunder  our  commerce,  let  England  understand  that 
her  ships  will  suffer,  and  her  commerce  also  be  annoyed 
and  injured  by  private  armed  ships.  With  her  distant 
and  dependent  colonies,  no  nation  has  greater  cause  to 
oppose  maritime  robbery  and  plunder,  such  as  is  being 
inflicted  on  us  by  Englishmen  and  English  capital,  than 
Great  Britain. 

"The  West  Indies  are,  notoriously,  harbors  of  refuge 
for  the  cruisers  that  are  plundering  our  merchants,  as 
well  as  for  the  infamous  and  demoralizing  business  of 
running  our  blockade,  to  encourage  the  insurgents  who 
are  waging  war  on  our  government.  Of  these  ports, 
those  of  England  are  the  worst,  and  a  vast  amount  of 
English  capital  is  engaged  in  illicit  traffic,  and  her 
people  and  authorities  exhibit  sympathy  for  and  afford 


160  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

aid  to  the  insurgents  and  their  abettors,  and  correspond- 
ing opposition  to  this  government. 

"  The  English  ship-yards  are  filled  with  vessels  built 
and  building  for  the  rebel  service,  and  if  measures  are 
not  taken  to  prevent,  these  will  soon  swarm  the  seas  to 
capture,  condemn  and  destroy  American  property,  with- 
out a  port  into  which  they  can  send  their  captures  for 
adjudication.  Enjoying  greater  advantages  than  the 
corsairs  and  sea-rovers  that  once  infested  the  ocean, 
because  protected,  harbored  and  sheltered  by  govern- 
ments in  alliance  with  and  professedly  friendly  to  us, 
while  ordinary  pirates  are  outlaws,  this  species  of  lawless 
outrage  cannot  be  permitted  to  go  on. 

"  England  should  be  warned  that  we  cannot  permit 
this  indirect  war  to  continue  with  impunity — that  it 
will  provoke  and  justify  retaliation,  and  that  if  her 
people  and  government  make  war  upon  our  commerce, 
by  sending  abroad  rovers  with  no  nationality,  to  prey 
upon  the  property  of  our  citizens,  it  will  be  impossible 
to  restrain  our  people  from  retaliatory  measures. 

"  I  am  respectfully, 

"  Your  ob'd't  serv't, 

"Gideon  Welles, 

"  Sec'Cy  of  Navyy 
"Hon.  Wm.  H.  Seward, 

"  SecH'y  of  State?' 

Whilst  this  letter  was  on  my  table,  Senator  Sum- 
ner, who  had  opposed  the  law  when  on  its  passage, 
called  on  me,  and  was  very  much  disturbed  by  what 
be  had  learned  from  Mr.  Seward  would  be  the  prob- 
able policy  of  the  administration.  From  the  com- 
mencement he  had  objected  to  licensing  privatedi's,  and 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  161 

was,  when  he  called,  a  good  deal  incensed  at  some  re- 
marks of  the  Secretary  of  State  whom  he  had  just 
left.  It  was  felt  by  Mr.  Seward  to  be  something  of  a 
triumph  over  Mr.  Sumner,  who  often  came  in  conflict 
with  his  views,  and  in  allusion  to  whom,  when  con- 
fronted, as  he  sometimes  was  by  the  President  with 
the  Senator's  opinions,  he  remarked,  '*  there  were  too 
many  Secretaries  of  State  in  Washington."  I  handed 
to  Mr.  Sumner  during  the  interview,  my  letter  which 
was  yet  unsent,  to  read,  and  remarked  as  I  did  so,  that 
I  was  very  much  disappointed  at  the  recent  course  of 
Mr.  Chase,  and  discouraged  by  communications  just 
received  from  Earl  Kussell.  He  expressed  great  grat- 
ification with  my  letter,  but  hoped  before  I  sent  it  to 
the  State  Department  that  I  would  read  it  to  Mr.  Lin- 
coln ;  this  was  not  my  practice.  I  could  not  doubt  that 
Mr.  Seward  himself  on  its  receipt  would  submit  it  to 
the  President. 

The  evening  after  this  interview,  the  President 
came  across  the  Square  to  my  house,  which  was  direct- 
ly opposite  the  executive  mansion,  and  said  his  princi- 
pal object  in  calling  was  to  see  a  letter  I  had  prepared, 
which  Mr.  Sumner  had  read  and  complimented,  and 
wished  him  to  peruse.  I  informed  him  that  the  letter 
had  gone  to  Mr.  Seward,  but  I  would  bring  him  the 
press  copy  in  the  morning.  He  thought  this  unne- 
cessary for  Mr.  Seward  would  undoubtedly  present  it. 
He  then  discussed  tliis  subject  with  others  at  consider- 
able length.  The  President  met  my  disbelief  that 
merchants  of  character  and  intelligence  would  be  in- 
duced to  engage  in  the  business  of  privateering,  and 
my  opinion  that  Mr.  Seward  was  deceiving  himself  in 


162  MB.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWAED. 

tliat  respect,  by  asking  whether  the  best  method  of 
testing  the  fact  would  not  be  by  giving  the  merchants 
an  opportunity  to  manifest  their  views  by  their  acts. 
Let  us  see,  said  he,  who  the  men  are  that  are  ready  and 
anxious  to  aid  the  government  in  this  way ;  perhaps 
you  are  mistaken  and  Seward  right.  Chase  who 
knows,  or  ought  to  know  the  commercial  sentiment 
has  come  into  Seward's  views.  It  may  be  well  to 
make  the  experiment.  The  State  and  the  Treasury 
may  know  more  correctly  the  feelings  of  the  merchants 
than  the  Navy.  I  replied,  the  test  would  be  hazard- 
ous. Should  the  merchants,  as  Mr.  Seward  believed, 
embark  in  the  measure,  adventurers  would  be  likely  to 
also  engage  in  reprisals,  and  might  involve  us  in  war 
which  with  the  load  upon  our  hands  would  be  disas- 
trous. We  ought  therefore  to  act  deliberately,  and 
with  a  full  and  right  appreciation  of  all  the  probable 
consequences.  He  said  that  was  true  and  he  had  con- 
fidence in  my  judgment  and  my  opinions,  but  I  might 
be  mistaken — the  State  and  the  Treasury  took  a  differ- 
ent view,  and  if  I  was  right  in  my  belief  that  the  mer- 
chants would  not  engage  in  privateering,  no  harm 
could  come  from  the  trial.  If  Seward  was  mistaken, 
and  the  substantial  men  of  the  country  held  off',  the 
credit  would  be  mine,  and  all  would  then  be  satisfied. 
At  the  Cabinet  meeting  on  Friday  the  3d  of  April 
Mr.  Seward  had  some  side  talk  with  me  in  relation  to 
the  assignment  of  a  naval  officer  of  character  to  the 
service  of  the  State  Department,  on  whom  he  could 
devolve  the  labor  and  details  of  examining  applications 
and  preparing  papers.  He  had  previously  requested 
that  Admiral  Foote  should  be  detailed  for  that  service, 


ME.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  163 

but  that  officer  after  looking  into  tlie  subject  requested 
to  be  excused.  As  all  matters  relating  to  privateers 
and  letters-of-marque  had  in  former  wars  been  com- 
mitted to  the  State  Department  and  were  to  be  on  this 
occasion,  I  objected  that  the  navy  ought  not  to  be 
blended  with  the  movement.  He  very  frankly  said  his 
purpose  in  asking  for  a  naval  officer  of  rank,  was  to 
be  relieved  himself  of  labor  and  details — in  other 
words,  I  perceived  the  Navy  Department  was  to  share 
in  the  responsibility  of  any  failure  or  imbroglio  that 
might  result  from  a  policy  which  it  disapproved. 
He  named  Rear- Admiral  0.  H.  Davis  as  acceptable, 
who  was  assigned  accordingly. 

The  President  requested  to  see  me  on  the  following 
morning,  Saturday,  and  as  I  entered  the  room  he  re- 
marked that  I  would  probably  be  surprised  to  hear  that 
Seward  already  had  application  for  letters-of-marque. 
I  acknowledged  I  was  disappointed  if  there  were  re- 
spectable and  responsible  parties  to  engage  in  the  busi- 
ness. The  President  said  he  knew  nothing  of  the 
gentleman  whom  Seward  had  brought  him,  farther 
than  that  he  had  a  vessel,  and  was  anxious  to  enter 
upon  the  service.  Taking  up  and  looking  at  a  paper, 
he  said  the  gentleman's  name  was  Seybert,  that  he  had 
a  vessel  of  one  hundred  tons,  into  which  he  proposed 
to  put  a  screw — that  this  gentleman  was  then  in  the 
audience  room,  and  he  would  call  him  in,  that  I  might 
examine  him.  This  I  informed  him  was  unnecessary, 
for  I  was  familiar  w^ith  the  case  which  had  already  been 
before  me.  There  were,  I  assured  the  President  no 
New  York  merchants  or  capital  in  this  enterprise. 
Seybert   was,  I  had  learned,  a  Prussian  adventurer, 


lt>4:  MR.    LESfCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

who  called  himself  a  citizen  of  South  Carolina,  and 
I  preferred  that  the  Secretary  of  State  should  dispose 
of  this  and  all  other  similar  applications.  With  a 
twinkle  in  his  eye  the  President  said  he  certainly 
would  not  trouble  me  farther  in  this  instance,  but 
wait  for  the  merchants. 

Senator  Sumner  informed  me  at  the  same  time 
that  the  President  had  experienced  great  difficulty  in 
getting  a  sight  of  my  letter  of  the  31st  of  March.  Mr. 
Seward  did  not  bring  it  to  his  notice  as  was  expected, 
and  when  he  asked  for  it,  one  excuse  after  another  was 
given,  but  the  President  persisted  until  it  was  sent 
him,  when  he  notified  the  Senator,  and  together  they 
read  it,  and  discussed  the  whole  subject  of  privateer- 
ing and  reprisals. 

This,  with  Seybert's  application,  the  only  one  that 
ever  after  came  to  my  knowledge,  terminated  the  pri- 
vateer policy,  closed  the  subject  of  letters-of-marque 
and  reprisals  during  the  rebellion.  I  never  again  saw 
the  Pegulations  or  heard  them  alluded  to.  That  Mr. 
Seward  was  earnest  and  sincere  in  his  belief  that  pri- 
vateers might  render  efficient  service,  I  never  question- 
ed, but  it  was  fortunate  for  the  administration  and  the 
country,  that  he  did  not  direct  affairs  for  the  nation  in 
regard  to  the  policy  of  letters-of-marque  during  our  civil 
war.  Mr.  Lincoln  proved  himself  on  that  subject  and 
others  through  that  whole  exciting  period,  the  *'  supe- 
rior in  native  intellectual  power,''  and  in  administrative 
ability. 


MR.   LINCOLN   AND   ME.    SEWAED.  fi65 


Official  intercourse  between  the  Secretary  of  Statejj 
and  the  Secretary  of  the  'Navy  was  probably  more  fre- 
quent than  between  any  other  two  departments. 

The 'service  of  naval   officers  on  foreign  stations 
where  courtesy  and  the  obligations  of  treaties  were  to  be 
observed  and  maintained,  and  questions  growing  out 
of  the  exercise  of  belligerent  rights,  including  those  of 
blockade,  contraband  and  the  right  of  search,  brought 
the  heads  of  these  two  departments  in  contact,  and 
rendered  consultations  necessary.    These  consultations, 
often  in  personal  interviews,  but  sometimes  by  corre- 
spondence, brought   out  the    points    in   which   they 
agreed  and  disagreed,  developed  the   views   of  each 
and  to  some  extent  the  policy  and  principles  and  the 
working  of  the  administration.     But  however  antago- 
nistic   their    opinions,  there    was   between    the   two 
Secretaries  always  harmony  and  mutual  good-will  an^ 
friendly  personal  relations  during  the  years  they  were 
associated  together.   When  they  did  not  agree  on  anyV 
public  measure,  the  subject   was   submitted    to    the\ 
President  who  usually  decided  for  himself;  but  some-  \ 
times  the  diiferences  were  made  the  subject  of  pabj-  1 
^et  consultation.     As  a  general  thing  the  Secretary  of    \ 
State  was  averse  to  bringing  department  differences    \ 
before  the  Cabinet.  Yisiting  the  President  daily,  there     I 
were  occasions  when  Mr.  Seward  obtained  a  decision      ♦ 
without  the  President's  being  aware  of  any  difference, 
or  that  the   point  was   contested.     A   decision   once 
made  and  promulgated  it  was  often  difficult  to  have  it 
reversed.     In   mentioning  these  and  other  incidents 
rendered  necessary  in  remarking  on  the  "  Memorial  Ad- 


166  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

dress,"  my  object  has   been  to  exhibit  the  executive 
ability    and    peculiar    management   of  Mr.    Seward, 
which  Mr.  Adams  assumes,  and  many  have   believed, 
controlled  and  directed  the  administration  of  Mr.  Lin- 
coln.    Such  was  not  the  fact.     The  ideas  of -the  two 
as  to  the  extent  and  exercise  of  executive  authority 
were  different,  the  grants  and  limitations  of  power  by 
the  constitution  were  less  respected  by  the  Secretary 
of  State  than  by  the  President,  hence   Mr.  Seward 
often  and  especially  when  Congress  was  not  in  session, 
freely  and  sometimes   inconsiderately   if  not   rashly, 
gave  unfortunate  opinions — conceded  away  important 
rights,  and  himself,  exercised   questionable  executive 
authority,  on  the  assumption,  apparently,  that  the  ex- 
ecutive was  the  government,  and  his  power  in  the  ad- 
ministration almost  absolute,     l^evertheless  Mr.  Sew- 
ard was  timid  in  facing  Congress,  felt  his  responsibility 
to  the  legislative  department  more  than  to  the  Consti- 
tution and  disliked  controversy,  especially  with  associ- 
ates who  were  compelled  to  sometimes  question  the 
correctness  of  his  views.     His  readiness  to  manifest 
his   authority   and  magnify  his  position  led  him   to 
make  t)ff-hand  promises  and  to  decide  questions  with- 
out  first   investigating   and   ascertaining   their   true 
merits,  or  his  authority  to  act  and  his  power  to  fulfil 
his  engagements.     This  precipitancy  not  unfrequent- 
ly  begat  embarassment  and  betrayed  not  only  a  want 
of  wise  diplomatic  reserve,  but  of  calm  and  intelligent 
executive  ability.     But  if  he  was  at  times  rash  and  ar- 
bitrary it  was  from  personal    weakness,  a  desire    to 
show  his  power  rather  than  from  malevolence  or  want 
of  patrioitsm.     Towards  the  demands  of  foreign  gov- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  167 

ernments,  particularly  the  great  powers  who  were  of- 
ten wrong  and  unreasonable,  he  was  submissive,  too 
ready  to  yield  and  make  concessions  that  could  not  be 
justified,  and  which  were  in  fact  sometimes  a  surren- 
der of  undoubted  national  rights. 

In  October  1862,  Mr.  Seward  sent  me  the  copy  of 
a  singular  letter  from  the  Spanish  Minister  claiming 
that  the  dominion  of  Spain  extended  six  miles  instead 
of  three  from  the  coast  of  Cuba.  In  his  reception 
and  treatment  of  this  absurd  demand,  and  in  trans- 
mitting the  letter  making  the  claim,  Mr.  Seward  un- 
wittingly erred  and  made  some  unfortunate  admissions, 
said  "  the  questions  raised  were  important  and  by  no 
means  easy  of  solution" — yet  there  was  no  principle 
or  rule  better  settled  by  the  consent  and  practice  of 
maritime  nations,  than  that  the  marine  league  or  three 
miles  off  the  open  sea  was  the  extent  of  sovereign 
dominion.  This  novel  assumption  if  permitted  or  enter- 
tained would  have  been  a  wonderful  protection  to  the 
rebels  and  blockade-runners  that  were  swarming  the 
waters  of  Cuba  and  its  vicinity.  Instead  of  squarely 
meeting  and  promptly  dismissing  this  strange  claim 
made  at  a  strange  period,  when  we  were  engaged  in  a 
deadly  struggle  with  the  insurgents  and  their  covert 
allies,  or  bringing  the  subject  before  the  Cabinet,  Mr. 
Seward  had  allowed  himself  to  discuss  it.  Instead  of 
appealing  to  the  law  of  nations  which  no  Secretary 
of  State  could  change,  he  had,  sitting  in  the  State 
Department,  incautiously  and  improperly  put  our 
rights  in  jeopardy  by  admitting  that  the  Spanish 
government,  when  it  asserted  that  an  improvement  in 
ordnance    enlarged  the   marine  jurisdiction  of  every 


168  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

sovereign,  had  "  set  forth  a  true  principle  of  interna- 
tional law."  But  the  law  should  have  governed  him. 
Neither  he  nor  the  Spainish  Minister,  nor  both  com- 
bined could  revoke  it.  Other  nations  were  interested. 
He  might  as  he  had  undertaken  in  the  matter  of  the 
captured  mails,  renounce  the  right  of  the  United  States, 
but  that  would  not  unsettle  or  change  the  law  of  nations. 
The  following  is  the  correspondence  referred  to  : 

"  Department  of  State. 

"Washington,  Oct.  10,  1862. 
"Sir:  — 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  communicate  for  your  informa- 
tion, a  copy  of  a  note  which  has  been  received  at  this 
Department  from  His  Excellency  Seiior  Don  Gabriel 
Garcia  y  Tassara,  Minister-Plenipotentiary  of  Her  Catho 
lie  Majesty,  on  the  subject  of  the  marine  dominion 
appurtenant  to  the  island  of  Cuba.  You  will  learn  from 
this  paper  that  Spain  claims  that  this  dominion  covers 
six  miles  upon  the  open  sea,  instead  of  three  miles  as  it 
has  been  understood  by  this  government.  The  questions 
raised  by  this  note  are  important,  and  by  no  means  easy 
of  solution.  The  Spanish  Government  sets  forth  a  true 
principle  of  international  law  when  it  states  that  the 
marine  jurisdiction  of  every  sovereign  extends  the  length 
of  a  cannon  shot  from  the  shore.  It  has  however,  been 
generally  agreed,  by  the  acquiescence  rather  than  by  the 
formal  consent  of  nations,  that  this  extent  is  a  marine 
league,  or  three  miles.  Spain  now  claims  that  the  limit 
may  be  extended  beyond  the  three  miles,  so  however,  as 
to  be  kept  within  the  length  of  a  gun-shot,  as  it  is  ex- 
tended by  modern  improvements  in  the  machinery  of 
ordnance,  and  that  each  nation  may  fix  the  limit  of  its 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWAKD.  169 

own  marine  dominion,  with  that  reservation,  for  itself, 
without  making  general  or  sj^ecific  arrangements  for  the 
purpose  with  other  states.  Spain,  moreover,  claims  that 
she  has  thus  iixed  the  limit  for  herself  at  six  miles.  The 
subject  will  receive  due  examination  by  this  Department. 
As  a  preliminary  to  that  examination,  I  have  the  honor 
to  ask  you  how  the  allowance  of  this  claim  would  prac- 
tically effect  the  efficiency  of  the  navy  in  the  exercise  of 
such  belligerent  rights  as  the  United  States  have  occasion 
to  maintain  and  exercise  in  the  vicinity  of  Cuba. 
"I  am,  Sir,  Your  Ob't  Serv't, 

«  Wm  H.  Seward." 
*'Hon.  Gideon  Welles, 

*'  SecH'y  of  the  NavyP 

**  Navy  Department, 
"Sir:—  Oct.  15,  1862. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  communication  of  the  10th  inst.  covering  the  dis- 
patch of  His  Excellency  Don  G.  G.  Tassara,  Minister- 
Plenipotentiary  of  Her  Catholic  Majesty,  on  the  subj"ect 
of  the  marine  dominion  appurtenant  to  the  island  of 
Cuba — claiming  that  it  covers  six  miles  upon  the  open 
sea,  instead  of  three  miles  as  hitherto  understood  by  this 
government — admitting  the  recognized  principle  that 
marine  jurisdiction  extends  to  cannon  ball  range,  and 
citing  modern  improvements  in  artillery  as  authority  in 
support  of  his  claim. 

"  You  do  me  the  honor  to  ask  me,  as  preliminary  to 
the  examination  which  you  propose  to  make,  how  the 
allowance  of  this  claim  would  practically  affect  the 
efficiency  of  the  Navy  in  the  exercise  of  such  belligerent 
rights  as  the  United  States  have  occasion  to  maintain 
and  exercise  in  the  vicinity  of  Cuba." 
8 


170  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

"The  concession  of  this  claim  would  be  inconsistent 
with  the  exercise  of  our  belligerent  rights  at  this  junc- 
ture, in  consequence  of  the  constant  and  flagrant  abuse 
of  neutral  flags  by  a  class  of  contrabandists  who  make 
it  their  business  to  set  our  laws  at  defiance,  violate  our 
blockade  and  aid  and  assist  the  insurgents  in  the  war 
which  they  are  waging  upon  our  government.  The 
vessels  engaged  in  this  system  of  indirect  aggression 
upon  a  country  at  peace  with  Spain,  when  pursued  by 
our  cruisers,  fly  to  the  shelter  of  neutral  territory  to 
escape,  and  the  more  extended  the  maritime  jurisdiction 
of  Cuba  and  the  possessions  of  other  governments  in 
the  West  Indies,  the  greater  impunity  to  these  violators 
of  our  laws. 

"  We  have  no  wish  to  intrude  upon  the  unquestioned 
rights  of  Spain,  whose  government  has  manifested  a 
friendly  spirit  and  just  regard  towards  us  in  other  par- 
ticulars, but  the  assertion  of  this  extended  jurisdiction 
at  this  particular  period,  I  should  deem  unfortunate. 
The  effect  would  be  to  aid  and  encourage  mischievous 
wrong-doers  and  to  inflict  injury  upon  a  friendly  nation 
in  the  day  of  her  misfortune. 

"  At  a  more  propitious  moment,  the  question  of 
maritime  jurisdiction  and  the  influence  of  modern 
improvement  in  ordnance  upon  it,  might  be  discussed 
and  settled  with  advantage ;  but  the  present  time  is 
inopportune  for  such  a  novel  interpretation  of  the  law 
of  nations.  The  publicists  and  the  world  generally 
have  hitherto  regarded  the  marine  league  adjacent  to 
the  coast  as  the  limit  of  territorial  jurisdiction,  and  our 
Naval  officers  in  this  particular  have  concurred  in  this 
view. 

.    "  Permit  me  to  add  that  the  object  of  law  is  to  put 
an  end  to  license  and  discretion  and  to  establish  a  fixed 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD.  171 

rule  which  all  may  ascertain,  and  be  guided  by.  It  is 
a  provision  of  international  law  that  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  state  extends  to  a  marine  league  or  cannon  range, 
beyond  its  shores.  The  marine  league  is  something 
fixed  and  definite  ;  the  cannon  range  is  not.  To  insist 
on  excluding  the  former  and  retaining  the  latter  only, 
would  be  to  revive  the  license  and  uncertainty  which  it 
was  the  purpose  of  the  law  to  prevent.  The  question 
and  dispute  would  be  constantly  recurring.  What  is 
the  range  of  a  cannon  ? 

"There  is  no  doubt  that  the  marine  league  was 
adopted  because  it  was  near,  but  somewhat  more  than 
the  extreme  range  of  the  heaviest  ordnance  in  ordinary 
use,  when  the  rule  was  adopted  ;  and  it  is  so  now,  not- 
withstanding the  improvements  in  ordnance.  Cannon 
range  is  merely  referred  to  in  the  rule  as  showing  the 
reason  of  the  rule ;  if  it  had  been  intended  to  be  the 
rule  in  itself,  it  would  have  been  absurd  to  refer  at  the 
same  time  to  the  marine  league.  The  marine  league  is 
now  universally  regarded  as  the  fixed  rule. 

"If  ordnance  should  come  into  general  use,  throwing 

their  projectiles  to   a  greater  distance  than  a  league, 

nations   might  feel  called  upon  to  consult  with   each 

other  as  to  a  revision  of  the  rule.     But  in  the  meantime 

for  any  one   nation   to   repudiate  it,  is   simply  to  set 

itself  above  the  obligation  of  international  law,  without 

even  the  pretence  of  necessity.     What  real  danger  or 

inconvenience  is  apprehended  from  a  continuance  of  the 

rule? 

"  I  am  respectfully, 

«  Your  Ob't.  Servt., 

"  Gideon  Welles, 

''•  SeQH\j  of  Navy:"* 

"  Hon.  Wm.  H.  Seward, 

Sec'€y  of  State:'' 


172  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

Unfortimatelj  the  Secretary  had  said  too  much  to 
the  Spanish  diplomat  to  retract,  and  put  himself  in  a 
right  position,  without  a  virtual  acknowledgment  of 
error  in  the  early  discussion ;  and  the  Minister  was  not 
inclined  to  relinquish  the  ground  he  had  gained,  but 
continued  to  press  his  advantage.  The  result  was,  that 
instead  of  referring  to  and  abiding  by  the  law  and  by 
established  usage  and  practice,  the  Secretary  and  the 
Minister  agreed  to  submit  the  question  to  the  king  of 
the  Belgians  for  a  decision,  and  the  project  for  a  Con- 
vention for  that  |)urpose  was  drawn  up  by  which  the 
two  governments  stipulated  in  the  second  article,  to 
*'  abide  by  the  decision  of  His  said  Majesty." 

When,  more  than  a  year  after  this  arrangement  be- 
tween the  two  functionaries,  had  been  entered  into, 
though  not  confirmed  by  the  Senate,  I  learned  what 
was  proposed  to  be  done,  I  objected  that  the  consent 
to  submit  our  unquestioned  and  undoubted  right  to 
arbitration  was  wrong.  There  was  little  doubt  the 
decision  would,  as  Mr.  Seward  felt  confident,  be  favor- 
able to  us  in  conformity  to  the  law  and  the  practice 
of  nations,  but  it  was  highly  improper  and  not  good 
and  faithful  administration  to  put  our  undoubted  rights 
in  jeopardy.  Had  Spain  laid  claim  to  the  possession 
of  Long  Island  or  Nantucket,  the  idea  of  submitting 
the  claim  to  the  decision  of  the  kino^  of  the  Beloqans 
or  any  other  king  would  never  have  been  for  a  mo- 
ment entertained.  Nor  should  the  principle  and  our 
legal  right  in  regard  to  the  great  highway  of  nations 
wdiich  Spain  had  undertaken  to  invade  and  appropri- 
ate to  her  exclusive  jurisdiction,  be  matter  of  arbitra- 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  173 

ment,  nor  would  other  governments,  whatever  might 
be  the  decision  regard  it  as  obligatory  on  them. 

Mr.  Adams  sajs,  "  in  respect  to  the  foreign  rela- 
tions, Mr.  Lincoln  knew  absolutely  nothing,"  but  that 
"  it  may  be  questioned  whether  any  head  of  an  execu- 
tive department  ever  approached  Mr.  Seward  in  the 
extent  and  minuteness  of  the  instructions  he  was  con- 
stantly issuing  during  the  critical  period  of  the  war." 
These  frequent  and  minute  instructions  and  conces- 
sions, incautiously  given  and  admitted,  were  often  er- 
roneous and  embarrassing.  Had  the  preposterous 
pretensions  of  the  Spanish  Minister  which  Mr.  Sew- 
ard listened  to  and  consented  to  negotiate  been  suc- 
cessful, scarcely  a  greater  or  more  injurious  error 
could  be  found  in  our  history.  It  would  have 
afforded  great  additional  security  to  the  rebels  and 
blockade-runners. 


SiMTJLTANEOTJSLY  with  tliis  Spanish  claim  of  an  ex- 
tension of  maritime  jurisdiction  the  Secretary  of  State 
sent  me  a  copy  of  an  unofficial  note  from  Mr.  Stuart 
of  the  English  legation,  and  at  the  time,  Charge 
d'affaires,  expressing  apprehensions  that  the  "  Bermu- 
da,'' a  captured  blockade-runner  would  be  purchased  by 
the  Navy  Department  and  taken  into  service  prior  to 
condemnation.  We  were  at  that  time  availing  ourselves 
of  every  suitable  steamer  in  the  country  that  could  be 
armed  and  made  efficient  in  enforcing  our  extensive 
blockade,  which  Earl  Russell  had  pronounced  at  the 
beginning  of  our  troubles  an  impossibility  ;  but  in  due 
time  he  admitted  it  was  effective.     When  the  block- 


174  MR.   LINCOLN   AND   MR.   SEWARD 

ade  was  first  proclaimed  we  could  neither  build,  nor 
buy  from  our  merchant  service  a  sufficient  number  of 
vessels  to  enforce  it  and  therefore  had  a  standing  order 
to  obtain  from  the  courts,  such  prizes  as  were  in  the 
possession  of  the  prize-commissioners  and  liable  to 
condemnation.  In  this  way  we  procured  many  excel- 
lent steamers,  which  having  been  built  for  speed  were 
a  valuable  acquisition  to  our  naval  force.  This  pro- 
ceeding became  a  great  annoyance  to  our  open  ene- 
mies, and  no  less  so  to  their  secret  allies  who  were 
largely  engaged  in  illicit  traffic,  and  found  their  risks 
increased  by  some  of  their  own  most  valuable  and  ex- 
pensive vessels  which  were  turned  against  them.  To 
prevent  this  as  far  as  possible,  and  if  they  could  not 
wholly  prevent,  to  postpone  as  long  as  possible  the 
condemnation  of  the  steamers  captured,  delays  in  court 
were  interposed  and  the  legality  of  the  captures  con- 
tested, although  there  was  not  a  doubt  that  they  would 
ultimately  be  condemned  as  good  prize.  In  the  mean- 
time the  prizes  were,  besides  the  detention,  deteriora- 
ting and  often  in  a  perishing  condition.  The  courts 
and  prize-commissioners  acting  in  good  faith  to  both 
captors  and  claimants,  always  had  vessel  and  cargo 
promptly  appraised  and  disposed  of  at  their  true  value, 
and  the  money  paid  into  court  to  abide  the  final  de- 
cree. That  there  might  be  no  delay  in  the  transfer,  a 
board  consisting  of  a  naval  constructor,  engineer 
and  ordnance  officer  was  empowered  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  to  make  a  thorough  examination  of  every 
prize  deemed  suitable  for  naval  service,  and  on  a  fa- 
vorable report  he  deposited  the  amount  of  the  apprais- 
ed value  with  the  registrar  of  the  court,  and  had  her 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  175 

immediately  taken  to  the  Kavj-jard,  fitted  and  armed 
for  naval  duty. 

This  was  the  state  of  facts  and  the  course  of  pro- 
ceeding when  Mr.  Stuart,  Her  Majesty's  Charge 
d'affaires  on  the  20th  of  October,  1862  sent  his  note, 
shrewdly  made  unofficial^  to  Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of 
State.  The  latter  without  knowledge  of  the  facts,  and 
without  investigation  or  inquiry — without  consulting 
the  President  or  Cabinet  or  any  one  of  them,  commit- 
ted himself  at  once  against  the  Navy  Department  and 
the  government,  and  in  an  official  communication 
*'  hoped  the  unofiicial  apprehensions  of  Mr.  Stuart  are 
unfounded,  as  such  a  measure  would  afford  ground  for 
serious  complaint  on  the  part  of  the  British  govern- 
ment, which  under  existing  circumstances  it  is  desira- 
ble to  avoid." 

It  was  a  timid  and  hasty  abandonment  of  a  right, 
an  admission  of  wrong  on  our  part,  and  an  acknowl- 
edgement of  the  propriety  of  foreign  interference, 
wholly  unjustifiable,  aside  from  the  obvious  intent  of 
keeping  out  of  our  service  as  long  as  possible  an 
important  prize,  captured  in  its  attempts  to  supply  the 
insurgents  with  munitions  of  war. 

Subjoined  is  the  correspondence : 

"Department  of  State, 

Washington,  Oct.  10,  1862." 
"Sir:— 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  a  copy  of  an  unofficial 
note  of  this  date,  addressed  to  me  by  Mr.  Stuart,  Her 
Britannic  Majesty's  Charge  d'affaires,  expressing 
apprehensions  that  the  steamer  "  Bermuda"  may  be 
taken  for  the  use  of  the  Navy  Department  prior  to  her 


176  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

condemnation  at  Philadelphia.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
these  apprehensions  are  unfounded  as  such  a  measure 
would  afford  ground  for  serious  complaint  on  the  part 
of  the  British  Government,  which  under  existing  cir- 
cumstances, it  is  desirable  to  avoid. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c, 

"  Wm.  H.  Seward." 
**  The  Hon.  Gideon  Welles, 

''jSecH'^of  the  JVavy.'^ 

"Navy  Department, 

Oct.  15,  1862." 
"  Sir  :— 

"  I  had  the  honor  on  the  evening  of  Saturday  last,  the 
11th  inst.  to  receive  your  communication  of  the  10th 
inst.  enclosing  the  copy  of  an  unofficial  note  from 
Mr.  Stuart,  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Charge  d'affaires, 
expressing  an  apprehension  that  it  is  the  intention  of 
the  naval  authorities  to  appropriate  the  steamer 
Bermuda,  although  no  judgment  has  as  yet  been  pro- 
nounced upon  her  by  the  court. 

"  This  is  certainly  a  very  extraordinary  communica- 
tion from  Her  Majesty's  Charge  d'affaires.  The  custody 
of  captured  property,  or  the  disposition  to  be  made  of 
it  before  adjudication,  is  not  regulated  by  international 
law,  but  that  law  requires  that  an  adjudication  should 
be  had  as  speedily  as  possible. 

"  In  some  cases  the  captors  themselves  have  a  right 
to  dispose  of  captured  property  before  adjudication. 
(2.  liob.  31.) 

"  The  court,  after  the  captured  property  comes  into 
its  possession,  may  deliver  it  on  bond  to  the  captors  or 
claimants,  or  if  ship  or  other  cargo  is  in  a  perishing 
condition  or  liable  to  deterioration  pending  the  process, 


ME.    LnfCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWAED.  177 

may  order  a  sale  of  it  by  interlocutory  decree.  This  is 
the  English  law  and  the  practice  followed  by  our  courts. 
There  is  no  doubt  as  to  this  discretionary  power  of  a 
prize-court  or  as  to  the  practice.  The  property  is  al- 
ways supposed  to  be  in  the  custody  of  the  court,  but  the 
practice  has  been  from  time  immemorial  to  consider  the 
proceeds  as  representing  the  thing  itself.  Certainly  the 
safest  custodian  of  the  property  is  the  government, 
which  is  ultimately  responsible.  The  marshal,  who  or- 
dinarily has  the  custody,  is  but  an  officer  of  the  govern- 
ment. In  the  event  of  a  decree  of  restitution,  if  the 
custodian  has  been  found  to  be  unfaithful  and  the  cap- 
tors unable  to  indemnify  the  foreign  claimants,  the  gov- 
ernment must  make  the  restitution  and  indemnify  the 
claimants.  There  could  be  no  additional  risk  to  the 
claimants,  but  rather  the  contrary,  if  the  government 
should  take  immediate  possession  of  the  captured  prop- 
erty without  waiting  an  order  of  the  prize-court.  All 
that  international  law  requires  is,  that  the  evidence  and 
all  the  necessary  witnesses  be  placed  in  the  presence  of 
the  court. 

"  International  law  is  rigid  against  individual  captors ; 
they  should  not  pillage  in  the  slightest  degree,  upon 
pain  of  forfeiting  their  rights.  But  it  does  not  pretend 
to  lay  down  rules  for  the  custody  of  captured  property. 
It  is  enough  that  the  government  of  the  captors  is  ulti- 
mately responsible  for  any  injury  done  by  the  captors. 

"The  Bermuda  was  captured  on  the  27th  of  April, 
1862,  about  fifteen  miles  K  E.  by  E.  from  the  "  Hole  in 
the  Wall,"  and  brought  into  Philadelphia.  She  has 
been  appraised  by  order  of  the  court,  on  application  of 
the  prize-commissioners,  and  the  Navy  Department  pro- 
poses to  purchase  her  under  the  decree  of  the  court.  If 
so,  the  amount  of  valuation  will  be  deposited  in  con- 
8* 


178  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWARD. 

formity  with  law  and  the  order  of  the  court  with  the 
registrar.  The  whole  proceeding  is  strictly  legal  and 
strictly  regular  and  for  the  benefit  of  all  having  a  legal 
interest  in  the  captured  steamer. 

"There  is  no  novelty  in  these  proceedings.  Other 
captured  vessels  have  in  like  manner  been  disposed  of, 
and  not  infrequently  purchased  by  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment on  appraisement,  not  only  in  Philadelphia  under 
the  order  of  Judge  Cadwalader,  but  in  New  York  under 
Judge  Betts,  and  in  Key  West  under  Judge  Marvin. 
But  these  are  matters  in  which  I  recognize  no  right 
for  foreign  interference.  The  capture  was  lawful  and 
prima  facie  correct. 

"It  was  made  under  the  authority  of  the  United 
States  in  the  exercise  of  an  undoubted  belligerent  right. 
But  the  capture  is  subject  to  adjudication,  and  if  the 
court  shall  fail  to  condemn,  the  United  States  must  and 
will  respond  in  damages.  But  until  the  final  judgment 
of  the  court,  I  know  of  no  right  for  foreign  interfer- 
ence. 

"  I  cannot  forbear  the  expression  of  my  surprise  at  the 
interposition  of  Her  Majesty's  representative  in  behalf  of 
a  vessel  captured  with  such  an  amount  of  contraband  of 
war  on  board  intended  to  afford  assistance  to  rebels  who 
are  waging  war  upon  this  government.  Her  cargo  of 
guns,  shot,  shell,  powder,  etc.,  isaperfect  magazine  of  mu- 
niticms  designed,  as  you  and  I  well  knew  before  she  left 
the  shores  of  England,  for  those  of  our  countrymen 
who  are  in  insurrection.  Taken  as  she  was  on  the  high 
seas  with  contraband  of  war  on  board  in  large  quanti- 
ties, does  Her  Majesty's  representative  appear,  eve7i  un- 
officially, in  behalf  of  this  vessel,  whose  mission  was  to  do 
wrong — to  violate  our  laws,  injure  our  country  and  fur- 
nish insurgent  rebels  with  the  means  to  destroy  our  coun- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  179 

trymen,  with  whom  he  and  his  government  are  profess- 
edly on  terms  of  amity  and  friendship  ? 

"  Assuredly  Her  Majesty's  Charge  d'affaires  could  not 
have  been  aware  of  the  character  of  the  steamer  Bermu- 
da and  her  cargo,  or  he  would  never  have  permitted 
himself  to  have  been  interested  for  her.  Captured  as 
she  was  on  the  high  seas,  filled  with  material  to  inflict 
wrong  upon  a  nation  with  which  Great  Britain  is  at 
peace,  I  confess  my  astonishment  at  the  interposition  of 
Her  Majesty's  Charge  d'affaires  in  the  action  of  our 
courts.  The  case  of  the  Bermuda  is  so  transparently 
wrong  as  to  admit  of  no  doubt  as  to  the  final  result  in 
regard  to  her,  but  were  it  otherwise,  the  government  of 
the  United  States  is  not  only  abundantly  able  to  respond, 
but  is  always  anxious  to  do  right  in  matters  of  this 
description.  We  may  be  wronged  and  experience  bad 
faith  from  others,  but  these  will  never  induce  our  courts 
or  our  government  to  be  unjust. 

"  The  opportunity  is  not  an  improper  one  for  me  to 
invite  your  attention  to  the  conduct  of  the  British  Co- 
lonial authorities  in  permitting  Her  Majesty's  Proclama- 
tion to  be  constantly  disregarded,  and  good  faith  and 
the  laws  of  neutrality  to  be  persistently  violated.  Ves- 
sels, as  is  known  to  us  and  to  the  whole  world,  are  con- 
stantly leaving  certain  ports  in  the  British  West  Indies, 
avowedly  to  run  our  blockade  and  furnish  assistance  to 
the  insurgents  in  their  criminal  assault  upon  our  gov- 
ernment. Nassau  is  notoriously  an  entrepot  for  sys- 
tematic arrangements  to  violate  our  blockade,  where 
cargoes  are  interchanged,  contraband  of  war  transhipped, 
and  vessels  are  received  and  fitted  out,  despite  the  re- 
monstrance of  our  Consul,  who  has  repeatedly  brought 
these  flagitious  proceedings  to  the  notice  of  the  public 
authorities.     So  flagrant   indeed  was   the  case  of  the 


180  MR.   LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWAKD. 

Oreto  that  she  was  once  or  twice  detained,  and  after 
the  formality  of  a  trial,  most  extraordinary  in  its  char- 
acter and  results,  was  permitted  to  depart  by  the  British 
Courts,  and,  as  is  well  known,  directly  after,  ran  the 
blockade  at  Mobile. 

"  But  the  Colonial  authorities  are  not  alone  in  fault. 
More  recently  we  have  intelligence  that  the  steamer '  290 ' 
alias  the  *  Alabama,'  which  our  Consul  and  our  Minister 
at  London  warned  the  British  authorities  was  being  pre- 
pared to  depredate  upon  our  commerce  and  make  war 
upon  our  flag,  but  which  in  spite  of  these  remonstrances 
they  permitted  to  escape,  has  got  abroad  and  is  seizing, 
sinking  and  burning  the  property  of  innocent  merchants. 

"  Who  is  to  be  responsible  for  the  devastation  made 
by  this  rebel  rover  which  has  never  yet  visited  the  ports 
of  any  other  country  but  those  of  Great  Britain,  when 
the  government  of  that  country  was  repeatedly  admon- 
ished of  her  true  character  and  purpose  before  she  left 
its  shores  ? 

"  I  know  of  no  case  in  history  that  has  a  parallel  in 
the  enormity  of  the  outrage  committed,  as  between 
friendly  nations,  to  that  of  this  semi-piratical  vessel 
from  England  which  is  now  plundering  and  destroying 
our  commerce.  From  the  commencement  of  the  insur- 
rection, the  insurgents  who  are  making  war  upon  our 
government  and  endeavoring  to  subvert  it,  without  a 
naval  vessel  of  their  own  afloat  or  a  port  free  of  access, 
have  gone  to  England — a  power  that  is  professedly  on 
terms  of  amity  with  the  United  States — and  there  have 
experienced  no  difficulty  in  contracting  for  and  procur- 
ing to  be  built  and  sent  forth,  a  cruiser,  armed'  and 
ladened  with  munitions  of  war,  to  make  waste  and  de- 
struction with  the  property  of  our  citizens  who  are 
wholly   uninformed,    and    consequently    wholly    unpre- 


MK.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  181 

pared  for  sucli  aggressive  proceedings  under  any 
guise  from  Great  Britain.  This  vessel  which  is  commit- 
ting these  outrages  upon  peaceful  commerce,  it  will  be 
borne  in  mind,  has  never  visited  the  waters  of  any  nation 
but  those  of  Great  Britain,  is  committing  havoc  upon 
the  commerce  of  a  people  who  enjoyed,  as  they  sup- 
posed, peaceful  relations  with  that  country. 

"  On  every  principle  of  equity  and  right,  morally 
and  politically,  the  British  nation  should  be  held  respon- 
sible for  the  losses  which  our  citizens  sustain  by  the 
depredations  which  this  semi-piratical  cruiser,  which 
was  built  on  British  soil,  and  went  forth  from  a  British 
port  against  the  remonstrance  and  protests  of  our  Minis- 
ter and  Consul,  to  prey  upon  American  commerce. 

"  I  do  not  permit  myself  to  doubt  that  you  have 
been  attentive  to  these  facts  and  have  duly  presented 
them  in  the  proper  quarter,  asserting  our  rights  and  our 
sense  of  the  injury  that  our  country  and  countrymen 
have  received.  But  I  have  deemed  it  not  inopportune, 
nor  improper  in  me,  to  invite  your  especial  attention  to 
the  subject,  because  there  is  no  concealment  of  the  fact 
that  there  are  at  this  time  vessels  being  built  and  others 
purchased  and  fitted  out  with  arms  and  munitions  and 
contraband  of  war  in  various  places  in  Great  Britain, 
notoriously  to  promote  aggressive  war  against  the 
United  States. 

"  I  am  respectfully, 

"Your  obed't  serv't, 

"  Gideon  Welles, 
"  Sec'Vy  of  the  Navy,^^ 
"Hon.  Wm.  H.  Seward, 

"  S>e(iH'y  of  State:' 

This  correspondence,  it  will  be  noticed,  was  not 


182  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

with  Lord  Lyons,  the  Minister,  who  was  then  absent, 
but  with  Mr.  Stuart  a  subordinate  then  temporarily 
in   charge   of  the  legation,  and    who   improved  his 
opportunity,  which  Lord  Lyons  would  scarcely  have 
asked   to  obtain   concessions   from  our  Secretarv  of 
State  in   the  case  of  captured  mails  as  well  as  cap- 
tured vessels.      In  the    case    of    captured    mails,  it 
will  be  remembered  Lord  Lyons  disavowed  to  Mr. 
Sumner  that  he  had  ever  made  a  demand,  but  that  it 
was  a   voluntary   renunciation   of  our  right   by   our 
Secretary   of   State   who    was   supposed    to   be   the 
authorized  organ  of  the  government.     In  a  letter  of 
the  31st  of  December  following,  Lord  Lyons,  who  had 
resumed  his  duties,  admitted  that  by  **  a  British  statute 
authorizing  the  sale  of  a  ship  before  the  decision  of 
an  appellate  court    has    been    pronounced,    is    well- 
founded," — that   '*  the   exercise   of  such   an   abstract 
power  of  sale  is  not  denied  by  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  the  United  States  authorities,"  but,  he  thouglit 
"  the  claimant  ought  to  be  preferred  as  a  purchaser,"  etc. 
This  letter  of  the  British  Minister  disposed  of  the 
unofficial  apprehensions  of  his  subordinate — apprehen- 
sions in  which  the  Secretary  of  State  participated,  and 
"  hoped  were  unfounded,"  but  which  the  Secretary  of 
the  I^av}^,  thus  admonished  or  rebuked,  disregarded. 
The  transfer  in  this  and  other  cases,  was  carried  into 
effect,   notwithstanding   hopes   and   fears   and   timid 
concessions   of  the   experienced   government   official, 
who  according  to  Mr.  Adams,  had  the  ''  solid  power  to 
direct  affairs" — and  possessed  "  breadth  of  philosophic 
experience"  and  "native  intellectual  power"  greatly 
--euperior  to  Mr.  Lincoln. 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  183 


The  President  had  a  happy  way  of  illustrating 
questions  and  sometimes  disposing  of  a  subject  by  an 
anecdote,  which,  better  than  an  elaborate  argument, 
expressed  his  opinion.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  win- 
ter of  1864,  Mr.  Seward  came  one  day  to  the  cabinet 
council  with  a  full  portfolio,  and  brow  clouded  and 
disturbed.  The  President  ever  watchful,  immediately 
detected  difficulty,  and  exhibited  his  concern  as  the 
Secretary  of  State  slowly  adjusted  his  papers.  Mr. 
Seward  commenced  by  alluding  to  tlie  fact  that  Spain 
was  sick  of  the  European  alliance,  and  was  beginning 
to  manifest  towards  our  country  a  more  friendly  spirit ; 
that  her  government  had  never  been  fully  identified 
with  Palmerston  and  Louis  Kapoleon  in  their  intrigue 
for  European  intervention,  but  she  had  at  the  begin- 
ning of  American  troubles  committed  herself  to  some 
extent  and  been  induced  to  undertake  to  recover  her 
possessions  in  San  Domingo.  She  had  however  been 
unfortunate  and  met  unexpected  resistance.  The 
negroes  were  making  a  great  struggle  to  maintain 
their  independence,  and  had  the  sympathies  of  the 
abolitionists  of  our  country  with  them.  It  was  im- 
portant in  every  point  of  view  to  detach  Spain  from 
the  alliance  and  preserve  her  friendship,  at  the  same 
time  not  give  oflence  to  our  own  countryjnen  whose 
sympathies  in  the  present  condition  of  affairs  were  en- 
listed in  behalf  of  the  negroes.  In  this  Spanish- 
Dominican  complication  we  were  pressed  from  both 
quarters,  and  it  was  a  delicate  and  grave  question  what 
position  we  should  take  and  what  course  pursue.  On 
one  side  was  Spain,  whom  we  wish  to  conciliate,  on 


184  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWAKD. 

the  other  side,  the  negroes  who  had  become  great  fa- 
vorites and  wanted  our  good-will  in  resisting  Spanish 
oppression. 

The  President's  countenance  indicated  that  his 
mind  was  relieved  before  Seward  had  concluded.  He 
remarked  that  the  dilemma  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
reminded  him  of  an  interview  between  two  negroes  in 
Tennessee.  One  was  a  preacher,  who  with  the  crude 
and  strange  notions  of  the  ignorant  of  his  race  was  en- 
deavoring to  admonish  and  enlighten  his  brother  Afri- 
can of  the  importance  of  reHgion  and  the  dangers  of 
the  future.  ''  Dere  are,"  said  Josh,  the  preacher,  "  two 
roads  before  you,  Jo.  Be  careful  which  you  take. 
One  ob  dem  roads  leads  straight  to  hell — de  odder 
goes  right  to  damnation."  Jo  opened  his  eyes  with 
affright  and  under  the  "inspired  eloquence,  and  awful 
danger  before  him  exclaimed,  "  Josh,  take  which  road 
you  please — I  shall  go  thro'  de  woods." 

"I  am  not  willing,''  said  the  President,  "to  assume 
any  new  troubles  or  responsibility  at  this  time,  and  shall 
therefore  avoid  going  to  one  place  with  Spain  or  with 
the  negro  to  the  other,  but  shall  take  to  the  woods. 
We  will  maintain  an  honest  and  strict  neutrality." 


The  relation  of  the  circumstances  attendins  the 
capture  and  release  of  the  rebel  emissaries.  Mason  and 
Slidell,  is  pregnant  with  error.  The  excitement  which 
accompanied  the  intelligence  of  the  capture  of  these 
mischievous  men  was  great,  and  had  at  one  time  a 
threatening  aspect.  The  final  disposition  of  the  ques- 
tion, with  the  restoration  of  the  prisoners  to  British 


MK.    Lli^COLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  185 

authority,  might  well  be  mentioned  as  displaying  the 
marked  and  in  some  respects  perhaps  happy  trait  of 
Mr.  Seward  in  adapting  himself  to  circumstances  which 
he  could  not  control.  But  Mr.  Adams  fails  to  bring 
out  that  shrewd  diplomatic  quality  of  Mr.  Seward's 
mind,  and  strives  to  inculcate  an  impression  that  the 
Secretary  of  State  stood  alone ;  was  wise,  sagacious, 
reserved,  and  profound,  when  others  were  blind,  pre- 
cipitate, and  weak  ;  took  upon  himself  '*  the  whole 
weight  of  popular  indignation,"  and,  "  like  the  Koman 
Curtius,  who  leaped  into  the  abyss  which  could  have 
been  closed  in  no  other  way,"  he  offered  himself  a  sac- 
rifice to  secure  the  safety  of  the  state.  Mr.  Seward  *^ 
should  receive  credit  for  the  dexterous  and  skilful  dis- 
patch which  he  prepared  on  his  own  change  of  position. 
It  exhibits  his  readiness  and  peculiar  tact  and  talent 
to  extricate  himself  from  and  to  pass  over  difficulties. 
But  in  point  of  fact  no  man  was  more  elated  or  jubilant  "^ 
over  the  capture  of  the  emissaries  than  Mr.  Seward, 
who  for  a  time  made  no  attempt  to  conceal  his  gratifi- 
cation and  approval  of  the  act  of  Wilkes.  But  while 
he  and  most  of  the  Cabinet  and  country  were  hilarious, 
the  President  had  doubts,  misgivings,  and  regrets, 
which  were  increased  after  an  interview  with  Senator 
Sumner,  with  whom  he  often — sometimes  to  the  dis- 
gust and  annoyance  of  Mr.  Seward — advised  on  con- 
troverted or  disputed  international  questions,  and  espe- 
cially when  there  were  differences  between  himself  and 
the  Secretary  of  State. 

On  the  question  of  giving  up* the  emissaries,  Mr." 
Adams  says  :  "  When  the  time  came  for  the  assembly 
of  the  Cabinet,  not  a  sign  had  been  given  by  the  Pres- 


ISQ  ME.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

ident,  or  any  of  tlie  members,  favorable  to  concession. 
Mr.  Seward,  who  had  been  charged  with  the  official 
duty  of  furnishing  the  expected  answer,  assumed  tlie 
responsibility  of  preparing  his  able  argument,  upon 
which  a  decision  was  made  to  surrender  the  men. 
Upon  him  would  have  rested  the  whole  weight  of 
popular  indignation  had  it  proved  formidable.  If  I 
have  been  rightly  informed,  when  read,  it  met  with 
few  comments  and  less  approbation.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  was  no  resistance.  Silence  gave  consent. 
It  was  the  act  of  Mr.  Seward,  and  his  name  was  to  be 
associated  with  it,  whether  for  good  or  for  evil." 

The  truth  is,  not  only  had  the  President  expressed 
his  doubts  of  the  legality  of  the  capture,  and  had  them 
increased,  while  Mr.  Seward  was  rejoicing  over  and 
approving  of  the  proceeding,  but  Mr.  Blair  from  the 
first  had  denounced  the  act  as  unathorized,  irregular, 
and  illegal.  Not  being  a  special  admirer  of  Wilkes, 
Mr.  Blair  recommended  that  Wilkes  should  be  ordered 
to  take  the  Iroquois  and  go  with  Mason  and  Slid  ell  to 
England,  and  deliver  them  to  the  British  government ; 
for  Palmerston  and  Russell  would,  he  said,  seize  the 
occasion  to  make  war.  The  prompt  and  voluntary 
disavowal  of  the  act  of  Wilkes,  and  delivering  over  the 
prisoners,  would  have  evinced  our  confidence  in  our 
own  power,  and  been  a  manifestation  of  our  indifference 
and  contempt  for  the  emissaries,  and  a  rebuke  to  the 
alleged  intrigues  between  the  rebels  and  the  English 
Cabinet.  Mr.  Seward  took  a  totally  different  view  ; 
scouted  the  idea  of  letting  the  prisoners  go ;  said  the 
British  did  not  want  them,  and  we  could  not  think  of 
delivering  them  up.     While  Mr.  Blair  did  not  go  about 


MB.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWAED.  ^187 

at  the  time  proclaiming  his  opinions  on  a  subject  which 
was  under  consideration,  his  dissent  from  the  original 
views  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  his  condemnation 
of  the  act  of  Wilkes,  are  notorious  among  those  who 
were  intimate  with  the  transactions  of  the  government. 
The  time  for  further  withholding  the  facts,  and  permit- 
ting men  like  Mr.  Adams  to  be  misled,  has  gone  bj. 
The  truth  in  relation  to  these  and  other  matters,  so 
long  perverted  and  suppressed,  should  be  known,  and 
history  set  right. 

Nearly  every  member  of  the  administration,  like 
Mr.  Seward,  rejoiced  in  the  capture  of  these  mischiev- 
ous men.  No  one  coincided  with  Mr.  Blair  in  his 
suggestion  to  compel  Wilkes  to  return  them  to  the 
custody  of  Great  Britain,  however  wise  it  may  have 
been  in  view  of  subsequent  events.  But  the  irregular 
action  of  Wilkes  in  this  case  was  in  various  ways  the 
cause  of  serious  embarrassment.  If  the  proceedings 
could  not  be  fully  justified,  neither  could  they,  in  the 
then  condition  of  affairs,  and  the  excited  state  of 
public  feeling,  be  censured  and  condemned.  But  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  before  hearing  from  Great 
Britain,  before  even  the  administration  had  passed 
upon  the  subject,  was  compelled  to  recognize  and 
approve  or  disapprove  the  act,  and  communicate  the 
transaction  in  his  Annual  Navy  Beport,  just  then  to  be 
submitted  to  the  President  and  Congress.  In  that 
Report,  and  in  a  congratulatory  letter  of  the  30th  of 
November,  allusion  is  made  to  the  irregularity  of 
Wilkes,  which,  it  is  suggested,  might  be  excused  in 
view  of  the  patriotic  motives;  "but  it  must  by  no  l^,^.f^ 
means  be  permitted  to  constitute  a  precedent  hereafter 


188  MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

for  the  treatment  of  auy  similar  infraction  of  neutral 
obligations  by  foreign  vessels  engaged  in  commerce  or 
the  carrying  trade."  This  Report,  though  bearing 
date  of  the  2d  of  December,  the  day  on  which  Con- 
gress convened,  was,  as  is  usual  with  Annual  Reports, 
delivered  complete  to  the  President  at  the  last  regular 
Cabinet  meeting  preceding  the  session,  which  was  on 
Friday,  the  29th  of  ]!^ovember,  1861,  to  be  trans- 
mitted with  the  Message.  Of  course  the  IN'aval  Report 
was  seen  on  that  day  by  Mr.  Seward,  who  until  then 
had  taken  no  exception  to  the  capture ;  but  on  the 
succeeding  day,  the  30th  of  ^N'ovember,  the  date  of 
the  congratulatory  letter  to  Wilkes,  he  wrote  to  Mr. 
Adams  what  the  latter  gentleman  calls  the  "  prelimi- 
nary dispatch  that  saved  the  dignity  of  the  country.'* 
These  matters,  it  will  be  borne  in  mind,  were 
weeks  before  hearing  from  England,  and  before  Mr. 
Seward's  elaborate  answer  of  the  26tli  of  December  to 
the  demand  of  the  British  government  for  the  sur- 
render of  the  emissaries.  When  Mr.  Adams  declares 
that  "  not  a  sign  had  been  given  by  the  President  or 
any  member  of  the  Cahi n p.t  fa, vorahl ft  to  concession," 
at  the  time  that  answer  was  prepared,  he  commits  an 
egregious  mistake.  The  President  was  from  the  first 
willing  to  make  concession.  Mr.  Blair  advocated  it. 
Mr.  Seward  was  at  the  beginning  opposed  to  any  idea 
of  concession  which  involved  giving  up  the  emissaries, 
but  yielded  at  once,  and  with  dexterity,  to  the  peremp- 
tory demand  of  Great  Britain.  Let  him  have  all  the 
applause  which  belongs  to  him  for  the  facility  and 
diplomatic  skill  which  he  displayed  in  that  change, 
but  in  doing  so,  it   is   unjust   to  the   President   and 


MR.    LINCOLN   AND   MK.    SEWARD.  189 

others  to  misrepresent  them,  or  to  mistake  ©r  pervert 
the  facts  in  regard  to  them  or  Mr.  Seward.  . 


These  incidents  selected  from  among  many  indicate 
something  of  the  managing  expediency,  fertility  of 
resources,  and  administrative  manner  of  Mr.  Seward, 
and  ilkistrate  the  "  superior  intellectual  power"  and 
**  force  of  moral  discipline  '  ivhich  the  "  Memorial  Ad- 
dress" undertakes  to  say,  enabled  him  to  "direct  affairs 
for  the  benefit  of  the  nation,  through  the  name  of 
another."  Acting  at  times  from  impulse,  often  with- 
out sufficient  forethought  of  consequences — fond  of 
displaying  power — frequently  exercising  questionable 
authority — prompted  in  some  degree  by  jobbing  and 
lobby  surroundings  which,  fostered  at  Albany  and 
defeated  at  Chicago,  followed  him  to  Washington, 
where  not  a  few  of  those  followers  contrived  to  grow 
rich  as  the  country  grew  poor,  Mr.  Sew'ard  attempted 
and  did,  many  things  which  could  scarcely  be  justified, 
hut  for  which  the  administration  was  held  responsi- 
ble. It  would  be  unjust  to  throw  his  eccentricities 
and  errors  upon  others,  and  to  award  to  him  the 
honors  and  credit  of  successful  measures  of  administra- 
tion which  he  did  not  originate. 

The  President,  never  unreasonably  obstinate  or 
wilful,  was  ever  lenient  and  forbearing,  even  when 
his  intentions  were  defeated,  and  sometimes  yielded  to 
proceedings  that  his  judgment  did  not  fully  approve. 
In  the  generosity  of  his  nature  he  was  tolerant  of  acts 
where  a  more  arbitrary  and  imperious  mind  would 
have  been  implacable  and   unforgiving.     There  were 


190  ME.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

occasions,  however,  when,  relying  on  his  own  convic- 
tions, and  the  exigency  being  great,  he  exercised  the 
executive  will — the  one-man  power — with  intelligent 
determination  and  effect.  His  promptness  and  energy 
in  an  emergency  were  displayed  on  one  memorable 
occasion,  when  danger  was  imminent  and  immediate 
decision  necessary.  It  may  be  mentioned  as  illustra- 
tive of  his  executive  ability,  promptness,  and  self-reli- 
ance ;  for  it  w^as  in  the  absence  of  Mr.  Seward,  and 
when  those  on  whom  he  had  a  right  to  rely  failed  him 
and  were  despondent.  Gloom  and  national  disaster 
were  upon  the  country,  but  the  President  met  the 
crisis  with  firmness,  rose  with  the  exigency,  and  in- 
dependent of  his  Cabinet  and  against  the  general  sen- 
timent of  the  people,  and  by  a  sacrifice  of  personal 
feeling,  adopted  a  course  which  results  justified,  and 
proved  his  ability  as  a  chief. 

In  the  early  period  of  the  war  the  proceedings  and 
operations  of  the  military  commanders  were  unsatis- 
factory, and  nowhere  equalled  the  general  expectation. 
Too  much  was  doubtless  expected  and  too  little  accom- 
plished. None  were  more  disappointed  or  depressed 
by  the  slow  progress  made  than  the  President  himself. 
For  a  period  he  had  hopes  from  McClellan,  whose  tal- 
ents at  organization  were  displayed  to  advantage  when, 
in  the  summer  of  1861,  he  took  command  at  Washing- 
ton, established  order,  and  enforced  good  military  ad- 
ministration. In  some  respects  the  President  esteemed 
him  to  be  superior  to  any  of  the  generals  with  whom 
he  had  come  in  contact ;  but  the  autumn  and  winter 
wore  away  in  dilatory  parades.  With  the  change  ia 
the  War  Department  in  January,  1862,  came  the  hos- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.      ,  191 

tility  of  Secretary  Stanton  to  McClellan,  then  Gener- 
al-in-Chief. The  hesitating  movements  of  that  officer 
weakened  the  confidence  of  the  President  in  his  energy 
and  military  power.  He  still  believed,  however,  that 
the  general  had  superior  military  capacity  and  intelli- 
gence, but  that  he  was  inert,  infirm  of  purpose ;  not 
quite  ready  to  do  all  that  he  had  the  ability  to  accom- 
plish. He  required  pushing,  and  the  President  there- 
fore took  upon  himself  to  order  a  forward  movement 
of  both  the  army  and  navy.  But  McClellan  continued 
tardy,  and  the  winter  and  spring  delays,  followed  by 
the  sluggish  movements  on  the  York  Peninsula  and 
the  reverses  before  Richmond,  discouraged  and  greatly 
disheartened  not  only  the  President  but  the  whole 
country.  At  this  juncture,  when,  with  large  armies 
under  him,  he  had  more  than  he  could  perform  in  the 
line  of  his  profession,  McClellan  in  July  wrote  from 
his  headquarters  a  very  injudicious,  not  to  say,  imperti- 
nent letter  to  the  President,  in  relation  to  the  civil 
administration  and  the  political  conduct  of  affairs. 
This  unwise  letter,  and  the  reverses  of  the  army,  with 
the  active  hostility  of  Stanton,  brought  Halleck,  a 
vastly  inferior  man,  to  Washington.  General  Pope 
had  preceded  him,  and,  by  an  executive  order  creating 
the  Army  of  Yirginia,  had  been  placed  in  command  of 
the  forces  then  in  front  of  Washington,  to  the  infinite 
disgust  of  some  of  the  older  generals.  This  disgust 
was  increased  by  his  public  gasconading  proclamation 
reflecting  on  .the  proceedings  of  his  seniors — on  their 
"lines  of  retreat  and  bases  of  supplies,"  which  must, 
he  said,  thenceforward  be  discarded.  These  blatant 
bulletins,  instead  of  inspiriting  the  men,  caused  ridi- 


192  MR.    LIXCOLX    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

ciile  in  the  ranks.  The  soldiers  were  attached  to  their 
old  officers,  particularly  to  McClellan,  and  to  a  great 
extent  sympathized  with  him  and  other  generals  in 
their  dislike,  almost  contempt,  of  this  junior  com- 
mander. Pope  had  been  brought  from  the  West 
directly  after  Halleck  reported  he  had  accomplished 
extraordinary  achievements — reports  grossly  untrue, 
and  which  Pope  himself  afterward  refuted.  On  com- 
ing to  Washington,  Pope,  who  was  ardent,  and  I  think 
courageous,  though  not  always  discreet,  very  naturally 
fell  into  the  views  of  Secretary  Stanton,  who  improved 
every  opportunity  to  denounce  McClellan  and  his  hes- 
itating policy.  Pope  also  reciprocated  the  commenda- 
tions bestowed  on  him  by  Halleck,  by  uniting  with 
Stanton  and  General  Scott  in  advising  that  McClellan 
should  be  superseded,  and  Halleck  placed  in  charge  of 
military  affairs  at  Washington.  This,  combined  with 
the  movements  and  the  disasters  before  Pichmond,  and 
his  own  imprudent  letter,  enabled  Stanton  to  get  rid 
of  McClellan  at  headquarters.  One  of  the  first  orders 
of  Halleck  on  reaching  Washington,  after  superseding 
McClellan,  was  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  from  the  vicinity  of  Pichmond.  This  recalled 
McClellan  and  his  generals  with  their  commands  to 
the  assistance  of  Pope,  for  whom  they  not  only  enter- 
tained no  special  regard,  but  some  of  them  absolute 
hate.  The  orders  to  reinforce  and  assist  Pope  were 
consequently  not  obeyed  with  alacrity.  There  is  no 
denying  the  fact  that  professional  pride  was  allowed  to 
encroach  on  patriotic  duty  in  that  momentous  period. 
The  selection  of  Pope  to  command  that  army  may  have 
been  injudicious ;  he  may  not  have  been  the  man  to 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  193 

take  in  band  and  wield  the  immense  force  which  met 
Lee  and  Jackson  at  the  front ;  there  may  have  been 
error  on  tlie  part  of  Stanton  and  Halleck  as  well  as 
Pope  in  sligliting  some  of  the  older  generals ;  the 
enmit}^  of  the  Secretary  of  War  toward  McClellan  may 
not  without  reason  have  been  felt  by  him  and  his 
favorites  as  unjust ;  yet  the  welfare  of  the  Republic 
should  not  have  been  put  in  jeopardy  to  gratify  per- 
sonal, official,  or  professional  resentments.  The  gen- 
eral in  command,  whether  young  or  old,  should  at 
such  a  crisis  "liave  been  earnestly  and  in  good  faith  sus- 
tained. Had  that  been  the  case,  the  results  of  the 
second  battle  at  Manassas  or  Bull  Kun  might  have 
been  different.  But  Pope  was  defeated,  and  the  army, 
sadly  demoralized,  came  retreating  to  the  Potomac. 
The  War  Department,  and  especially  Stanton  and 
Halleck,  became  greatly  alarmed.  On  the  30th  of 
August,  in  the  midst  of  these  disasters  and  before  the 
result  had  reached  us,  though  most  damaging  informa- 
tion in  regard  to  McClellan,  who  lingered  at  Alexan- 
dria, was  current,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Mr. 
Chase,  called  upon  me  with  a  protest,  signed  by  him- 
self and  Stanton,  denouncing  the  conduct  of  McClellan 
and  demanding  his  immediate  dismissal.  Two  other 
members  were  ready  to  append  their  names  after  mine. 
I  declined  to  sign  the  paper,  which  was  in  the  hand- 
writing of  Stanton,  not  that  I  did  not  disapprove  of 
the  course  of  the  general,  but  because  the  combination 
was  improper  and  disrespectful  to  the  President,  who 
hai-fifilected  his .  Cabinet  to  consult  and  advise  with, 


not   to   conspire   against  him;  besides,   some   of  the 

charges  or  allusions  in  the  paper  I  knew  nothing  of, 

_  _  _ 


194  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWAKD. 

and  I  had  doubted  the  wisdom  of  recalling  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  from  Richmond,  therein  differing  from 
Chase  and  Stanton.  The  object  in  bringing  that  army 
back  to  Washington  in  order  to  start  anew,  march 
overland,  and  regain  the  abandoned  position,  I  did  not 
understand  unless  it  was  to  get  rid  of  McClellan ;  and 
if  that  was  the  object,  it  would  have  been  much  better 
to  place  another  general  at  the  head  of  the  army  while 
it  was  yet  on  the  James.  But  a  majority  of  the  Qabi 
inet  finally  united  in  this  proceeding.  On  Monday, 
the  1st  of  September,  the  paper,  somewhat  modified 
and  signed  by  four  of  the  Cabinet  officers,  was  brought 
me.  Mr.  Seward  was  at  the  time  absent  from  "Wash- 
ington— I  never  doubted  purposely  absent — and  not 
of  the  number.  My  refusal  and  perhaps  my  remarks 
prevented  the  matter  from  proceeding  further.  The 
indignation  against  McClellan  was  at  the  time  intense 
in  AYashington  and  the  country.  The  President  never 
knew  of  this  paper,  but  was  not  unaware  of  the  popular 
feeling  against  that  ofiicer  in  which  he  sympathized, 
^nd  of  the  sentiments  of  the  members  of  the  ^abinet, 
aggravated  by  the  hostility  and  strong,  if  not  exagger- 
ated rumors  sent  out  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  Both 
Stanton  and  Halleck  were,  however,  filled  with  appre- 
hensions beyond  others,  as  the  army  of  stragglers  and 
broken  battalions  on  the  last  of  August  and  first  of 
September  came  rusliing  toward  Washington. 

At  the  stated  Cabinet  meetingjon  Tuesday,  the  2d 
of  September,  while  the  whole  community  was  stirred 
up  and  in  confusion,  and  affairs  were  gloomy  beyond 
anything  that  had  previously  occurred,  Stanton  enter- 
ed the  council-room  a  few  moments  in  advance  of  Mr. 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  195 

Lincoln  and  said,  with  great  excitement,  he  had  just 
learned  from  General  Halleck  that  the  President  had 
placed  McClellan  in  command  of  the  forces  in  Wash- 
ington. The  information  was  surprising,  and,  in  view 
of  the  prevailing  excitement  against  that  officer,  alarm- 
ing. The  President  soon  came  in,  and  in  answer  to 
an  inquiry  from  Mr.  Chase,  confirmed  what  Stanton 
had  stated.  General  regret  was  expressed,  and  Stan- 
ton with  some  feeling  remarked,  that  no  order  to  that 
efi'eot  had  issued  from  the  War  Department.  The 
President,  calmly  but  with  some  emphasis,  said  the 
order  was  his,  and  he  would  be  responsible  for  it  to 
the  country.  With  a  retreating  and  demoralized  army 
tumbling  in  upon  us,  and  alarm  and  panic  in  the  com- 
munity, it  was  necessary,  the  President  said,  that 
something  should  be  done,  but  there  seemed  to  be  no 
one  to  do  it.  He  therefore  had  directed  McClellan, 
who  knew  this  whole  ground,  who  was  the  best  organ- 
izer in  the  army,  whose  faculty  was  to  organize  and 
defend,  and  who  w^ould  here  act  upon  the  defensive, 
to  take  this  defeated  and  shattered  army  and  reorgan- 
ize it.  He  knew  full  w^ell  the  infirmities  of  McClellan, 
who  was  not  an  afiirmative  man ;  was  worth  little  for 
an  onward  movement ;  but  beyond  any  other  officer 
lie  had  the  confidence  of  the  army,  and  he  could  more 
efficiently  and  speedily  reorganize  it  and  put  it  in  con- 
dition than  any  other  general.  If  the  Secretary  of 
War,  or  any  member  of  the  Cabinet,  would  name  a 
general  that  could  do  this  as  promptly  and  wxll,  he 
would  appoint  him.  For  an  active  fighting  general 
he  was  sorry  to  say  McClellan  was  a  failure ;  he  had 
<*  the  slows"  ;  was  never  ready  for  battle,  and  probably 


196  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

never  \Vbnld  be  ;  but  for  this  exigency,  when  organi- 
zation and  defence  were  needed,  he  considered  hira 
the  best  man  for  the  service,  and  the  countrj  must 
have  the  benefits  of  his  talents  though  he  had  behaved 
badly.  The  President  said  he  had  seen  and  given  his 
opinion  to  General  Halleck,  who  was  still  General-in 
Chief;  but  Halleck  had  no  plan  or  views  of  his  own, 
proposed  to  do  nothing  himself,  and  fully  approved 
his  calling  upon  McClellan. 

In  stating  what  he  had  done  the  President  was  de- 
liberate, but  firm  and  decisive.  His  language  and 
manner  were  kind  and  affectionate,  especially  toward 
two  of  the  members  who  were  greatly  disturbed ;  but 
every  person  present  felt  that  he  was  truly  the  chief, 
and  every  one  knew  his  decision,  though  mildly  express- 
ed was  as  fixed  and  unalterable  as  if  given  out  with 
the  imperious  command  and  determined  will  of  An- 
drew Jackson.  A  long  discussion  followed,  closing 
with  acquiescence  in  the  decision  of  the  President, 
but  before  separating  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
expressed  his  apprehension  that  the  reinstatement  of 
McClellan  would  prove  a  national  calamity. 

In  this  instance  the  President,  unaided  by  others, 
put  forth  with  firmness  and  determination  the  execu- 
tive will — the  one-man  power — against  the  temporary 
general  sense  of  the  community  as  well  as  of  his 
Qabiiiet ;  two  of  whom  it  has  been  generally  supposed 
had  with  him  an  influence  almost  as  great  as  the  Sec- 
retaiy  of  State.  They  had  been  ready  to  make  issue, 
and  resign  their  places  unless  McClellan  was  dismiss- 
ed ;  but  yet  knowing  their  opposition,  and  in  spite  of 
it  and  of  the  general  dissatisfaction  in  the  community, 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  197 

the  President  had  in  that  perilous  moment  exalted 
him  to  new  and  important  trusts.  In  an  interview 
with  the  President  on  the  succeeding  Friday,  when 
onlj  he  and  myself  were  present,  he  unburthened  his 
mind  freely.  Military  matters  were  still  in  confusion, 
without  plan  or  purpose  at  headquarters.  The  Secre- 
tary of  War,  under  Pope's  defeat  and  McClellan's  re- 
instatement, was  not  only  disappointed,  but  dejected 
and  dispirited.  The  President  said  most  of  our  troub- 
les grew  out  of  military  jealousies.  Whether  chang- 
ing the  plan  of  operations  (discarding  McClellan  and 
placing  Pope  in  command  in  front)  was  w^ise  or  not, 
was  not  now  the  matter  in  hand.  These  things,  right 
or  wrong,  had  been  done.  If  the  administration  had 
erred,  the  country  should  not  have  been  made  to  suf- 
fer nor  our  brave  men  been  cut  dowm  and  butchered. 
Pope  should  have  been  sustained,  but  he  was  not. 
These  personal  and  professional  quarrels  came  in. 
Whatever  may  have  been  said  to  the  contrary,  it  could 
not  be  denied  that  the  army  w^as  wdth  McClellan.  He 
had  so  skilfully  handled  his  troops  in  not  getting  to 
Kichmond  as  to  retain  their  confidence.  The  soldiers 
certainly  had  not  transferred  their  confidence  to  Pope. 
He  could,  however,  do  no  more  good  in  this  quarter. 
It  was  humiliating,  after  what  had  transpired  and  all 
w^eknew,  to  reward  McClellan  and  those  w^ho  failed  to 
do  their  whole  duty  in  the  hour  of  trial,  but  so  it 
was.  Personal  considerations  must  be  sacrificed 
for  the  public  good.  He  had  kept  aloof  from  the 
dissensions  that  prevailed,  and  intended  to;  "but,'* 
said  he,  "  I  must  have  McClellan  to  reorganize  the 
army  and  bring  it  out  of  chaos.     There  has  been  a  de- 


198  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWARD. 

sign,  a  purpose  in  breaking  down  Pope,  without  re- 
gard to  the  consequences  to  the  country  that  is  atro- 
cious. It  is  shocking  to  see  and  know  this,  but  there 
is  no  remedy  at  present.  McClellan  has  the  army 
with  him."  These  were  the  views  and  this  the  course 
of  the  President  when  there  was  general  dismay  in  the 
country  and  confusion  in  the  army  ;  the  rebels  near  the 
intrenchments  of '/-Washington,  and  some  of  the  Cab- 
inet alarmed  and  preparing  to  leave.  The  President 
was  not  insensible  to  the  deficiencies  or  ignorant  of  the 
faults  of  McClellan,  nor  yet  blind  to,  and  stubborn  as 
regarded-  his  better  qualities.  In  placing  him  at  the 
head  of  the  army  he  went  counter  to  the  wishes  of  his 
friends,  and  forgetful  of  all  else  he  subdued  every  per- 
sonal feeling,  and  in  the  spirit  of  unselfish  patriotism 
resolved  to  do  what  was  for  the  true  interest  of  the 
country.  Had  the  general  followed  up  the  battle  of 
Antietam,  which  took  place  a  fortnight  later,  he  would 
have  retrieved  the  misfortunes  of  the  peninsula  and 
given  the  President  additional  reason  to  congratulate 
himself  on  the  reinstatement ;  but  the  old  dilatory  in- 
firmity remained,  which  strengthened  the  influence 
that  persistently  opposed  him,  and  soon  after  led  to  his 
being  retired  from  the  command  of  the  army. 


The  President  was  a  much  more  shrewd  and 
accurate  observer  of  the  characteristics  of  men — better 
and  more  correctl}'  formed  an  estimate  of  their  power 
and  capabilities — than  the  Secretary  of  State  or  most 
others.  Those  in  the  public  service  he  closely  scanned, 
but  was  deliberate  in  forming  a  conclusion  adverse  to 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  199 

any  one  he  had  appointed.  In  giving  or  withdrawing 
confidence  he  was  discriminating  and  just  in  his  final 
decision ;  careful  never  to  wound  unnecessarily  the 
sensibilities  of  any  for  their  infirmities,  always  ready 
to  praise,  but  nevertheless  firm  and  resolute  in  dis- 
charging the  to  him,  always  painful  dutj^  of  censure, 
reproof,  or  dismissal. 

Dupont  he  classed  in  the  naval  service  with 
McClellan  in  the  military.  Both  were  intelligent, 
accomplished,  and  valuable  officers  in  their  way,  but 
neither  was  the  man  for  fierce  encounter  and  desperate 
fighting.  The  two  until  tried  had  his  support  and  all 
the  confidence  to  which  they  were  entitled,  or  which 
either  had  reason  to  expect.  If  the  results  at  Port 
Eoyal  were  not  followed  up  with  the  energy  and  vigor 
anticipated,  the  fault  was,  he  justly  considered,  as 
much  with  the  military  as  with  the  navy.  But  in  the 
autumn  of  1862  and  winter  of  1863  extensive  prepa- 
rations were  made  for  retaking  Fort  Sumter  and  the 
capture  of  Charleston.  Dupont  visited  Washington 
in  the  autumn,  and  had  consulted  on  the  subject,  but 
would  listen  to  no  suggestion  that  any  other  officer 
should  be  detailed  for  that  especial  service,  which  he 
claimed  as  a  right  and  as  within  the  limits  of  his 
blockade.  Extraordinary  effijrts  were  accordingly 
made  bj  the  Navy  Department,  which  gave  hira  a 
large  portion  of  the  best  officers  and  vessels  in  the 
service  that  he  might  be  successful.  But  time  wore  on, 
w^ith  no  more  eftective  demonstration  than  had  been 
made  by  the  army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  York 
peninsula.  Dupont,  like  McClellan,  was  constantly 
asking  for  more  reinforcements,  and  the  Nav}^  Depart- 


200  MR.   LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWARD. 

ment  strained  every  nerve  to  aid  Lim,  and  often 
answered  his  requisitions  at  the  expense  of  other 
squadrons. 

Tlie  President,  as  well  as  the  whole  country,  felt 
greatly  interested  in  this  subject ;  not  that  Charleston 
was  of  any  great  strategic  importance,  but  it  was  the 
hot-bed  of  secession,  and  there  the  rebellion  had  its  ori- 
gin. It  was  winter  or  early  spring,  and  nothing  had 
been  accomplished,  when  the  President  one  day 
said  to  me  he  had  but  slight  expectation  that  we 
should  have  any  great  success  from  Dupont.  "  He, 
as  well  as  McClellan,"  said  Mr.  Lincoln,  "  hesitates — 
has  *  the  slows.'  McClellan  always  wanted  more  regi- 
ments; Dupont  is  everlastingly  asking  for  Tnore  gun- 
boats— more  iron-clads.  He  will  do  nothincr  with  an  v. 
He  has  intelligence  and  system,  and  will  maintain  a 
good  blockade.  You  did  well  in  selecting  him  for 
that  command,  but  he  will  never  take  Sumter  or  get 
to  Charleston.  He  is  no  Farragut,  though  unquestion- 
ably a  good  routine  officer,  who  obeys  orders  and  in  a 
general  way  carries  out  his  instructions."  A  few 
weeks  served  to  verify  all  that  the  President  had  said 
on  the  subject.  Dupont  died  without  planting  the 
flag  on  Sumter  or  visiting  Charleston. 


The  views,  theories  and  policy  of  Mr.  Seward  so 
far  as  he  had  a  policy  in  relation  to  secession,  were  at 
the  heginning  different  from  the  purposes  and  inten- 
tions of  the  President  and  his  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet 
Through  the  winter  of  1861  he  possessed  extraordi- 
nary opportunities  to  infurm  himself  of  the  schemes 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MK.    SEWAKD.  201 

and  intrigues  of  the  secessionists,  and  also  the  opera- 
tions and  designs  of  the  Buchanan  Administration  as 
well  as  of  the  Republicans.     In  the  Senate  he  had  free 
intercourse  with  all  parties,  and  the  fact,  well  under- 
stood, that  he  was  to  receive  the  first  appointment  in 
Mr.  Lincoln's^Cabin^t  gave  to  his  opinions  weight  and 
influence.     Leading  men  of  opposing  factions  courted 
and  consulted  him,  for  many,  like  Mr.  Adams,  under- 
estimated the  capacity  and  qualities  of  Mr.  Lincoln, 
and  assumed  that  the  future  Secretary  of  State  would 
be  the  guiding  spirit  of  the  incoming  administration. 
It  is  now  well-known  that  Mr.  Stanton,  at  that  time  a 
member  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet  was  impressed 
with  this  beliei  and  secretly  confided  to  Mr.  Seward 
the  consultations  and  purposes  of  that  administration. 
General  Scott  also,  an  old  courtier  as  well  as  soldier, 
.  turned  to  the  rising  sun  and  in  deference  to  the  new  pro- 
jected policy,  abandoned  his  original  and  sensible  pa- 
triotic advice  to  Mr.  Buchanan  to  garrison  the  southern 
forts  and  prepare  the  government  for  the  threatened  out- 
break.   Neither  Mr.  Lincoln  nor  any  of  his  Cabinet  ex- 
cept Mr.  Seward,  was  aware  of  the  schemes  wliicli  had 
been  maturing  for  a  few  months  preceding  the  inaugu- 
ration.    Mr.  Seward,  with  whom  many  of  the  southern 
leaders  held  intercourse,  was  gratified  with  the  atten- 
tion shown  him,  and,  having  really  no  settled  convic- 
tions was  kindly  conciliatory  and  made  concessions  and 
promises  which  he  found  it  difiicult  to  carry  fully  into 
efiect.     In   his   speech   of  the   12th  of   January  he 
expressed  his  intention  "  to  meet  exaction  with  conces- 
sion," and  his  readiness  to  change  the  Constitution  to 
get  over   difficulties.     It  has  also  been  claimed  and 
9* 


202  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   ME.    SEWARD. 

never  denied,  while  facts  go  far  to  confirm  the  state- 
ment, that  he  had  an  understanding  with  the  secession- 
ists to  the  effect  that  Sumter  and  other  forts  in  the 
seceding  states  should  be  surrendered.  In  such  a 
purpose  he  entertained  no  intention  of  permanent 
disunion,  but  there  are  many  circumstances  which 
indicate  that  he  contemplated  temporary  separation, 
and  a  reunion  by  a  national  convention  to  revise  the 
constitution,  and  among  other  things  give  new  guaran- 
ties to  the  slave-holding  states.  A  new  faith  in 
expedients  such  as  in  the  absence  of  principle  had 
been  resorted  to  by  the  Albany  lobby  and  made  suc- 
cessful in  great  emergencies. 

On  the  10th  of  April,  two  days  after  sending  to 
Judge  Campbell  "Faith  as  regards  Sumter — wait 
and  see,"  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Adams :  ''  Only  an  imperial 
or  despotic  government  would  subjugate  thoroughly 
disaffected  and  insurrectionary  members  of  the  state. 
This  federal  republican  system  of  ours  is,  of  all  forms 
of  government,  the  very  one  which  is  most  unfitted 
for  such  a  labor.  Happily  however,  this  is  only  an 
imaginary  defect.  The  system  has,  within  itself  ade- 
quate peaceful,  conservative  and  recuperative  forces. 
Firmness  on  the  part  of  the  government  in  maintain- 
ing and  preserving  the  public  institutions  and  property, 
and  in  executing  the  laws  where  authority  can  'be  exer- 
cised  without  waging  war,  combined  with  such  meas- 
ures of  justice,  moderation,  and  forbearance  as  will 
disarm  reasoning  opposition,  will  be  sufficient  to  secure 
the  public  safety  until  returning  reflection,  concurring 
with  the  fearful  experience  of  social  evils,  the  inevi- 
table fruits  of  faction,  shall  hring  the  recusant  mem- 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  203 

hers  cheerfully  hack  into  the  family^  which,  after  all, 
must  prove  their  best  and  happiest,  as  it  undeniably 
is  their  most  natural  home.  The  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  provides  for  that  return  by  authorizing 
Congress,  on  application  to  be  made  by  a  certain 
majority  of  the  States,  to  assemhl-e  a  National  Conven- 
tion, in  which  the  organic  law  can,  if  it  he  needful^  he 
revised  so  as  to  remove  all  real  obstacles  to  a  reunion 
so  suitable  to  the  habits  of  the  people,  and  so  eminently 
conducive  to  the  common  safety  and  welfare." 

This  was  the  scheme,  or  policy  if  it  may  be  so  call- 
ed, of  Mr.  Seward  and  his  conferees  at  the  begin- 
ning, but  it  was  not  the  policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  The 
letter  to  Mr.  Adams  was  prepared,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, at  the  very  time  when  the  squadron  to  relieve 
Fort  Sumter  was  rendered  abortive,  by  his  detaching 
the  Powhatan,  the  flag-ship  from  the  expedition.  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  not  a  party  to  the  arrangements.  They 
were  concerted  and  employed  to  defeat  his  efforts  to 
use  the  power  of  the  government  to  check  and  break 
down  the  early  movements  of  the  rebels.  The  nation- 
al forces  and  authority  were  ejected  from  the  forts  in 
South  Carolina  and  Geogia.  The  "  way  ward  sisters 
were  to  go  in  peace,"  and  be  brought  back  by  a  Kational 
Convention,  "  in  which  the  organic  law  can  be  revised, 
so  as  to  remove  all  real  obstacles  to  a  reunion^ 

Without  discussing  the  soundness  of  the  policy  in- 
dicated in  this  letter  to  Mr.  Adams  and  the  facts  which 
accord  with  that  policy,  it  is  sufficient  to  state,  and 
subsequent  events  demonstrate,  that  it  was  not  the 
policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  the  administration.  In  its 
details  the  course  proposed  by  Mr.  Seward  conformed  to 


204  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MK.    SEWARD. 

the  policy  of  Buclianan  and  Black,  that  a  state  could 
not  be  coerced — the  union  was  to  be  dismembered  and 
reunited  by  a  new,  or  revised  constitution.  In  these 
proceedings,  Mr.  Seward  perplexed,  confused  and  em- 
barrassed, but  did  not  direct  affairs  of  the  administra- 
tion. 


The  distinctive  measure  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  Adminis- 
tration, beyond  all  others,  that  which  makes  it  an  era 
in  our  national  history,  is  the  decree  of  Emancipation. 
This  movement,  almost  revolutionary,  was  a  step  not 
anticipated  by  him  when  elected,  and  which  neither 
he  nor  any  of  his  Cabinet  was  prepared  for,  or  would 
have  assented  to  when  they  entered  upon  their  duties. 
He  and  they  had,  regardless  of  party  discipline,  resist- 
ed the  schemes  for  the  extension  of  slavery  into  free 
territory  under  the  sanction  of  federal  authority.  All 
of  them,  though  of  different  parties,  were  and  ever 
had  been  opposed  to  slavery,  but  not  one  of  them  fa- 
vored any  interference  with  it  by  the  National  Gov- 
ernment in  the  states  where  it  was  established  or  per- 
mitted. The  assumption,  after  the  acquisition  of  ter- 
ritory from  Mexico,  that  slavery  was  a  national  and 
not  a  local  institution  had  opened  a  new  controversy 
in  American  politics,  which  contributed  to  the  disin- 
tegration of  old  party  organizations,  each  of  which  be- 
came in  a  measure  sectional.  The  dissenting  elements 
resisted  the  centralizing  claim  that  slavery  was  national, 
not  local ;  and  ultimately,  after  a  struggle  of  several 
years,  they  threw  off  old  party  allegiance  and  com- 
bined under  a  new  organization,  thenceforward  known 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  205 

as  Kepublican.  In  the  first  stages  of  this  movement 
neither  Mr.  Lincoln  nor  Mr.  Seward  participated. 
Both  of  them  had  sympathized  with  what  was  known 
as  the  Free-soil  party  in  1848,  but  declined  to  become 
identified  with  it.  They  were  politicians,  and  not 
then  prepared  to  abandon  the  organization  with  which 
they  had  previously  acted.  Mr.  Lincoln,  with  the  free 
thought  and  independence  of  the  men  of  the  West, 
less  trained  and  bound  to  party  than  the  disciplined 
politicians  in  the  old  states,  holding  no  official  position, 
a  quiet  but  observing  and  reflecting  citizen  ;  truthful, 
honest,  faithful  to  his  convictions,  and  with  the  men- 
tal strength  and  courage  to  avow  and  maintain  them, 
early  appreciated  the  important  principles  involved  in 
this  rising  question,  and  boldly  cast  off  the  shackles 
of  party  in  defence  of  the  right,  and  earnestly,  irre- 
spective of  any  and  all  parties,  opposed  the  extension 
and  aggressions  of  slavery.  Mr,  Seward  was  in  those 
d'dys  in  office,  trammelled  by  party  followers  and  party 
surroundings.  Trained  during  his  whole  public  career 
in  the  severest  discipline  of  party,  indebted  to  it  for 
his  high  position,  always  subservient  to  its  decrees  and 
requirements,  active  and  exacting  in  enforcing  its  ob- 
ligations, he  had  not  the  independence  and  moral 
stamina  to  free  himself  from  the  restraints  and  despot- 
ism of  party,  whatever  were  his  sympathies,  until  the 
Whig  organization  disbanded.  The  people  of  the 
West,  w^ho  knew  Mr.  Lincoln  and  appreciated  his  ca- 
pabilities, tried  in  1856  to  place  him  on  the  ticket  with 
Fremont  as  a  candidate  for  Vice-President.  Although 
Init  slightly  known  in  the  East,  such  was  the  zeal  and 
enthusiasm  in  his  favor  of  those  who  knew  him,  that 


206  MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD. 

nothing  but  the  expediency  of  selecting  an  Eastern 
man  to  be  associated  with  Fremont,  who  was  from  the 
West,  prevented  his  nomination  instead  of  Daj^ton. 
From  the  start  he  was  a  prominent  Kepublican  cham- 
pion and  leader,  while  Mr.  Seward,  a  partisan  politi- 
cian, held  off;  was  reluctant  to  leave  the  party  with 
which  he  had  been  associated,  hoping  to  make  the  new 
movement  subservient  to,  or  a  part  of  the  Whig  party. 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  no  such  purpose ;  the  principles  in- 
volved were  with  him  above  mere  party.  With  np 
fortune,  nnaided  by  metropolitan  funds  or  pecuniary 
assistance  from  any  quarter,  he  gave  his  time  and 
mind  with  unstinted  devotion  to  the  cause  of  freedom 
and  in  his  memorable  campaign  with  Douglass,  alone 
and  unassisted,  he,  through  the  empire  State  of  the 
West,  met  the  Senatorial  giant  on  the  questions  of  the 
extension  of  slavery,  the  rights  of  the  states,  the  grants 
to  and  limitation  of  the  powers  of  the  general  gov- 
ernment, and  displayed  ability  and  power  w^hich  won 
the  applause  of  the  country,  and  drew  from  Douglass 
himself  expressions  of  profound  respect. 

When  the  Kepublicans,  in  convention  at  Chicago, 
chose  their  standard-bearer,  they  wisely  and  properly 
selected  as  their  representative,  the  sincere  and  able 
man  who  had  no  great  money-power  in  his  interest,  no 
disciplined  lobby,  no  host  of  party  followers,  but  who, 
like  David,  confided  in  the  justice  of  his  cause  and 
with  the  simple  weapons  of  truth  and  right,  met  the 
Goliath  of  slavery  aggression,  before  assembled  multi- 
tudes,, in  many  a  well-contested  debate.  The  popular 
voice  was  not  in  error,  or  its  confidence  misplaced, 
when  it  selected  and  elected  Lincoln. 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    ME.    SEWARD.  207 

After  his  election,  and  after  the  war  commenced, 
events   forced    npon   him    the    emancipation   of  the 
slaves  in  the  rebellious  states.     It  was  his  own  act, 
a  bold  step,  an  executive  measure  originating  with  him, 
and  was,  as  stated  in  the  memorable  appeal  at  the 
close  of  the   final  Proclamation,  invoking  for  it  the 
considerate  judgment  of  mankind,  warranted  alone  by 
military  necessity.     He  and  the  Cabin  etwere  aware 
that  the  measure  involved  high  and  fearful  responsi- 
bility, for  it  would  alarm  the  timid  everywhere,  and 
alienate,  at  least  for  a  time,  the  bold  in  the  border 
states  who  clung  to  the  Union.     The  act  itself  could 
not  have  been  justified  or  excused,  and  would  never 
have  been  attempted,  had  the  country  been  at  peace ; 
yet   the    movement    seemed   aggravated    and   more 
hazardous  from  the  fact  that  the  Union  was  weakened 
and  imperilled  by  civil  war.    Results  have  proved  that 
there  was  in  the  measure  profound  thought,  statesman- 
ship,  courage,  and   far-seeing   sagacity — consummate 
executive  and  administrative  ability,  which  was,  after 
some  reverses,  crowned   with   success.     The  nation, 
emerging  from  gloom   and   disaster,   and  the  whole 
civilized  world,  united  in  awarding  honor  and  gratitude 
to  the  illustrious  man  who  had  the  mind  to  conceive 
and  the  courage  and  firmness  to  decree  the  emancipa- 
tion of  a  race.     Ten  years  after  this  event,  when  the 
patriot  and  philanthropist  who  decreed  emancipation 
had  been  years  in  his  grave,  an  attempt  is  made  on  a 
solemn  occasion  to  award  to  one  of  his  subordinates 
the  honor  and  credit  which  justly  belong  to  the  great 
chief  who    decreed     it.      The    Albany    ''Memorial 
Address"    dwells   on    public    measures,   particularly 


208  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

during  the  war,  but  makes  no  allusion  to  this  great  act 
of  Lincoln,  nor  to  his  merits  in  the  cause  of  freedom, 
for  which  he  labored  and  in  which  he  died,  but  de- 
clares that  his  Secretary  of  State,  a  life-long  partisan 
politician,  was  always  opposed  to  slavery,  and  that  he 
"  directed  affairs  for  the  benefit  of  the  nation,  through 
the  name  of  another."  It  is  unnecessary,  after  what  has 
already  been  said,  to  comment  on  this  assumed  direc- 
tion by  a  subordinate  instead  of  the  chief,  or  on  the 
gross  injustice  to  Mr.  Lincoln  ;  but  it  should  be  known 
that  the  Secretary  of  State  neither  originated  nor 
directed  the  affairs  of  the  government  on  the  great 
measure  of  emancipation.  Mr.  Seward  was  undoubt- 
edly opposed  to  slavery,  and  so  was  every  member  of 
the  administration,  but  his  opposition  nev^er  led  him 
to  propose  any  measure  of  relief  to  the  country,  or  to 
take  any  steps  against  slavery  which  would  be  likely 
to  impair  the  Whig  party  or  the  Whig  organization 
while  it  existed.  'No  specific  act  of  his — no  measure 
or  distinct  proposition  to  emancipate  the  slaves  at  any 
time — is  mentioned,  for  there  was  none.  In  the 
administration  of  the  government  he  took  no  advance 
step  on  the  slavery  question.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  the 
pioneer  and  responsible  author,  while  the  Secretary 
of  State  studiously  avoided  any  expression  of  opinion 
in  regard  to  it.  The  Secretaries  of  War  and  'Navj 
were  compelled  to  act  in  relation  to  fugitives  from 
slavery  who  sought  protection  under  the  Union  flag — 
an  anomalous  question — but  they  could  obtain  no 
counsel  or  advice  from  the  Secretary  of  State  how  to 
act.  He  not  Duly  avoided  giving  an  opinion,  but 
recommended  that  the  administration  should  abstain 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  209 

from  any   decisive   stand   on   that   controverted   and 
embarrassing  subject. 

The  President,  who  is  represented  as  incompetent 
for  his   position,  and  whose  mind  in  1861,  it  is  said, 
*'had  not  even  opened  to  the  crisis,"  was  rehictant  to 
meddle   with   this   disturbing    element.     Yet   earlier 
than  others  he  rightly  appreciated  what  the  govern- 
ment  would  have  to  encounter,  and  was  convinced 
it  must  be  taken  in  hand  and  disposed  of.     The  mag- 
nitude of  the  rebellion,  and  the  nature  of  the  contest, 
compelled  him,  after  the  civil  war  had  been  carried  on 
for  twelve  months,  to  grapple  with  this  formidable 
subject.      His   first   movement,  in  March   1862,   was 
cautious  and  deliberate,  characterized  by  great  pru- 
dence and  forethought,  and  designed  not  to  alarm  the 
friends  of  the  Union  by  any  harsh  or  offensive  pro- 
ceeding.    It  was  an  ameliorated  plan  for  the  gradual 
abolition  of  slavery  by  action  of  the  states  respectively, 
with  the  cooperation  and   assistance  of  the   general 
government.     This  plan  of  voluntary  and  compensated 
emancipation   was    pressed    upon    Congress  and   the 
border  slave  states,  with  great    earnestness,  by   the 
President.     Mr.  Blair  and  Mr.  Bates,  both  residents 
of  the  border  slave  states,  were  the  only  members  of 
the  Cabinet  who  cordially  seconded  these  first  early 
measures  in  the  cause  of  emancipation.     Their  asso- 
ciates  cheerfully  assented  to  and  acquiesced   in  the 
proposition,   but   had   neither   faith   nor   zeal    in   its 
success ;  nor  did  Mr.  Seward  or  any  one  of  them  sug- 
gest a  different  or  more  available  plan  for  national 
relief.     The   subject  was  beset  on   every  side   with 
difficulty,  requiring  for  its  manipulation  and  disposi- 


c- 


210  MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 

tion  the  highest  order  of  administrative  and  executive 
ability.     No  one  more  than    the  President  was  im- 
pressed with  the  difficulties  to  be  met,  and  at  the  same 
time  with  the  imperative  necessity  of  decisive  action. 
The  details  of  these  proceedings,  and  the  final  deter- 
mined stand  taken  by  him — not  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  or  any  of  the  Cabinet — to  decree  by  an  execu- 
tive order  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  the  rebel- 
lious  states,   have   been    elsewhere    related.     It   was 
after  all   efforts   for^bluntary   emancipation  by   the 
states  interested,  with  pecuniary  aid  from  the  national 
treasury,  had  failed.     To  Mr    Seward  and  myself  the 
President  communicated  his  purpose,  and  asked  our 
views,  on   the  13th  of  July  1862.      It  was  the  day 
succeeding  his  last  unsuccessful   and  hopeless  confer- 
ence with  the  representatives  in  Congress  from  the 
border  slave  states,  at  a  gloomy  period  of  our  affairs, 
just  after  the  reverses  of  our  armies  under  McClellan 
before  Kichmond.     The   time,  he  said,   had  arrived 
when  we  must  determine  whether  the  slave  element 
should  be  for  or  against  us.     Mr.  Seward,  represented 
as  a  superior  in  "  native  intellectual  power,"   and  as 
having  forty  years  previously  chosen  his  side,  and  as 
at  that  early  period  having  claimed  ^'a  right  in  the 
government  to  emancipate  slaves,"  was  appalled  and 
not  prepared  for  this  decisive  step,  when  Mr.  Lincoln 
made  known  to  us  that  he  contemplated  by  an  exec- 
utive order,  to  emancipate  the  slaves.     Startled  with 
so  broad  and  radical   a  proposition,  he  informed  the 
President  that  the  consequences  of  such  an  act  were 
BO  momentous  that  he  was  not  prepared  to  advise  on 
the  subject  without  further  reflection. 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  211 

He  had,  it  will  be  remembered,  only  the  preced- 
ing year,  in  his  carefully  prepared  and  studied  speech 
of  the  12th  of  January  1861,  avowed  a  policy  diametri- 
cally opposed  to  emancipation  by  the  general  govern- 
ment. "  1  am  willing,"  said  he,  on  that  occasion,  *'  to 
vote  for  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  declaring  that 
it  shall  not  by  any  future  amendment  be  so  altered  as  to 
confer  on  Congress  a  power  to  abolish  or  interfere  with 
slavery  in  any  state."  In  addition  to  this  speech  on 
the  floor  of  the  Senate  and  in  corroboration  of  it,  he,  as  a 
member  of  the  Senatorial  committee  of  thirteen,  pro- 
posed the  following  amendment  to  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution :  "  'No  amendment  shall  be  made  to  the  Con- 
stitution, which  will  authorize  or  give  to  Congress  any 
power  to  abolish  or  interfere  in  any  state  with  the  do- 
mestic institutions  thereof,  including  that  of  persons 
held  to  service  or  labor  by  the  laws  of  said  state." 

The  President  aware  of  the  position  taken  by  Mr. 
Seward  and  of  the  embarrassment  which  he  might  feel 
in  acceding  to  a  measure  that  conflicted  with  that  posi- 
tion, stated  he  wished  from  neither  of  us  a  committal, 
but  he  thought  best  to  make  known  to  us,  that  emanci- 
pation appeared  to  him  an  inevitable  necessity. 

While  Mr.  Seward  hesitated,  and  had  the  subject 
under  consideration,  the  President  deliberately  pre- 
pared his  preliminary  proclamation,  which  met  the  ap- 
proval, or  at  least  the  acquiescence,  of  the  whole^CaJj^ 
inet,  thoug^h  there  were  phases  of  opinion  not  entirely 
in  accord  with  the  proceedings.  Mr.  Blair,  an  original 
emancipationist,  and  committed  to  the  principle, 
thought  the  time  to  issue  the  order  inopportune,  and 
Mi\  Bates  desired  that  the  deportation  of  the  colored 


212  MR.    LINCOLN    AHD    MR.    SEWARD. 

race  should  be  coincident  with  emancipation.  Aware 
that  there  were  shades  of  difference  among  his  coun- 
sellors, and  hesitation  and  doubt  with  some,  in  view 
of  the  vast  responsibility  and  its  consequences,  the 
President  devised  his  own  scheme,  held  himself  alone 
accountable  for  the  act,  and,  unaided  and  unassisted, 
prepared  each  of  the  proclamations  of  freedom.  Mr. 
Seward  in  no  way  or  form  originated  or  was  responsi- 
ble for  that  important  measure,  did  not  in  any  way 
*'  direct  affairs  "  in  regard  to  it,  was  in  no  other  way 
cognizant  of  it  beyond  his  colleagues,  except  as  com- 
municated to  him  and  myself  on  the  13th  of  July,  at 
its  inception.  Yet  in  the '' Memorial  Address,"  Mr. 
Seward  is  represented  as  the  life-long  opponent  of  sla- 
very, beyond  others  the  master  spirit  in  the  Lincoln 
Administration.  The  President  and  this  great  event 
are  ignored,  and  the  inference  is  intended  to  be  con- 
veyed, that  the  Secretary  of  State  who  "  chose  his  side" 
in  the  morning  of  life  adverse  to  slavery,  is  entitled  to 
the  credit ;  for  it  is  represented  that  the  President  was 
a  mere  secondary  personage,  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  directed  affairs  in  the  name  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  who 
was  to  "  reap  the  honors  due  chiefly  to  Mr.  Seward's 
labors." 

To  unfold  the  leaves  of  suppressed  history,  and 
correct  the  errors  and  perversions  which  interested — 
and  many  of  them  still  living — persons  have  spread 
abroad  and  inculcated,  is  a  thankless  task,  and  will 
subject  him  who  performs  it  to  partisan  abuse.  It  is 
scarcely  to  be  expected  that  the  present  generation 
will  know  or  be  able  to  appreciate  the  labors  and  acts 
of  those   who,  intrusted    with  the  government  in  a 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD.  213 

trying  period,  took  upon  themselves  immense  and 
unprecedented  responsibilities,  or  that  a  rightful  dis- 
crimination will -at  this  early  day,  if  ever,  be  made  as 
regards  those  who  in  the  quiet  of  civil  official  life  par- 
ticipated in  the  movements  which  eventuated  in  the 
salvation  of  the  Union  and  the  emancipation  of  a  race. 
The  late  labored  effort  of  the  distinguished  gentleman 
of  an  historic  family  and  name  to  depreciate  the 
talents  and  services  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  and  to  crown 
another  with  honors  that  justly  belong  to  him,  is  a 
specimen  of  lamentable  partisan  prejudice  and  error. 
It  is  but  one,  and  perhaps  the  last  of  many  attempts 
of  a  similar  character,  to  take  from  the  brow  of  Lincoln 
the  wreath  of  merit  that  is  justly  his — to  deprive  him 
of  the  reward  due  for  his  labor,  and  give  to  another 
credit  for  his  acts.  It  is  not  the  first  time  in  our 
history  when  like  injustice  has  been  witnessed  toward 
our  Chief  Magistrates.  Volumes  have  been  written 
to  prove  that  Hamilton  controlled  Washington  and 
directed  the  afi'airs  of  the  nation  in  the  name  of  his 
chief.  Yan  Buren,  it  was  claimed,  controlled  the 
imperious  will  of  Jackson  and  dictated  his  measures. 
Undoubtedly  each  had  influence  with  his  chief, 
perhaps  more  than  he  deserved.  The  same  may  be 
said  of  Mr.  Seward,  who  had  undeniably  influence 
with  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  who  was  no  more  the  directing 
mind  of  the  Administration  of  Lincoln,  but  really  much 
less,  than  was  Hamilton  of  Washington  or  Yan  Buren 
of  Jackson.  '  Both  Hamilton  and  Seward  are  charged 
with  having  given  countenance  to  this  false  impression, 
which,  however,  redounds  to  the  credit  of  neither. 
In  these  pages  written  to  correct  the  misconcep- 


214 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND    MR.    SEWARD. 


tions  of  Mr.  Adams,  and  the  misrepresentations  of  the 
Albany  ''  Memorial  Address,"  incidents  of  what  oc- 
curred would,  I  thought,  better  than  mere  contra- 
dictory assertions,  illustrate  the  acts,  the  executive 
management  and  administrative  ability,  as  well  as  the 
capacity  and  mental  energy  of  the  men  whose  traits 
are  involved  in  the  statements  which  have  been  made. 

Of  the  incidents  that  took  place  during  the  admin- 
istration of  Mr.  Lincoln,  some  of  which  and  the  attend- 
ing circumstances  could  not  have  been  disclosed  at  the 
time  of  their  occurrence,  there  are  in  most  cases  living 
witnesses.  The  transactions  of  an  earlier  date  are  of 
public  notoriety  and  matters  of  record,  commencing 
with  the  organized  anti-masonic  proscription,  and 
embracing  the  rise  and  fall  of  that  and  subsequent 
parties,  down  to,  and  including  the  much  misrepre- 
sented proceedings  of  the  Chicago  Convention  in 
1860. 

It  has  been  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  magnify  or ' 
overstate  the  qualities,  or  to  give  undue  credit  to  the 
labors  and  abilities  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  still  less  to  do 
injustice  to  Mr.  Seward,  who  is  represented  in  the 
"  Memorial  Address"  as  overshadowing  his  chief. 
Mr.  Lincoln  was  in  many  respects  a  remarkable, 
though  I  do  not  mean  to  say  an  infallible  man.  ~Eo 
true  delineation  or  photograph  of  his  intellectual 
capacity  and  attributes  has  ever  been  given,  nor  shall 
I  attempt  it.  His  vigorous  and  rugged,  but  compre- 
hensive mind,  his  keen  and  shrewd  sagacity,  his 
intellectual  strength  and  mental  power,  his  genial, 
kindly  temperament — with  charity  for  all  and  malice 
towards  none —  his  sincerity,  unquestioned  honesty  and 


MR.    LINCOLN    AND   MR.    SEWARD.  215 

homely  suavity,  made  him  popular  as  well  as  great. 
Had  he  survived  to  this  day,  the  Albany  "  Memorial 
Address"  would  have  been  of  a  different  character, 
and  its  pages  not  marred  with  paragraphs  which 
reflect  on  his  ability  and  do  injustice  to  his  memory. 


THE  END. 


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